Vulnerability Assessment Software Toolkit (VAST)

Improving U.S. Army Civil Affairs Assessment

A Consideration of Social Power

Lucy A. Whalley, Judith M. Vendrzyk, and George W. Calfas

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Abstract

The U.S. Army has a need to shape the operational environments of its mission, whether they require offensive, defensive, or stability operations. Current Army Civil Affairs doctrine fails to take into account the workings of social power, and thus it limits the Army’s complete understanding of an operational environment. In its mission planning, the Army needs to take into account all aspects of power, not just the visible forms. This work explains the concept of social power and discusses frameworks for implementing its context- and conduct-shaping aspects in operational planning. By incorporating social power analysis into its operational planning, Army Civil Affairs will be able to develop doctrine that will improve its understanding of the operational environment. In turn, the military’s ability to identify centers of gravity for influencing social change will be improved, and the likelihood of unintended consequences occurring from armed interventions will be lessened.
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Preface

This work was performed for the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) under Project BHCF09 (P2# 458305), “Vulnerability Assessment Software Toolkit.”

The work was performed by the Land and Heritage Branch (CNC) and the Environmental Processes Branch (CNE) of the Installations Division (CN), U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (ERDC-CERL). At the time of publication, Dr. Michael J. Hargrave was Chief, CEERD-CNC; Mr. H. Garth Anderson was Chief, CEERD-CNE; and Mr. Donald K. Hicks was Acting Chief, CEERD-CN. The Technical Director was Mr. Kurt Kinnevan for Adaptive and Resilient Installations (CEERD-CZT). The Interim Deputy Director of ERDC-CERL was Ms. Michelle J. Hanson, and the Interim Director was Dr. Kirankumar V. Topudurti.

The Commander of ERDC was COL Bryan S. Green, and the Director was Dr. David Pittman.
1 Introduction

We must break away from the familiar think tanks and perfunctory advice from complacent experts regurgitating thread-worn theories and statistics. Instead, we must bring new fields of knowledge and information that draw upon diverse experiences and data sets. In short, if the Army is truly serious about understanding human interaction and its relationship with warfare then there has to be a concerted effort to reach out to these other fields of study that specialize in humanness in a more hands-on way...the incorporation of fields other than history—psychology, anthropology, sociology, and the like—will open myriad new and insightful doors to ideas about warfare and the human domain. (Herbert 2014, 83).

1.1 Background

The U.S. Army aspires to shape the operational environment, whether through offensive, defensive, or stability operations. When planning and conducting stability operations, the Army focuses on how to engage with, protect, and build the capacity of the civilian population in support of the mission. The Civil Affairs (CA) branch is the Army’s expert in civil-military operations that are at the core of the Army’s approach for promoting stability. When engaged in stability operations, CA appears to have much in common with the development community, which includes international organizations such as the United Nations, government agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, non-governmental organizations such as Partners in Health, and academic researchers who support development practitioners. Both CA and the development community intend to influence social change in ways that are in keeping with the goals of their distinct missions. However, the development community recognizes that social power analysis is essential for understanding the complex and changing environments of interventions, and for anticipating the effects of planned interventions on political, economic, social, and cultural systems. The assessment frameworks presented in current CA doctrine fail to take into account the workings of social power and thus limit understanding of the operational environment.

Social theorists agree that a consideration of the workings of social power is crucial for understanding social systems (e.g., Allen 2016; Boonstra
2016; and Hearn 2012). Although a number of soldiers have offered constructive critiques of the Army’s method of assessing the human domain (e.g., Ducote 2011; Herbert 2014; Hildebrand 2016; Lushenko and Hardy 2016; and Schmidt 2014) and although several of these references cursorily mention issues related to social power, no systematic method has been proposed for incorporating an analysis of power relations into a CA assessment. A systematic method for conducting social power analysis would yield insight into the structure and exercise of power, and it would also reveal the socially constructed asymmetries of hierarchy and inequality associated with differences in ethnicity, race, class, age, and/or gender. These differences can fuel social conflict or inspire collective action for social change.

Scholarly debates on the concept of power have continued since the 1950s, with no agreement on a single concept or theory (Dahl 1957; Haugaard 2002, 2010, 2015). Social power is conceptualized here as that which is present in all social relations, in ongoing processes or interactions. It is systemic or constitutive, e.g., “systematically structuring possibilities for action, or, more strongly as constituting actors and the social world in which they act” (Allen 2016). Thus, our use of the term social power agrees with Boonstra (2016), who argues that social power is exercised by human beings in the process of social interaction, either to reproduce, resist, or transform the structure of power in society, which in turn influences the nature of political, economic, social, and cultural systems. This view takes into account less obvious relations of power that occur behind the scenes or persist in traditions that perpetuate social inequality due to race, class, caste, age, gender, etc. These relations of social power impact the success of military operations, whether they are obvious or hidden. By focusing almost exclusively on visible forms of power (military, political, diplomatic), such as that exercised by armed adversaries or key civilian leaders to the exclusion of less-overtly political manifestations, the Army increases the risk that its interventions will result in unintended and adverse consequences.

To make sense of the operational environment, CA soldiers employ an assessment process by using frameworks comprised of a defined set of operational variables and factors relating to civil considerations. These frameworks are characterized in doctrine as enabling a systems-of-systems approach, both to analysis and to the understanding of the operational environment. This approach informs the U.S. Army in its consideration of
courses of action (COAs) for engagement. Unfortunately, this approach fails to mobilize the theoretical traditions of anthropology, sociology, and other relevant social science disciplines to aid both the identification of various mechanisms of social power and the understanding of how those mechanisms impact the form and dynamics of social systems within the operating environment. Such an understanding will provide insight into how a particular society works and how social change occurs, thereby enabling the U.S. Army to identify entry points for shaping stability.

Military engagement most often takes place in the context of armed conflict, a time period when social change is likely to occur in rapid and complex ways. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1989) argued that war is politics by other means. Even interventions by CA, outside the context of ongoing armed conflict, are conducted in areas of the world that are recovering from the effects of past armed conflict or where armed conflict remains a possibility. Pettit, of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), uses power analysis to understand conflict, noting that “… conflict transforms and reconfigures power relationships…” (Pettit 2013, 30–31). Fundamentally, CA planners and operators need to know how power relations affect and are affected by major disruptions in society, such as disruptions caused by armed conflict or natural or human-induced disasters, in order to shape a pathway to stability.

1.2 Objectives

The objectives of the first phase of research were (1) to determine an approach to the analysis of social systems that is relevant to the mission of CA) and can be justified by social science research, and (2) to avoid the static and disarticulated representation of social systems that is inherent in the current doctrinal approach of CA for assessment of the operational environment.

1.3 Approach

Our approach to this research was to review current doctrine of CA that is related to the assessment of the operational environment in the mission planning stage, and to identify conceptual gaps. We determined that social systems were represented as distinct and unrelated systems by the acronym PMESII-PT (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time). According to CA doctrine, the
impacts of the variables related to the mission (i.e., Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events [ASCOPE]), are evaluated for each system plus the variable of Time included in the concept of PMESII-PT. We discovered that the concept of social power, an important means of analyzing linkages among social systems and monitoring differential outcomes in social interactions, was missing from the approach of CA to assessment of the operational environment. We then surveyed and reviewed the multidisciplinary literature on power to identify the theoretical foundation for an approach to social power analysis that can be applied to CA assessment, to improve understanding of the social dynamics in the operational environment.
2 Civil Affairs Doctrine

Offensive and defensive tasks have long been the focus of military expertise and training. However, stability tasks emerged in 2008 as having equal import in the Army’s repertoire of capabilities with publication of a field manual (FM) 3-07 dedicated to Stability Operations (U.S. Army 2008). Whereas offensive and defensive tasks are designed to defeat enemy forces, stability tasks are intended to shape the social conditions of the environment in which the Army is engaged so as to secure lasting peace. Stability operations are the means by which the Army, in coordination with other instruments of national power, establishes conditions that the local populace can regard as “legitimate, acceptable, and predictable” (U.S. Army 2008, iv). The need to establish conditions for stability may occur before, during, or after hostilities. According to FM 3-07, primary stability tasks include the following: establish civil security and control, restore essential services, and provide support to governance and to economic and infrastructure development. The mission of CA is to mitigate or defeat threats1 and vulnerabilities2 to civilian society and thereby promote stability. The Army acknowledges that effective stability operations require all of the following: (a) an understanding of the sociocultural foundations and dynamics of society that affect instability, (b) a familiarity with the relevant social actors and their agendas that contribute to instability, and (c) a keen sense of the potential consequences of actions intended to promote

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1 FM 3-07 explains “Threats consist of individuals or groups with the capability, intent, and opportunity to harm civilians. Specific threats vary in terms of their dimensions, type, and perpetrators’ objectives. The most important aspect of the threat is the perpetrators’ motivation or strategic logic behind the violence. If the violence is intrinsic to the goals or ideology of the perpetrator (such as cases of sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing, or genocide), the perpetrator may view the civilian population as a threat, and may prove difficult to deter. Similarly, when violence against civilians is intrinsic to a group’s existence, such as a group that survives from forced recruitment and pillage, it can be difficult to deter the perpetrators. When violence is instrumental to a group’s goals, such as some cases of terrorism or a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, perpetrators may attack civilians as a means to achieve some other objective. In such cases, perpetrators may be deterred or persuaded to use other methods. Their motivations may change over time and may overlap” (p. 1-9, par. 1-51).

2 FM 3-07 Stability Operations elaborates on the concept of civilian “vulnerabilities,” which the manual explains “come from many sources, including individual and community factors, environmental factors, and unavailability of services such as healthcare and emergency food distribution. For example, ethnic or sectarian violence may target certain groups within a population, rendering those more vulnerable than others. Civilians near military targets may be more vulnerable to collateral damage, and dislocated civilians who flee their homes may be more vulnerable to disease, starvation, and crime. Some groups may be vulnerable in certain contexts, including women, children, or the elderly, infirm, and disabled. Stability partners can mitigate vulnerabilities in many ways, including assistance and security” (p. 1-9, par. 1-50)
stability, and (d) ownership by the host-nation of the transition to and sustainment of stability.

### 2.1 Assessment doctrine

According to the U.S. Army’s FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations (U.S. Army 2011), “The United States Army Civil Affairs forces are the Department of Defense’s primary force specifically trained and educated to shape foreign political-military environments by working through and with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations.” Further, “the mission of the CA forces is to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range of military options by engaging and influencing the civil populace and authorities through the planning and conducting of Civil Affairs Operations (CAO)” (U.S. Army 2011, 1-1). Core tasks of CA forces include the following: population and resources control (PRC); foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA); civil information management (CIM), national assistance (NA), and support to civil administration (SCA; U.S. Army 2011 – FM 3-57, 1-4). Assessment is integral to the planning process of the U.S. Army and the Joint Forces, which is described at length in doctrine. The doctrine of CA provides the most explicit methodology for planning support for stability operations as well as Army and Joint offensive and defensive operations.

In addition to FM 3-57, there are seven Army Techniques Publications (ATPs) that describe in great detail the duties and processes of CA in executing their core tasks. Due to space constraints here, our description of these duties and processes will provide only a basic overview of the fairly complex process of CA Assessment. Readers desiring greater detail are encouraged to consult the FM and ATPs, which are available online at [http://www.apd.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/FM.aspx](http://www.apd.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/FM.aspx) and [http://www.apd.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/ATP.aspx](http://www.apd.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/ATP.aspx), respectively.

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3 Due to the Army’s pervasive use of acronyms and to facilitate the reader’s understanding, a glossary of acronyms and other military-specific terms is provided in Appendix A to this paper.

4 See ATP 3-57.10 (U.S. Army Aug 2013); ATP 3-57.20 (U.S. Army Feb 2013); ATP-3-57.30 (U.S. Army May 2014a); ATP 3-57.50 (U.S. Army Sep 2013); ATP 3-57.60 (U.S. Army Apr 2014); ATP 3-57.70(U.S. Army May 2014b); and ATP 3-57.80 (U.S. Army Oct 2013).
CA soldiers employ a methodology, prescribed by doctrine, that focuses on “assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning political, economic, social, and cultural institutions” (U.S. Army 2011 – FM 3-57, 4-1). The methodology consists of the following six steps:

1. **Assess.** Assess current conditions in the area of operations against a defined norm or established standards.
2. **Decide.** Decide who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA assets and actions that support the commander’s intent, planning guidance and concept of operations.
3. **Develop and Detect.** Develop rapport and relationships with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including with indigenous populations and institutions [IPI]) and detect those conditions or events that would call for a specific CAO.
4. **Deliver.** Engage the civil component with planned or on-call CAO (i.e., PRC, FHA, CIM), NA, SCA, or Civil Military Operations (CMO), as appropriate.
5. **Evaluate.** Evaluate the results of the mission(s) executed.
6. **Transition.** Transition CAOs or CMOs to follow-on CA units, other military units, host nation (HN) assets, United Nations (UN) organizations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other civilian agencies as appropriate (U.S. Army 2011 – FM 3-57, 4-1).

### 2.2 Types of assessments

Assessment is integral to the planning process of the U.S. Army and the Joint Forces, and it is described at length in doctrine. The doctrine of CA provides the most explicit methodology for planning support for stability operations as well as Army and Joint Forces offensive and defensive operations.

Army CA conducts the following three types of assessment: Initial, Deliberate, and Surveys. Each of these assessments is based on the information and analysis of the previous. In other words, Deliberate Assessments build upon, revise, and update information discovered in the Initial Assessment. Surveys are developed and executed based on specific issues identified as requiring in-depth analysis in the Deliberate Assessment. CA assessments employ established techniques thought to extract “meaningful and significant” information (U.S. Army 2011 – FM 3-57, C, 4-4).
2.2.1 Initial assessments

The objectives of initial assessments are to do the following (U.S. Army 2011 – FM 3-57, 4-5):

- Obtain a rapid overview of the conditions in the area of operations (AO).
- Validate or refute information used during planning.
- Validate or refute assumptions used during planning.
- Determine general areas of perceived civil vulnerabilities.
- Update the CAO running estimate.
- Finalize or modify operations planned before deployment.
- Update CAO priorities.
- Identify key areas for follow-on deliberate assessments.
- Update the CAO information collection plan to provide input to the priority intelligence requirement (PIR) and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).
- Update the area study.
- Identify patterns and indicators.
- Identify requirements for follow-on CA forces.
- Identify requirements for functional specialty support.

2.2.2 Deliberate assessments

The objectives of deliberate assessments are the following (U.S. Army 2011 – FM 3-57, 4-6):

- Update the area study.
- Collect civil information on specific geographic areas (region, city, or town).
- Collect civil information on social, economic, governmental, legal, health, educational, or infrastructure systems.
- Determine specific areas of perceived civil vulnerabilities.
- Provide greater detail on priorities identified during the initial assessment.
- Update the CAO running estimate.
- Update the CAO information collection plan to provide input to the PIR and CCIR.
- Identify key locations for follow-on surveys.
- Identify patterns and indicators.
- Identify key leaders for engagement.
2.2.3 Survey assessment

The objectives of survey assessments are to do the following (U.S. Army 2011 – FM 3-57, 4-6):

- Collect detailed civil information on specific location within a geographic area (e.g., forest, lake, valley, or neighborhood).
- Collect civil information on specific components of social, economic, governmental, legal, health, educational, or infrastructure systems (e.g., religious sect, water treatment plant, hospital, or prison).
- Identify capabilities and capacities, to include shortfalls, of surveyed items.
- Analyze specific areas of perceived civil vulnerabilities.
- Identify patterns and indicators.
- Identify possible project solutions to identified shortfalls and vulnerabilities when appropriate.
- Update requirements for follow-on CA forces.
- Update requirements for functional-specialty support.
- Validate/assess MOE and MOP.
- Identify/verify key leaders.

2.3 Mission variables

Army personnel use mission variables to focus analysis on specific elements of the environment that apply to their mission. Mission variables are those listed below, which are collectively abbreviated as METT-TC and spelled out below (U.S. Army 2011 – FM 3-57, 1-4):

Mission
Enemy
Terrain and weather
Troops and support available
Time available
Civil considerations
Under the civil considerations element of the above mission variables, CA personnel analyze six additional factors, collectively abbreviated as ASCOPE and listed below (U.S. Army 2011 – FM 3-57, 1-5):

Areas
Structures
Capabilities
Organizations
People
Events

ATP 3-57.60 (U.S. Army 2014) defines and further elucidates each of these ASCOPE factors, as summarized in the subsections that follow here.

2.3.1 Areas

Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s OE not normally thought of as militarily significant. However, failure to consider key civil areas can seriously affect the success of any military mission. CAO planners analyze key civil areas from the following two perspectives:

- How do these areas affect the military mission?
- How do military operations affect civilian activities in these areas?

At times, the answers to these two questions may dramatically influence major portions of the COAs under consideration (U.S. Army 2014 – ATP 3-57.60, 4-9, par. 4-41 and 4-42).

2.3.2 Structures

Structures can be either existing or nonexisting (lack of) civil structures that take on many significant roles. Some—such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams—are traditional high-payoff targets. Others—such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals—are cultural sites that international law or other agreements generally protect. Other structures are facilities with practical applications—such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants—that may be useful for military purposes. Structures analysis involves determining the locations, functions, capabilities, and applications of structures in support of military operations. Structures analysis also involves weighing the consequences of removing the structures from civilian use in
terms of the following (U.S. Army 2014 – ATP 3-57.60, 4-9, 4-9, par. 4-43 and 4-44):

- Political, economic, religious, social, and information implications
- Populace reaction
- Replacement costs

2.3.3 Capabilities

Civil capabilities (shortfalls and strengths) can be viewed from several perspectives; the term civil capabilities may refer to any of the areas listed below.

- Capabilities that exist and allow the populace to sustain itself, such as the following:
  - Public administration
  - Public safety
  - Emergency services
  - Food and agriculture systems
- Capabilities the populace needs assistance with, such as the following:
  - Public works and utilities
  - Public health
  - Public transportation
  - Economics
  - Commerce
- Resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission, such as the following:
  - Interpreters
  - Laundry services
  - Construction materials
  - Equipment

Local vendors, the HN, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include resources that military forces may take and use, consistent with international law. Analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO is normally conducted based on the CA personnel’s functional specialties. Capabilities analysis also identifies the capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in the operation, which allows CAO/CMO planners to consider how to address shortfalls and capitalize on strengths in capabilities (U.S. Army 2014 – ATP 3-57.60, 4-9, 4-9, par. 4-45 and 4-46).
2.3.4 Organizations

Civil organizations are organized groups that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, or community watch groups. They may be IGOs, NGOs, or even violent extremist organizations that work contrary to the HN. Organizations can assist or deter the commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and in influencing the actions of the populace. They can also form the nucleus of humanitarian assistance (HA) programs, interim governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities (U.S. Army 2014 – ATP 3-57.60, 4-9, 4-10, par. 4-47 and 4-48).

2.3.5 People

People, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, a negative, or a lack of impact on military operations. In the context of ASCOPE, the term “people” includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel encountered in an AO. The term may also extend to individuals outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all military operations, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of all types. When analyzing people, CA soldiers may consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, humanitarian, and other social factors. They also should identify the key communicators who influence people in the AO, as well as the communicators’ organizational ties or relationships. Regardless of the nature of the operation, military forces will usually encounter various civilians living and operating in and around the supported unit’s AO. Separating civilians into distinct categories helps soldiers identify locals. In foreign operations, these categories might include the following:

- Local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers and other rural dwellers, and nomads)
- Local civil authorities (elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government)
- Expatriates
- Foreign employees of IGOs or NGOs
- United States Government (USG) and third-nation government agency representatives
- Contractors (U.S. citizens, local nationals, and third-nation citizens providing contract services)
• Department of Defense (DoD) civilian employees
• Media (journalists from print, radio, and visual media)

Civilian activities are primarily dictated by the type of environment in which they occur. Each category of civilian should be considered separately because the activities of each will have both a positive and negative impact on the unit’s mission. Military operations affect civilian activities in various ways. Commanders should consider the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal impact of operations on the categories of civilians identified in the AO (U.S. Army 2014 – ATP 3-57.60, 4-9, 4-10, par. 4-49 and 4-50).

2.4 Events

Just as there are many different categories of civilians, there are many categories of civilian events that may affect the military mission. Some examples include the following:

• Planting and harvesting seasons
• Elections
• Riots
• Religious activities and holidays
• Evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary)

Likewise, there are military events that affect the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples include those listed below:

• Combat operations, including indirect fires
• Humanitarian assistance
• Deployments and redeployments
• Sustainment operations (e.g., unit training, live fire exercises, convoy operations).

CAO/CMO planners determine what events are occurring and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications (U.S. Army 2014 – ATP 3-57.60, 4-9, 4-10, par. 4-52).
Army forces use operational variables to understand and analyze the broad environment in which they intend to conduct or are conducting operations. The U.S. Army’s Operational Variables (collectively abbreviated as PMESII-PT) are listed below (U.S. Army 2011 – FM 3-57, 1-4):

**Political**

**Military**

**Economic**

**Social**

**Information**

**Infrastructure**

**Physical environment**

**Time**

ATP 3-57.60 (U.S. Army 2014) clarifies each of these factors, as summarized in the subsections here.

2.4.1.1 Political

Data, including but not limited to the following (U.S. Army 2014 - ATP 3-57.60, 1-12 and 1-13):

- Overall political situation in the area of responsibility (AOR)
- Political leadership and type of government
- Key aspects of the AO such as political boundaries, centers of the foreign nation, and the government’s strengths, weaknesses, and role in society
- IGOs in the AO (e.g., UN, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], World Food Program, United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF])

Examples of political considerations include the following (U.S. Army 2014 - ATP 3-57.60, 4-13):

- Political environment’s major strengths and weaknesses
- Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves
- Characteristics of the political relationship with Western civilization
- Branches of the government (e.g., legislative, judicial, and executive) and their identification and definition

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5 Joint Doctrine provides for Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII). Army doctrine adds two more: Physical Environment and Time (PMESII-PT).
- Electoral procedures and results
- Religion (Muslim, Christians, or other) and state influences
- Organizations that influence the political environments (for example, NGOs, UN, and military)
- Population centers by size, accessibility, sustainability, and essential functions
- USG agreements, international treaties, standardization agreements (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] or other standardization agreement), and treaties with HN
- Department of State (DOS) position with an awareness of national policy and strategy
- American embassy in the country (embassy workers and staff [how many], noncombatant evacuation operation [NEO; how many], and composition (e.g., private U.S. citizens, military personnel, dependents, designated aliens, and other government employees and their dependents).

2.4.1.2 Military

Data, including but not limited to the following (U.S. Army 2014 - ATP 3-57.60, 1-13):

- CMO capabilities of all U.S. and non-U.S. forces available in the AO
- Manner in which the military situation within the AO influences the current mission requirements
- Manner in which the current military situation is affecting stability, government security, etc.
- Role of the military in the applicable country

Examples of military considerations include the following (U.S. Army 2014 - ATP 3-57.60, 4-14):

- The largest adversary to the military (e.g., government, foreign country [negative or positive position or attitude toward the United States], and internal opposition)
- Chain of command and military structure (for example, civilian leadership, conscript or volunteer force, and compensation compared to the civilian security force)
- Influences on the military structure (drugs, Western civilization, religion, USG, etc.)
• Military-to-civilian relationships (controversial, appropriate, intimidating, etc.)
• Corruption, such as involvement in black marketing and the extent of involvement in such activities (e.g., the entire military or factions of it)
• Military training
• Military preparation and ability to support domestic emergencies (for example, floods, hurricanes, mudslides)
• Military support of any past peace operations
• Military involvement in maintaining civil order
• Morale
• Military history

2.4.1.3 Economic

Data, including but not limited to the following (U.S. Army 2014 - ATP 3-57.60, 1-13):

• Strengths and weaknesses of the economic system, and the nation’s plans to meet economic development goals and objectives that might affect mission accomplishment
• Shortages in foreign nation supplies affecting the operation; shortages could include the nation’s ability to meet the needs of the civil population (e.g., food and water).
• Agricultural calendar, including harvest and planting seasons
• Economic fiscal calendar

Examples of economic considerations include the following (U.S. Army 2014 - ATP 3-57.60, 4-15):

• Economic basis, such as capitalism, socialism, communism, or other (a description is necessary if the economy is not categorized)
• The underlying causes of social unrest in the civilian populace (e.g., issues involving human rights, monetary equity, judicial impropriety, and existence of lack of government assistance programs)
• Class divisions (e.g., lower, middle, and upper classes) and class resource control (e.g., sharing and hoarding by the wealthy)
• Labor pool – skilled or unskilled
• The accessibility of import and export capabilities (e.g., long hauls [overseas] and border crossings)
• Equity of medical services (i.e., medical services are provided to all sects and classes)
• Foreign investor and international community involvement in the overall economic system fostering future development
• Education system and its relation to economic opportunities (e.g., viability and accessibility of the system to all sects and classes and at what levels)
• Corruption, such as involvement in the production, sale, or transport of illicit drugs; participation in the black market; and manipulation of the banking system and observations of whether these types of corruption activities are socially acceptable
• Viability of the domestic market
• Accessibility of loans to the populace and to business owners
• Identification of the organizations with stakes in future development (e.g., IGOs and NGOs)
• Top three positive and negative economic indicators affecting overall economic stability from a governmental and populace perspective

2.4.1.4 Social

Data, including but not limited to the following (ATP 3-57.60, 1-13):

• Current social climate in the AO
• Key personnel inside and outside the AO and their linkage to the populace. Key figures include figureheads, clerics, and subject-matter experts (from health, electrical, transportation, and other services).
• Role of religion in society
• Events that can affect the commander’s mission, such as weather events (floods), elections, school year, fiscal year, and holidays (religious periods and traditional vacations).

Examples of social considerations include the following (ATP 3-57.60, 4-15 and 4-16):

• Social identity (described through nationality, tribe, or clan)
• Underlying causes of friction among civilian sectors such as social, economic, geographical, ethnic, religious, and political (government or lack thereof)
• Importance of tribal (or other factional) rules, whenever they conflict with the general law and order established by the government or other controlling power
• Availability of water, food, and shelter
• Populace’s perception of security from social and economic aspects
• Status of law, order, and the protection of personal property
• Tolerance of government for religious freedom
• Corruption such as following: involvement in the production, sale, or transport of illicit drugs; participation in the black market; and manipulation of the banking system. Planners should note whether these activities are socially acceptable.
• Identification and location of dislocated civilian (DC) camps and the system that facilitates their existence.
• Presence of terrorist groups that affect the social fabric through either the population’s fear or compassion toward the groups
• Government travel restrictions on the local populace
• Overall positive and negative quality-of-life factors

2.4.1.5 Information

Data, including but not limited to the following

• Status and ability to transmit and receive information in the AO
• Locations and meeting cycles of key nonmilitary agencies in the AO (e.g., international groups, NGOs, UNHCR, World Food Program, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) (U.S. Army 2014 - ATP 3-57.60, 1-13).

Examples of information considerations include the following (ATP 3-57.60, 4-16 and 4-17):

• Areas of the information circuit that the government controls and the general attitude of the civilian populace with the subsystem.
• Existence of government monitoring of communications; if communications exist, consider if the messages are balanced.
• Primary mode and effectiveness of information transmission from the government to the local populace
• Government’s censorship of any or all media communications and the extent of any censorship
• Locations of critical communication facilities and, if possible, their power wattage.
• Internet’s availability and the percentage of the local population with access to the internet as well as access to telephones, telegrams, radios, etc.
• Resistance movement’s access, if applicable, to open communications
• Location of government-controlled newspapers, periodicals, and publishing firms, along with the editorial policy of each (i.e., political persuasion)
• Identification of private printing facilities, advertising agencies, and other such facilities (if time permits).
• General conditions, problems, and stages of development that affect the geographical, social, economic, and political factors of society, including the reading, listening, and viewing habits of the populaces.

2.4.1.6 Infrastructure

Data, including but not limited to the following (ATP 3-57.60, 1-13):

• Civil infrastructure in the AO. (The state of the infrastructure assists or hinders the supported commander’s mission.)
• Conditions and locations of key structures, such as the following: government facilities; medical treatment facilities; cultural sites; power generation and transmission facilities; transportation grids; port, rail, and aerial facilities; water purification and sewage treatment plants; and radio and television production and transmission facilities.
• Agricultural and mining regions and other significant geographic and economic features.

Examples of infrastructure considerations are as follows (ATP 3-57.60 p. 4-17 and 4-18):

• Overall government infrastructure rating in comparison with the AOR.
• Level of government infrastructure from a national, regional, and local perspective through evaluation and analysis.
• Infrastructure’s ability to support the movement of goods and supplies (farm-to-market roads, factory-to-port access, and mine-to-refinery processing capability).
• Leading companies in infrastructure development and the country of origin for foreign companies.
• Overview of the condition of dams, toll roads, ports, railroads, airports (especially runways), inland waterways, government factories, etc.
• Status of civil telecommunications systems and capabilities of the infrastructure to support information technology.
• Status of public works infrastructure, including the capability of power, water, sewage, and refuse collection systems.
• Status of public health and facilities (provisions of healthcare).
• Information dissemination at key gatherings sites (e.g., churches, mosques, and sporting events).
• Extent of the role unions play in the utilization of infrastructure (truck drivers, factory workers, longshoremen, masons, etc.).
• Infrastructure’s ability to continue maintaining DC camps and the system facilitating the existence of the camps.
• Top three infrastructure systems that create or exacerbate dissatisfaction among the populace.

2.4.1.7 Physical environment

Data, including but not limited to the following (U.S. Army 2014 – ATP 3-57.60 p. 1-13):

• Man-made structures, particularly in urban areas
• Climate and weather
• Topography
• Hydrology
• Natural resources
• Biological features and hazards
• Environmental conditions

Examples of physical environment considerations are as follows (U.S. Army 2014 – ATP 3-57.60, 4-18):

• Natural and man-made physical characteristics of the AO.
• Analysis of which urban areas could contribute to restrictive movement of the force (combat or humanitarian) and the civilian populace (e.g., main supply route accessibility, DC control and movement, and NEOs).
• Effects of rural areas on force movement (e.g., unpaved roads, quagmires, marshes, and sand dunes), commodities (e.g., farm-to-market roads, factory-to-port accessibility, mine-to-refinery processing capability), and accessibility and availability of foreign nation support.
• Time-of-year considerations in relation to the climate (e.g., hot, cold, or arid), as those considerations pertain to the care and welfare of the civil populaces (morale considerations).
• Hydrology of the AO in comparison with the time of the year (e.g., distribution of surface and underground water, evaporation process, and flow of the sea [tides]).
• Topography (geography) or environmental conditions that add to the operation or detract from it (e.g., environmental health considerations that could affect military forces).
• Natural resources that could assist the force and the populace (e.g., raw materials, water, coal, and oil).
• Protection restraints within each physical characteristic.

2.4.1.8 Time

Time is always a significant consideration in military operations. Analyzing it as an operational variable focuses on how an operation’s duration might help or hinder each side. This time consideration has implications at every planning level. An enemy with limited military capability usually views protracted conflict as advantageous to them. They avoid battles and only engage when conditions are overwhelmingly in their favor. This is a strategy of exhaustion. Such a strategy dominated the American Revolution and remains effective today. The enemy concentrates on surviving and inflicting friendly and civilian casualties over time. Although the military balance may not change, this creates opportunities to affect the way domestic and international audiences view the conflict. Conversely, a hostile power may attempt to mass effects and achieve decisive results within a short period (U.S. Army 2014 – ATP 3-57.60 1-13 and 1-14).

Examples of time considerations are as follows (U.S. Army 2014 – ATP 3-57.60, 4-19):

• Effect of time on the civil environment and CMO, and the impact of military operations (consider both the friendly and enemy forces if the situation warrants).
• Knowledge from legacy data (such as situation reports, lessons learned, project tracking documentation of the area, after-action reports, and past mission objectives), which allows the force to measure certain factors of time, as listed in the examples below:
  o Multiple situation reports from past rotations identified the time of year that the Helmand River increased in size, which denied access to vehicle patrols. The reports informed the force of limited access to opposite sides of the Helmand River during the spring and early summer. This information allowed the force to do the following:
    ▪ Prepare for enemy tactics aimed at taking advantage of this reduced capability.
Plan and execute a bridge project that allowed locals to bring goods to the market in a village on the opposite side of the river.

Lessons learned and submitted by a rotational unit stated that residents were dissatisfied with the presence of the force within the city because their combat patrols disrupted traffic and pushed through crowded streets, which caused damage. This knowledge allowed the force to do the following:

- Identify alternate routes through the city.
- Work with city officials to develop a memorandum of understanding and agreements of cooperation.
- Create and utilize existing neighborhood and city officials to mitigate and manage accidents between military personnel and civilians.

Information from past force rotations identified contractors that were war profiteers and dishonest. These contractors would wait until a new unit arrived and attempt to win projects funded by those forces. This information allowed the force to take the following actions:

- Develop and utilize a filing system that transcended rotational units.
- Maintain a biometric database of undesirable contractors.
- Take protective measures that apply across rotational time frames.

These operational variables (PMESII-PT) coincide with the six CA functional specialty areas (rule of law, governance, infrastructure, economic stability, public education and information, and public health and welfare). In conducting assessments, CA soldiers use an ASCOPE x PMESII-PT crosswalk matrix (see Figure 1 below, which provides an example from Afghanistan) to ensure they are investigating and addressing all relevant factors (ATP 3-57.60 2014, 4-20 – 4-21). That is, for each of the PMESII-PT operational variables, CA soldiers identify and evaluate the inter-reactions with ASCOPE mission variables.
### Figure 1. Sample ASCOPE x PMESII-PT crosswalk matrix (U.S. Army 2014 –ATP 3-57.60).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASCOPE Within PMESII-PT</th>
<th>A Areas</th>
<th>S Structures</th>
<th>C Capabilities</th>
<th>O Organizations</th>
<th>P People</th>
<th>E Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>P Political</strong></td>
<td>District or province boundaries and party affiliation areas</td>
<td>Province and district centers, Shura halls, and polling sites</td>
<td>Dispute resolution, local leadership, civil/individual rights</td>
<td>Political parties, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, volunteer groups, labor unions</td>
<td>Governors, mullahs, Shura members, elders, councils, parliamentarians, and judges</td>
<td>Elections, Shuras, Jirgas, provincial council meetings, and speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M Military</strong></td>
<td>Coalition bases, historic ambush/improvised explosive device sites</td>
<td>Operating bases, provincial/district police headquarters, border points of entry</td>
<td>Twenty-four/seven security, quick reaction force present, military strength/weapon</td>
<td>Command structure, volunteer/contract, coalition forces</td>
<td>Defense coalition, ministries, morale</td>
<td>Lethal events, loss of leadership and operations, peace operations support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E Economic</strong></td>
<td>Bazaar areas, farming areas, border crossing</td>
<td>Bazaar, wheat storage, and banks</td>
<td>Access to banks, ability to withstand drought, government assistance programs</td>
<td>Class deviations, banks, large landholders, black market cooperative, and nongovernmental organizations</td>
<td>Bankers, foreign investors, merchants, and money lenders</td>
<td>Drought, harvest, business opening, loss of business, and good or bad crop season</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S Social</strong></td>
<td>Traditional picnic areas, bazaars, outdoor Shura sites</td>
<td>Churches, mosques, wedding halls, popular restaurants, displaced-civilian camps</td>
<td>Strength of tribal, clan, or village traditional structure, availability of food, water, shelter</td>
<td>Tribes, clans, families, and sport and youth, Shuras</td>
<td>Classes (upper/lower/middle), Mullahs, Maliks, elders, Shura members, and influential families</td>
<td>Friday prayers, holidays, births, weddings, deaths, and bazaar days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I Information</strong></td>
<td>Radio, television, Internet, paper coverage areas, and word-of-mouth gathering points</td>
<td>Cell, radio, and television production and transmission facilities, and print shops</td>
<td>Literacy rate, and electronic media and phone service availability</td>
<td>News and media networks, influential mosques, and information operations groups</td>
<td>Media, owners, Mullahs, Maliks, elders, and heads of families face to face</td>
<td>Friday prayers, publishing dates, project openings, information operations campaigns, and civilian casualty incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Irrigation networks, water tables, and areas with medical services</td>
<td>High-payoff targets, roads, bridges, electrical lines, gabion walls, and dams</td>
<td>Build, inspect, and maintain roads, walls, dams, refuse collection, and irrigation systems</td>
<td>Government ministries, medical and construction companies, unions</td>
<td>Builders, road contractors, and local development councils</td>
<td>Road, bridge, school, and center construction, and well digging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P Physical Environment</strong></td>
<td>Boundary (domestic/international) characteristics of area of operations (natural/built environment), ethnicity, natural resources, agricultural/forestry/fisheries</td>
<td>Unpaved roads, quaggires, farmer-to-market roads, port, power grids, military barracks, prisons/jails</td>
<td>Port access, safe havens, emergency services, academia, print/internet, distribution channels, technical strengths</td>
<td>Political chamber of commerce, tribal/clan, coalition forces, unions/labor, United States Agency for International Development, illicit organizations</td>
<td>Medical, health hazards, social classes permissible/restrictive movement, displaced-civilian camps, transportation modes</td>
<td>Holidays, voting speeches, demonstrations, sports, food/job lines, bars, tea shops, funerals, harvest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**T Time** The time available influences decision cycles, operational deployments, planning cycles, and the other seven variables that planners analyze to discover predictable patterns, trends, and associations (cyclic on a variable time).

Source: ATP 3-57.60 Civil Affairs Planning dated 27 April 2014, para 4-44, pp. 4-20 and 4-21
The application of the PMESII-PT framework, as explained in ATP 3-57.60 (U.S. Army 2014, 4-41–4-45, paras 1–38), covers a contextual analysis at the theater of operations level. Each letter in the abbreviation PMESII-PT represents a social subsystem in the environment in which military operations are planned. The PMESII-PT subsystems represent the building blocks of society that describe a context of strategic interest to the military. This contextual analysis characterizes the prevailing conditions in the environment in which the military is planning to conduct the mission’s operations, and it provides the background information for determining the best course of action to take for accomplishing the mission.

Army doctrine refers to the PMESII-PT framework as supporting a systems analysis. However, this framework does not account for the nesting and interlinkages among subsystems that are described as political, economic, social, etc.; the dynamics of systems that contribute to their reproduction and transformation; and system constraints on and opportunity for human agency. In general, systems thinking, which is embraced by a multitude of disparate disciplines (e.g. biology, ecology, anthropology, sociology, operations research or engineering), is familiar to military planners and operators as they imagine conducting military operations in increasingly urbanized landscapes to include megacities. For example, David Kilcullen (2012) popularized the concept of “city as a system” among Army strategic and operational planners. However, the military view of systems thinking diverges from that of ecological or social science in that the system is conceived to measure and optimize the process in which the Army is either engaged, such as establishing supply chains, or is targeting. While the exact provenance of PMESII-PT is unknown, it has been alleged that this construct was adapted from a battle command concept for targeting adversaries. Social subsystems became the targets for establishing the stability of nations. To further complicate matters in Army doctrine, although the PMESII-PT framework is said to represent a “systems-of-systems” approach, it prompts the analyst to bin information into discrete subsystems, as noted by McCauley (2017). Therefore, the analytical process is one of taking a descriptive inventory and is not oriented to a problem focus that would necessitate understanding the linkages among the

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6 The PMESII-PT construct was born of a Battle Command concept for targeting adversaries (see U.S. Joint Forces 2004; Vego 2006; Van Riper 2009; Carpenter and Andrews 2009; Sloan 2017).
subsystems of PMESII-PT, which would explain the prevailing conditions in the operational environment.

A CA analyst uses this knowledge of prevailing conditions in the operational environment to inform the next step in the planning of operations, which is to determine the “key and decisive” aspects within the ASCOPE factors for each PMESII-PT category (U.S. Army 2014, 1-35). These key and decisive aspects of the operational environment are considered to be centers of gravity. The identification of centers of gravity contributes to the determination of entry points for CA to engage with the population. The key and decisive aspects of the operational environment are expressed in terms of a matrix that features ASCOPE variables on the vertical axis and PMESII-PT variables on the horizontal axis (see Figure 1). The information included in the matrix is a shorthand for features about the population that CA should take into account when considering which actions to take to promote stability in the operational environment.

2.5 **Social power considerations**

The ASCOPE x PMESII-PT assessment process used by CA is insufficient for determining important sociocultural linkages among subsystems. Our interest is to inform the military’s approach to the analysis of social systems so that it can be applied in furthering the understanding of the sociocultural dynamics in the situations in which the military engages. To this end, we will focus on those treatments of social power that are based on empirical evidence from non-western societies; that are systematic and principled attempts to guide explanations of social power across cultures and societies; and that enable the analyst to discover the outcomes of the exercise of social power. Social scientists and philosophers agree that the nature of social power does not lend itself to the development of a comprehensive theory to explain its workings in society. Boonstra’s (2016) approach to social power in a social-ecological model provides one example of a treatment of social power that meets the criteria listed above and integrates the concept of social power into an analysis of social systems. We also examined, relevant to the military endeavor, what can be learned from

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7 In a social-ecological system approach, the social systems of human beings are seen as interlinked with the ecological system of natural environment. Fabinyi et al. (2014) point out that until recently the emphasis on human relations with the environment in this approach resulted in weak theorization of the social aspect. They argue that the concepts of social diversity and power as conceived in the disciplines of social anthropology and political ecology can be used to strengthen the theorization of the social in social-ecological systems.
other systematic and principled approaches to power analysis used by the development community.

2.5.1 Conceptual model

Taking his inspiration from the system-orientation of social ecology, Boonstra (2016, 24-25) characterizes social power as having two dimensions (i.e., context-shaping and conduct-shaping), which he argues are inextricably interconnected. Power as context-shaping shapes social structures, as defined by Merton (1938), and social events, which are actions and interactions that are situated in time and place (Reed 2013). The context-shaping function of power aligns with (1) Foucault’s (1977 trans.) argument that the prison infrastructure of the state creates certain predispositions in social subjects (prisoners) which enables the state to maintain power in that context; (2) Gaventa’s (1980) analysis of poor miners whose powerlessness is due in part to their position in the structure of power; or (3) Bourdieu’s (1984) theory that power is created in lasting dispositions or habitus that shape current structures, practices, and perceptions that can be observed in particular contexts.

For Boonstra (2016, 24), power as conduct-shaping accounts for the capacity of social actors to exercise power. Boonstra (2016) references Lukes (2005 [1974]) to point out that social actors have the capacity to influence outcomes in social relations. Social actors, in Boonstra’s concept, are people who are engaged in social interaction (e.g. leaders, voters, personnel or members of an organization, or participants in a social movement). Boonstra’s view agrees with those of Elias (2012 [1970]) and Pansardi (2012a; 2012b). The context- and conduct-shaping aspects of power enacted in social relations comprise social power and function together to constrain or enable people’s ability to exercise power (Boonstra 2016, 24). Boonstra (2016, 24) also views the context- and conduct-shaping aspects of social power as logically equivalent because one dimension does not take absolute precedence over the other in the interaction between agency and structure, in agreement with Pansardi (2012a).

Boonstra’s (2016) approach mitigates the debate among social scientists, described in detail by Sewell (1992), as to whether social structure or the agency of social actors takes precedence in perpetuating or transforming social systems. Keith Dowding (2008) argues convincingly that deciding whether to privilege structure over agency (or vice versa) for social analysis is a false dilemma. He, similar to Boonstra, offers that how one handles
the relationship between structure and agency in analysis depends upon the question under investigation.

Boonstra’s (2016, 25–27) additional contribution to the understanding of the dynamics of social power is his argument that outcomes of the exercise of power can transform social-ecological systems. Other scholars (e.g., Bourdieu 1984; Giddens 1984; Haugaard 2003, 2010; Hayward and Lukes 2008; Pansardi 2012a; and Raik et al. 2008) note the interrelationships between context- and conduct-shaping aspects of social power. However, they did not consider how these shaping aspects can lead to the transformation of social-ecological systems.

2.5.2  Social power and processes of social change

Boonstra’s (2016, 25–27) conceptual model of social power differs from much of the theoretical work on power because of his concern with outcomes from the exercise of power, and how these outcomes might affect the transformation of social systems. Nonetheless, not all context- and conduct-shaping interrelationships in the workings of social power result in the transformation of social-ecological systems at the macro-scale. The example that Boonstra (2016, 25–27) invokes to discuss the role of social power in the transformation of social-ecological systems is how human control over the use of fire served as an enabler of social power. He argues that the use of fire for cooking, clearing vegetation for agriculture, warfare, driving and attracting animals for hunting, signaling, ritual activities, asserting property rights, clearing ground, and for aesthetic pleasure and entertainment can be viewed as both shaping social and ecological contexts and human and non-human conduct so as to influence social-ecological interactions that contribute to the transformation of social systems. This example represents evolutionary change at the macro-scale by arguing that the use of fire by early humans changed how they lived, how they organized themselves, and how they attributed cultural meaning to their world in the process of constructing their social-ecological niche.

Michel Foucault, the late influential French philosopher and social theorist, describes power as being instrumental in promoting social integration, or its fragmentation and factional repression (see, e.g., Foucault 1977). Heller (1996, 87) explains that “... power is, for Foucault, neither inherently positive nor inherently negative ....” Power is the ability to either create social change or maintain the status quo. In this conceptualization,
power resides along a spectrum ranging from that of individuals to that of political, social, economic, and/or religious institutions.

The exercise of power that Foucault describes can affect various social outcomes at different rates and scales without resulting in the total transformation of a social-ecological system. Evidence suggests that major shifts in power relations that occur during episodes of conflict may initially appear to be social transformation but instead result over time in reproduction of the social system (e.g., results of Arab Spring in Morocco or Egypt). In addition, significant transformation in relations of power indeed may be evolutionary but still not completely meet the goals of the founders of a social movement decades hence (e.g., civil rights or women’s movements in the United States).

Similarly, Special Operations Forces (SOF) goals to defeat the Taliban and secure strategic rural areas by implementing the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) program were met in the short term for some villages even after violence spiked during initial implementation of the program (Green 2017, 266267). In the long term, absent another Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) investigation, it is difficult to determine the effects of the ALP program in the many villages where it was implemented. However, the 2017 World Report on Afghanistan by Human Rights Watch states that the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and the ALP increasingly occupied or used schools for military purposes in contested areas, particularly in the Baghlan and Helmand provinces. The UN is noted as reporting a significant increase in attacks against schools by the Taliban and groups affiliated with Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This increase may be indicative that the role of the ALP in transforming relations of power with the Taliban is not consistent throughout the rural villages in Afghanistan.

Gaventa (2006, 29) attributes the various outcomes in the exercise of power to the pluralistic and active social construction of power in any particular situation. Foucault has observed, as interpreted by Heller (1996, 87), that the exercise of power has unintended consequences. Dowding (2008, 27) acknowledges that actions by agents intended to reproduce a certain balance of power can have unintended consequences.

Agents respond to their environment and their actions might reinforce existing structures or, at crucial or critical junctures, lead to changes in
those structures. Such changes might be planned by agents (the transformation in the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk might be a particularly dramatic example) or they might come about through the unintended consequences of a series of agents’ actions.

Empirical studies show that the exercise of power, although adaptive for some social actors, can result in the reproduction of the overall system (Bourdieu 1984; Nelson and Finan 2009; Willis 1981). For example, in the case described in Nelson and Finan (2009), human adaptation in the form of a reliance on patron-client relations during recurring droughts results in reproduction of the structure of power. In Ceará, a state in northeastern Brazil, patron-client relations between the government and low-income households during reoccurring droughts perpetuates the vulnerabilities of this population that is dependent on agriculture and animal husbandry. Although Nelson and Finan (2009) do not invoke the term “social power,” one could say that the government uses its instruments of power—food baskets, water delivery, and cash-for-work programs—to provide relief to farmers whose land and livestock cannot sustain their families during a drought. By doing so, the government assumes a traditional patronage role that has been part of local political relationships long before Brazil became a modern nation-state. The expectation of farmers (clients) is that in return for government aid they will support their government (patron) at election time. As a result, the structure of power is perpetuated in a patron-client system. The low-income farming households have limited their own options for transcending this system by retaining their dependence on government relief during times of crisis. The adaptation of social actors to this perilous situation for agricultural production is to pray for drought so that they can receive relief from the government.

Nelson and Finan (2009, 312) describe an “underlying and persistent pathology of vulnerability” in rural Ceará that is caused by “historical inequity in resource distribution, the lack of quality education and health care, insufficient water systems, inadequate investment in physical infrastructure (energy, roads, etc.), and the absence of climate-neutral employment (i.e., manufacturing).” Power relations supported by the tradition of patron-client relations shape this vulnerability and contribute to its sustain-ment and leave peasants praying for drought. All the while, the government receives affirmation from constituents and development organiza-tions for providing relief to its most vulnerable citizens, and it is
able to attract national and international funding that will perpetuate its ability to act as the patron.

### 2.5.3 Power analysis frameworks from the development community

As discussed above, there are many ways that the exercise of power can affect change. Despite their sometimes different world views, development organizations, like the military, aspire to induce change in a situation. Thus, it is useful for both communities of practitioners to understand the workings of social power in the situations in which they intervene, and to anticipate the effects of the exercise of power that is intended to induce the desired change. The interventions of both development organizations and military forces are implicated in existing power relations as they seek to shape a situation (c.f., O’Connell 2017 and Turnley 2017, which discuss SOF as agents of change). Both groups are interested in monitoring the outcomes of their efforts, although the military has yet to systematically undertake an investigation of the effects of their operations on establishing stability, either short- or long-term. The work of Gaventa and Barrett (2012) is an example of a systematic examination of the effects of social interventions.

Both development organizations and the military are looking for entry points, or what the military terms “centers of gravity,” through which they can influence a population. Gaventa (2006, 30), who is a contributor to a power analysis framework for the development community, discusses the nature of entry points in relations of power when planning strategic social interventions with the following statement: “For any given issue or action, there is no single strategy or entry point. Much depends on navigating the intersection of the relationships, which in turn can either contribute to new misalignments and distortions of power, or simultaneously creates new boundaries of possibility for strategic action.”

Pettit (2013, 10), who has written the power analysis guidance for SIDA, discusses how power analysis can provide insights into multiple entry points for interventions. He observes that a power analysis can be used strategically to anticipate how populations may respond to new programs and to determine how powerful interests may block, deflect, co-opt, or profit from the implementation of new programs. Pettit (2013, 31) asserts “Power analysis provides an excellent opportunity for thinking more explicitly about – and testing – our different assumptions about how change happens.”
In this section, the “power cube” and the SIDA frameworks are examined, both of which are based on various theories of social power and have been used to guide social power analysis for development applications. Gaventa (2006) adapts theories of social power to a framework for power analysis he calls the “power cube,” which is designed to help development specialists identify opportunities for citizen engagement in policy-making processes from local to global levels. The power cube has three dimensions that represent the forms, spaces, and levels of power and their interrelationships. When applying the framework, the sides of the cube may be used to begin analysis; however each dimension is linked to the other (Figure 2).

Gaventa’s three forms of power (2006, 28–30), as depicted in the power cube, are inspired by Lukes’ (2005) three-dimensional view of power. Gaventa’s definitions for the three forms of power that are used in the power cube (visible, hidden, and invisible) are the result of a collaboration with VeneKlasen and Miller (2007) of Just Associates. Visible power is observable in the formal rules, structures, authorities, institutions, and procedures of political decision making. Hidden power is exercised by social actors behind the scenes to set the political agenda and control who has
the opportunity to be involved in the decision making. *Invisible* power is embedded in social and political culture and individual consciousness, and it shapes people’s beliefs, sense of self, and acceptance of what is “normal, acceptable, and safe.”

The second dimension of the power cube deals with spaces, which Gaventa (2006, 26) defines as “...opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their lives and interests.” Spaces are the discursive, virtual, or physical locations where social power is manifested. Gaventa (2006, 26-27) describes spaces as *closed* because one set of actors, such as bureaucrats or elected representatives, determines the agenda and what actions will be taken; he describes spaces as *invited* in that a broader set of participants, such as users or citizens, are asked to enter the decision-making process; he describes spaces as *claimed/created* in that empowered social actors claim spaces formerly dominated by more powerful actors or create their own space for social action. Gaventa mentions other possibilities for describing spaces, such as “conquered,” “instigated,” or “initiated” spaces. He also invokes Lefebvre’s (1991) work, which deals with the exercise of power through the construction of and control over the built environment and physical territory. Gaventa notes that the kinds of spaces that are available for social engagement vary across context and historical setting; hence there is room for additional terminology to be applied to the characterization of spaces. Following Gaventa, those social actors who can create and control these spaces are more likely to have power within them and/or to shape outcomes in related spaces.

The third dimension of the power cube deals with levels or places where power is expressed (i.e., the private and public places at local, national and global levels in which actors participate in the contest for power; Gaventa 2006, 27-28). In geographical terms, these levels or places are related to issues of scale. The problem for analysts of power relations, as Gaventa discusses, is to determine to *what extent* and *how* local conditions are influenced by regional, national, and/or global conditions. Recently, a significant portion of development literature has focused on ways to empower local communities, particularly in weak states recovering from the ravages of armed conflict. Nonetheless, such communities (even in rural areas) may be influenced politically and economically by regional, national, and even global conditions, and by national, international, and transnational actors, as in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In his report on SIDA’s guidance, Pettit (2013, 44) refers to visible, hidden, and invisible power as dimensions or faces of power, and reserves the term “forms” of power for power over, power to, power with, and power within. VeneKlasen and Miller (2007, 3) describe power over as a negative ability to dominate, coerce, control, force, discriminate, marginalize, or otherwise render other social actors powerless. Power to, power with, and power within are characterized as positive expressions of power that empower people to form more equitable relationships. Power to is the ability to take action to shape one’s life and world. Power with has to do with taking collective action. Power within refers to a person’s sense of self-worth, self-knowledge, and respect for others, all of which are empowering for taking social action.

These terms, as defined by VeneKlasen and Miller (2007), are appropriate for describing relations between social actors who are exercising agency power—or what Boonstra (2016, 24) would call the conduct-shaping aspects of social power. Pettit (2013, 43) notes that power to, power with, and power within (as expressions of human agency) can be used positively or negatively. Power over, power to, power with, and power within operate as Gaventa’s visible, hidden, and invisible forms of power in the discussion provided by VeneKlasen and Miller (2007, 47–49). Although useful for conceptualizing kinds of agency for social actors, characterizing power over as negative and power to, power with, and power within as positive imposes an unnecessary value judgment on an analytical process that is supposed to result in an objective portrayal of social reality.

SIDA’s guidance reminds us that those moments, opportunities, or channels for social action that Gaventa describes as realized in spaces may arise from violent conflict. In SIDA’s experience, “unequal power relations may also foster acute social conflict, political violence and insecurity” (Pettit 2013, 9). Power analysis should be part of any conflict assessment, because it helps an analyst to identify actors who benefit from the persistence of conflict, such as intransigent political elites, warlords, criminal mafias, or unemployed noncombatants, and determine which actors and agencies are implicated in causes of conflict (Pettit 2013, 19 and 21).

Pettit (2013, 18) also discusses the significance of the consideration of scale in power analysis, using the example of Tanzania with its decentralized government to underscore the importance of local level analysis. Decentralization of governance is a global phenomenon, as discussed in
Gaventa and Tandon (2010), which should be taken into account in a social power analysis. Sometimes, decentralization of governance is a conscious choice on the part of a national government that is unable to control all the intricacies of administration in a geographically and culturally diverse nation, as in the case of the Philippines in the 1980s.

2.5.4 Incorporating social power analysis in Civil Affairs assessment

Published accounts of military experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (c.f., Gavrilis 2005; Lushenko and Hardy 2016; O’Connell 2017) relate that operators on the ground learned about the structure of power embedded in cultural traditions and the exercise of power by adversaries, government officials and organizations, and community leaders and their organizations (e.g., tribal councils in Iraq, shura and jirga in Afghanistan). Initially, little was known about how local governments actually operate, their relationship with their communities or the national government, the role of “informal” leadership (non-nation state government), or the relationship of communities and governments with adversaries. It is difficult to obtain accurate information on these types of relationships if one is a novice or a remote observer. Gaventa (2006) terms these relationships as ones of hidden and invisible power, the understanding of which requires in-depth knowledge of and on-the-ground experience with the particular social situation of interest. Understanding the mechanisms of social power from the local perspective improves the ability to identify opportunities for influencing security and stability and to anticipate changing conditions that are likely in a conflict situation.

In the SOF example discussed in Green (2017), determining the forms, spaces, and levels of power identified in Gaventa’s (2006) framework could have been employed to improve knowledge of the situation and to shape it. However, the emphasis in the Green (2017) example is on achieving local security. In the military experience (c.f., Green 2017; SIGAR 2015; Lushenko and Hardy 2016), an integrated approach that engages local communities in security, governance, and development is thought to be the most productive. CA as an enabler for SOF and stabilization should also consider how knowledge of the workings of social power can be mobilized to empower local communities to develop their own pathways to stability while local engagement in establishing security is underway.

The assessment process can provide the means to identify the role of social power in fostering pathways to stability. An example of an assessment
framework that incorporates a consideration of the structure and exercise of power is that of Social Impact Assessment (SIA; Turnley 2002), which has a long history of use in the United States and internationally. SIA is used to analyze, monitor, and manage “the intended and unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, of planned interventions (policies, program, plans, projects) and any social change processes invoked by those interventions” (Vanclay 2003, 6). Each planned intervention is likely to address a problem unique to that particular situation, which would necessitate designing and implementing a situation specific social impact assessment. However, as Boonstra’s (2016) and Gaventa’s (2006) work suggest, the generalizable dynamics of social power can be conceptualized in a framework that can be used to guide the assessment of particular situations in which interventions are planned.

If one followed the SIA process with regard to the SOF example from Green (2017) discussed earlier in this report, the first step would be to identify the problem posed by the planned intervention. In this case, the problem to be addressed was how to engage rural villages in their own defense against Taliban violence and recruitment of community members. In order to develop some possible scenarios for courses of action, one must first understand the structure of power or, in Boonstra’s (2016) terms, the context-shaping aspects of social power. Green (2017) explains how SOF made sense of the structure of power in rural Afghan villages and their relationships with the national and district governments as well as with the Taliban. The SOF lens for analysis was primarily a political one. Green (2017) mentioned SOF’s interest in encouraging economic development; however, the small amounts of economic aid that were distributed were intended to encourage local officials to support the local defense forces. The major economic boost came from the salaries paid to the participants in the ALP program, and the reemergence of commerce once the Taliban no longer had control of an area.

If the intent of military intervention was also to mitigate civilian vulnerabilities that led to support of the Taliban, which would be in keeping with a CA mission, then one would investigate how the role of social power extends from the political into economic, social, and cultural domains. For example, in the Afghanistan case discussed by Green (2017, 254–259), the Taliban were adept at gaining the support of the rural population because they understood the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of social power. They recognized that the national government had a limited
reach in the rural villages. They knew that rural communities had experienced violence dealt by the U.S. coalition and the national government, that local officials practiced corruption and murder, and that tribal and family frictions existed. The Taliban helped to mitigate economic vulnerabilities by offering a livelihood to young men who had few other options, and by allowing farmers to grow poppy, a lucrative cash crop whose cultivation the U.S. coalition and the Afghan government were seeking to eradicate. The Taliban also realized that given the lack of a functioning justice system, local communities had no formal dispute resolution process to deal with their issues of murder, theft, assault, rape, and land and water disputes. The Taliban offered dispute resolution available in the Sharia law of the religion of Islam, a tradition which they shared with the local communities.

Green (2017) argues that SOF learned how to design their approach to implementing the ALP program by observing how the Taliban gained villager support. One could argue that CA could also learn from the Taliban’s approach with rural villages when designing an assessment process that takes into account the workings of social power in political, economic, social, and cultural domains. The Taliban essentially determined civil vulnerabilities in the asymmetry and heterogeneity of social power among government officials, community leaders, and the citizenry, and provided solutions that gained community support or at least tolerance of Taliban presence. More difficult to determine for a remote observer is the extent to which the Taliban manipulated civil vulnerabilities based on gender to instill fear and thereby exerted control over or compliance of a community.

In understanding the context-shaping aspects of social power in the SOF example, one necessarily has to consider the actions of key people who are the drivers in structuring power or who may be followers, resisters, or change agents. In other words, one must take into account Boonstra’s (2016) conduct-shaping aspects of social power. SOF identified the key political players who could aid in the development and sustainment of a program for community self-defense. It appears the Taliban went further in their assessment of the situation to consider individual and community empowerment in economic, social, and cultural domains in order to gain the support of the population. In a CA assessment, one could move beyond providing a list of “people” and “organizations” who are potential players related to the mission in the operational environment (as in U.S. Army
CA would want to look for resistors or change agents with which to collaborate to foster community empowerment that would contribute to stability. Violent conflict results in changes in political, economic, and social conditions. In response to conflict, individuals, families, and/or organizations may coalesce and mobilize as they adapt to changing conditions. Such adaptation may also create new roles for women, such as assuming more economic responsibilities and duties as heads of households or engaging in post-conflict activism for peace-building. For example, Arostegui (2013) observes, based on her work in Rwanda, Uganda, and South Sudan, that the experience of conflict changes women’s lives and can serve to empower them post-conflict to advocate for long-term changes in their status and conditions of life.

The SIA process takes into account the positive and negative consequences of an intervention. In the SOF case, given the existing structure of power, an intervention on the part of the military might feed the culture of corruption among local officials, as was feared in the SOF intervention. On the other hand with more funds available, local officials can better play the role of patron in a patron-client relationship with a community (as in the Brazilian case discussed earlier in this report), thereby bolstering the legitimacy of government.
3 Conclusions

Conceptual gaps were identified within the Civil Affairs approach to assessment, based on how it is presented in U.S. Army doctrine. As in a development scenario, the social relations in a military area of operations are complex, asymmetrical, and may change rapidly if the context is one of armed conflict. As in development work, CA planners and operators will benefit from the ability to characterize the following for their area of operations: (1) the context- and conduct-shaping aspects of social power in the forms, spaces, and levels relevant to assessment; and (2) the outcomes of these workings of social power in society. This ability will promote an understanding of the conditions in the operational environment and the impact of the conditions on the mission variables as outlined in ASCOPE. In turn, these characterizations will improve the military’s ability to identify centers of gravity for influencing social change and to consider potential effects of different courses of action.

This report provides the theoretical basis for a social power analysis that is relevant to CA assessment. The next phase of our applied research project will focus on the development of a framework for social power analysis that can be applied to the Civil Affairs assessment process.
References


# Appendix A: Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan local police</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army Technique Publication</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>CAO</td>
<td>civil affairs operations</td>
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<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIM</td>
<td>civil information management</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil military operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>dislocated civilian</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>indigenous populations and institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>national assistance</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
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<td>--------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>population and resources control</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Social impact assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Support to Civil Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAST</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment Software Toolkit</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSO</td>
<td>village stability operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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The U.S. Army has a need to shape the operational environments of its mission, whether they require offensive, defensive, or stability operations. Current Army Civil Affairs doctrine fails to take into account the workings of social power, and thus it limits the Army’s complete understanding of an operational environment. In its mission planning, the Army needs to take into account all aspects of power, not just the visible forms. This work explains the concept of social power and discusses frameworks for implementing its context- and conduct-shaping aspects in operational planning. By incorporating social power analysis into its operational planning, Army Civil Affairs will be able to develop doctrine that will improve its understanding of the operational environment. In turn, the military’s ability to identify centers of gravity for influencing social change will be improved, and the likelihood of unintended consequences occurring from armed interventions will be lessened.

### 15. SUBJECT TERMS
Power (Social sciences); Sociology, Military; Military doctrine; Civil-military relations; United States Army

### 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

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<th>a. REPORT</th>
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### 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
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### 18. NUMBER OF PAGES
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