Refugees Flexing Social Power as Agents of Stability
Creating Modes of Economic Livelihoods in Kenya’s Camps

Lance L. Larkin and Sarah A. Clark

November 2017

Image from https://worldhelp.net/road-to-dadaab/

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Refugees Flexing Social Power as Agents of Stability
Creating Modes of Economic Livelihoods in Kenya’s Camps

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Prepared for Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
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Under Program Element T41, Project 458305, “Vulnerability Assessment Software Toolkit”
Abstract

Although the United States Army recognizes the importance of the social domain in military and humanitarian aid zones, little work has been done to analyze and describe the social domain in those areas. The Engineer Research and Development Center of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is designing an interactive mapping program that provides information on social categories. It is not enough to understand who the local powerbrokers might be, because national and international connections also play into social power dynamics. More importantly, this report demonstrates how social power should be analyzed in order to understand how each situation of conflict or emergency hides threads of power that are not obvious. To establish how a social power analysis might be performed, this work discusses relevant social science theory to construct a framework for study. Using a case study of the Kenyan government’s threats to close their largest refugee camp due to their claims that the camp is full of terrorist activity, the authors demonstrate how closer analysis can provide critical understanding of a situation. That new understanding shows that refugee camp citizens harness their own social power, acting as agents of social and economic stability within the country.
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Preface

This study was conducted for the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) under Program Element T41, Project 458305, “Vulnerability Assessment Software Toolkit.” The technical monitor was Mr. Kurt Kinnevan (CEERD-CZT).

The work was performed by the Environmental Processes Branch (CNE) of the Installation Division (CN), U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (ERDC-CERL). At the time of publication, Mr. H. Garth Anderson was Chief, CEERD-CNE; Mr. Donald K. Hicks was Acting Chief, CEERD-CN; and Mr. Kurt Kinnevan CEERD-CZT, was the Technical Director for Adaptive and Resilient Installations. The Interim Deputy Director of ERDC-CERL was Ms. Michelle J. Hanson, and the Interim Director was Dr. Kirankumar V. Topudurti.

The Commander of ERDC was COL Bryan S. Green, and the Director was Dr. David W. Pittman.
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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The Vulnerability Assessment Software Toolkit (VAST) is a project that will provide Army planners with information and analytical processes to understand the sociocultural environment for the area of interest. Operating theaters involve areas that range from conflict to humanitarian efforts in response to natural and epidemiological disasters. Military planners must comprehend the societal environment and analyze the social power factors unique to each situation in order to plan for and mitigate unnecessary tension. Although the Army recognizes the importance of social systems in the conduct of operations, current standard practices and frameworks (e.g., DIME-FIL, PMESII-PT, ASCOPE*) do not provide guidelines for analysis of social power dynamics.

In responding to critical concerns addressed within the Functional Concept for Engagement (U.S. Army 2014), Army Operating Concept (U.S. Army 2016), and Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (U.S. Department of Defense 2016), the team acknowledges the importance of social categories (race, class, religion, sect, ethnicity, gender, etc.). However, in recognizing these categories, while understanding that each one has different weight in varying contexts, this work emphasizes the analysis of interplay between these complex systems of social power relations. To demonstrate how social power must be analyzed in context, a conceptual framework is provided that is based on social scientific principles.

1.2 Objectives

Running from 2017–2020, the VAST project consists of the following three tasks: Task 1, Conceptual framework for social power analysis; Task 2, Social Systems Impact Assessment; and Task 3, Geosocial-temporal disease modeling. As part of Task 1, this report’s objective is to outline general theoretical tools for analyzing social power. In addition, as preparation for Task 2 and Task 3, there is a second objective—to develop an

* Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL); Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII_PT); and Area Structures Capabilities Organizations People and Events (ASCOPE).
analytical framework by using two units of broad analysis that can be utilized in a variety of contexts. Drawn from the general theoretical tools of Task 1, the units of analysis used were (1) the four dimensions of power and (2) the power cube to provide a framework that can then be applied in Tasks 2 and 3 to analyze multiple facets of social power.

1.3 Approach

Although VAST can be understood as a broad social power analytical tool, each situation must be examined to discover what social factors are most relevant. For this reason, the analytical framework was outlined by using a specific case study of Kenya’s largest refugee camp, Dadaab. In analyzing the social power dynamics for the camp, the authors highlight how the Army’s current approach must include detailed analysis, rather than just an acknowledgement of the social factors in play.
2 The Kenyan Refugee Dilemma

Political science and economic analyses often examine higher-level agents to understand national and international incidents, so it is people on the ground who are ignored or at least methodologically glossed over. Yet, the people are of prime importance because they utilize social power to create stability or instability and inclusion or exclusion within a nation. Analyzing the local people’s agency is critical, because when national and global actors do not take into account social power, their efforts to “fix” problems can often backfire. The attempts of the Kenyan government and international non-governmental agencies (NGOs) to deal with border-crossing refugees in Kenya illustrates how detailed social analysis can alleviate intensifying conflict.

Since the civil war in neighboring Somalia began in 1991, Kenya has been the host for an escalating number of refugees fleeing the violence and a greater amount of terrorist attacks within its borders (Figure 1). As conflict and environmental disasters in other parts of the world generate more refugees, understanding the problems of people on the move must include accounting for both institutional and social power. When examining power, it is critical to focus on institutional actors and overarching processes, such as governance and commerce. The Kenyan economy, as a primary driver for East Africa, provides impetus for understanding how displaced peoples impact local and national regions (Kimenyi and Kibe 2014).* While research on Kenya must account for the authority inherent in these institutions and processes, that research must analyze how refugees assert their social power in the refugee camps to understand whether the camps are training grounds for terrorists—as the government claims. Examining the largest camp in the country, Dadaab, allows an assessment of the Kenyan government’s assertions as compared to data on the ground.

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* The significance of Kenya’s stability was highlighted when 2007–2008 post-election violence impacted the regional economy by cutting off shipments of goods to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan (Kabukuru 2009:65). The attacks demonstrate another aspect of this study—the Kenyan government’s predilection to create rhetorical outsiders for its own political gain. This aspect will be examined in Section 2.1.1, which gives historical background on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
The Dadaab refugee camp was created in 1991, at the start of Somalia’s civil war as refugees fled into Kenya and the government created a refuge in the arid and sparsely populated area of northeastern Kenya. The Kenyan government severely restricted the 245,000 refugees’ movement outside the camp and disallowed them gainful employment. These limitations provided substantial hurdles for the refugees to support their families, and these hurdles continue to curb their ambitions. Due to not providing legal recourse for lost income, the Kenyan government’s enforced confinement of refugees could provide incentives for refugees to join terrorist organizations in order to gain an income. Indeed, the Kenyan government claims the camp is a refuge for terrorists. Within this report, the authors argue
that the camp is, in fact, not a source of terrorism, but rather it is an example of poorly attempted, overarching governmental control of human movement and social power.

The timing of this work highlights the continuing problems that the Kenyan government deals with and the opportunities that it squanders. Instead of tapping the social power of refugees, the government has threatened to close Dadaab numerous times—most recently in May 2016. Its claims that the camp is a hotbed of terrorism mirrors historical precedent of the Kenyan government using the rhetoric of ethnic insiders and outsiders during elections. Consequently, to understand why the government continues to frame the ethnic Somalis from Somalia as outsiders*—despite Kenya having its own Somalis—we turn to historical analysis.

Section 2.1 looks at both the colonial and post-colonial history of Kenya and a short background on Somalia. From a socio-historical perspective, it becomes clear that the recent call for the closure of Dadaab is part of the Kenyan government’s continued rhetoric of creating insiders and outsiders for political gain. The framing of elections in terms of ethnicity generates a strong ideology of national fervor that also colors the state’s approach to the refugee problem. Examining how electoral winners and losers utilize propaganda to create insiders and outsiders—thereby creating instability and internally displaced people (IDP) through violence—shows how refugees are also framed for political purposes. Section 2.1.2 provides an overview of how social power is analyzed through an examination of interactions between relevant actors.

Despite the institutional authority and flexing of power imposed by both the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) and the Kenyan government, refugees stabilize the economy through their own social power, which is demonstrated using the four dimensions of power (Digereser 1992; Haugaard 2015). Briefly, the Kenyan state flexes the first dimension of power as physical coercion. If refugees are found outside the camps without an identity card, they can be jailed, fined, deported, and even beaten. The second dimension of power highlights behind-the-scenes institutional power, as refugees are not allowed to join either state legislators or become judges, even though laws are created that directly affect the refugees. From these two obvious measures of power, the social sciences

* The ethnic Somalis, situated on the Horn of Africa, are spread over primarily four countries: Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.
provide a more nuanced view within the third and fourth dimensions of power, which focus on how the subjects of power (the refugees), internalize their domination (Figure 2).

**Figure 2.** Diagram of four dimensions of power. Note that the two largest (third and fourth dimension) are the hardest to see in action.

The **third dimension of power** is a domain wherein the refugees accept their status (i.e., inability to move beyond the refugee camps, except with UNHCR permission, and inability to hold legal jobs). Their acceptance of the status quo can be measured through the fact that most refugees stay in the camp, despite having to struggle, by accepting the largesse of the international humanitarian effort or by utilizing overseas connections and wide-flung family networks for remittances.

On a level that is harder to measure, the **fourth dimension of power** shows how refugees build their own subject-hood by gathering resources from a variety of sources, including some that operate outside of the institutional controls placed by the Kenyan government and the UNHCR. The imposition of official regulations upon refugees can be seen to be offset by their
creative use of social and economic capital, but only if that view is attended by ethnographic detail (Gledhill 2009; Ortner 1995) or by analyses based on long-term fieldwork with the refugees.

Section 2.3 investigates the actions of refugees within Dadaab as agents operating in the limited confines of the camp and who must provide for their economic stability through remittances sent from relatives overseas, or by working at minimal-paying jobs for NGOs within the camp. Understanding how refugees assert their agency is most easily measured through the social analytic of Gaventa’s power cube (2006), which examines the spaces, forms, and levels of power. Applying power cube-inspired analysis in the context of the Kenyan refugee camp, institutional power is seen to be subverted on global, national, and local levels as refugees assert their own agency despite being stateless subjects.

Section 2.4 demonstrates how refugees are working for stability and order within the camp. Following terrorist attacks both inside and outside the camp in 2011, the Kenyan government indiscriminately beat refugees in an attempt to gain information about the attacks’ perpetrators, and the UNHCR withdrew services because of the terrorism. The refugees volunteered to both distribute food and provide security, even dispensing vigilante justice against violent offenders with possible terrorist connections. As UNHCR funding shrank due to crises in other parts of the world and as attacks escalated, the refugees continued supporting the camp. Despite the Kenyan government’s claims that the refugees contribute to instability, this analysis shows them at the core of both informal economic and social power in Northeastern Kenya.

After analyzing the fourth dimension of power by demonstrating that some refugees use their social power to be an agent of stability despite their marginalization as subjects within the humanitarian aid regime, the authors propose that governmental and institutional actors should find a different approach to both Kenya’s war on terror and the Somalian civil war. Ultimately, the Kenyan government’s rhetorical creation of insiders and outsiders generates more instability within the region. With implications for the fight against terrorism in other parts of the world, this work’s analysis of social power demonstrates that more diplomatic pressure from global leaders is needed to encourage nation building within Kenya. Rather than providing funds for Kenya’s war on terror, the international community should find a balance of humanitarian aid for the immediate
refugee emergency along with a plan for longer-term building of stability through the refugees’ own use of social power.

The growing number of refugees worldwide because of natural disasters and conflict should be the impetus for the international community to change their methods of dealing with these emergencies. If we continue to treat refugees as a “temporary” problem to be quarantined until the environmental catastrophe or the war dissipates, then the power of the refugees as actors in the process of rebuilding is being squandered. By performing a social analysis of each refugee-spawning event, governments and international organizations should be able to tap the creative power of the victims so that they do not find themselves in the midst of 25 years of warehousing people in marginal locations with no end in sight.

2.1 **Historical landscape**

A historical framework is crucial to understand the current relationship between the Kenyan government and the refugees. This history also must extend farther than Kenya’s borders to fully grasp the multitude of factors at play in the refugee situation. The refugees’ homeland, Somalia, and the major threat that drives them from that homeland, political violence (first a coup/civil war and currently al-Shabaab), are also integral to the historical discussion of the refugee situation in Kenya. The following section will present a brief history of Kenya, Somalia, and the Dadaab camp to give both a timeline of the events leading up to and through the creation of the refugee situation and insight into the Kenyan government’s false claim of refugee-based instability within the nation.

2.1.1 **A history of Kenya: Land, ethnicity, politics**

Both historically and presently, the inhabitants of Kenya have regarded land as a precious commodity. Agriculture is a main pillar of the economy, but with only about 24% of arable land, access for both subsistence and commercial farming is extremely competitive (Kamungi 2009, 347). During British colonial rule, the marriage of land and the ethnicity of its residents found new ties to economic standing and productivity (Holmquist et al. 1994). The British attempted to profit from existing African export revenue by appropriating land to European settlers. The colonial state did everything in its power to create a lucrative economic environment for the settlers, and the settlers in turn were encouraged to request state assistance to fulfill the production demand. This “pattern of ethnically-defined
large-holder export sector dependent upon state nurture” (Holmquist et al. 1994, 71) began a relationship between economy, politics and ethnicity (Ajulu 2002, 253; Holmquist et al. 1994). Furthermore, the colonial state was giving landed settlers a larger share in the decision of the national framework because of the land and revenue opportunities they had claim to. One example was the state giving settlers veto authority over policy issues directly affecting them (Holmquist et al. 1994, 5). Africans internalized this example in two ways when they were later settling into independence: (1) ethnicity is tied to who gets the land and (2) owning land means a bigger share of the national decision-making power. These two concepts also serve as the base ideology for the insider/outsider dichotomy.

Despite the British colonial state’s coaxing of European settlers’ economic growth, some Africans did enjoy commercial revenue successes (Holmquist et al. 1994, 72). Most notable was the first coffee-growing licenses issued by the British to members of the Kikuyu ethnic group (Ajulu 2002, 254), though this happened very late in the colonial period with meager earnings. Crucially though, the Kikuyu economic accumulation was an empowerment of the African residents and was a main instigator of the 1940s era of political radicalization against colonial rule (Holmquist et al. 1994). The political radicalization and upheaval of the indigenous residents was a desperate cry for security and stability because the colonial rulers’ support allowed the white settlers to take resources and modes of profit at will while ignoring the needs of the African settlers. In response, Africans formed and strengthened existing ethnic ties to offer financial and (at the time) physical protection and advancement for the Africans struggling in the colonial economy (Holmquist et al. 1994, 72-73)—a strength in numbers type of approach. The sectioning of ethnic groups scrambling for a share of scarce economic resources would prove to have huge ramifications in the post-colonial period of Kenya.

The slow beginning of a state power transfer from the British to the Africans in the 1940s (Ajulu 2002, 255), led to Kenya’s independence in 1963. Ironically, independence further encouraged ethnic divisions in the new African-controlled political realm, with an increase in ethnic- and clan-based political organizations that were all vying for influence in the burgeoning nation-state (Ajulu 2002, 257). As the rocky transition to independence concluded, “It was this competition for control of the post-independent state that was to provide the background for post-colonial
political ethnicity” (Ajulu 2002, 259). The bold ethnic lines that were created in attempting to win power over the new nation-state would reappear to fuel and define the insider/outsider dichotomy that was based on the relationship between land ownership and the amount of power/share of decision making. This dichotomy would build in strength as Kenya settled into independence.

The newly independent Kenya was a one-party system from 1963–1991 and was first led by a Kikuyu, Jomo Kenyatta, until his death in 1978. After Kenyatta’s death, the country was then led by his vice-president, Daniel arap Moi, who is a Kalenjin. But at the regional and local level, ethnic tension was still gaining ground, fostered by ethnic territorial squabbles between newly independent Kenyan citizens regarding the unequal land redistribution from the ex-colonizers (Holmquist et al. 1994). The oftentimes class-based scramble for limited amounts of land left many Africans without land and bitter towards the landed classes (Kamungi 2009, 348). This bitterness, combined with the repressive Moi regime (Kamungi 2009, 350), had a direct effect in the violent aftermath of the election of 1992. Two things are important to note about this election: (1) Daniel arap Moi’s re-election was steeped in corruption and (2) dissatisfaction with that corruption led to the development of a multi-party system. This new political system would prove to shatter any hope of multi-ethnic unity in the Kenyan government (Kamungi 2009, 351-2).

Following his election, an alleged Kalenjin-led ethnic cleansing of the Rift Valley occurred, with the support of the Maasai people. The ethnic cleansing displaced more than 300,000 people in order to “punish communities who did not vote for the ruling party” (Kamungi 2009, 352). Even though some of these IDPs returned to the Rift Valley in 1993, they continued to be punished “through illegal transfers of their land, malicious grazing on their crops, corrupt diversion of humanitarian aid and privatization of public land allocated for IDP resettlement” (Kamungi 2009, 352). This was the first major instance of politicized, ethnically-charged, widespread autochthony. Autochthony, the practice of labeling who is indigenous and who is an outsider, has repercussions that affect not only the many different ethnicities inside Kenya, but also the many different nationalities that enter Kenya.
An elaboration upon the situation of the IDPs and how the Kenyan government has used ethnic tension to ostracize its own displaced citizens for political ends is important in understanding the effects of autochthony on the refugees in Kenya. IDPs are in a unique situation; they have not crossed any internationally recognized borders (KHRC 2011, 8), but they are in desperate need of humanitarian support. They retain full Kenyan citizenship but have been displaced within their own borders, mainly due to political violence. Unlike refugees, who garner protection under the Geneva Convention because they travel across national boundaries to escape local violence or environmental catastrophe, IDPs fall under the auspices of their own government; however, they receive very limited and fluctuating Kenyan governmental support, and they rely on NGO assistance when available (KHRC 2011, 12). They are forced to rely on their own government for basic survival supplies and resettlement assistance (both financially and geographically). However, the Kenyan government is woefully underequipped to deal with such massive human movement. It also lacks motivation to create durable solutions and instead, it creates and encourages hostile environments for the IDPs through the propagation of autochthony.

Returning to Kenya’s timeline, a brief flirtation with relative peace and rejection of ethnic hatred and violence occurred after the 2002 election, which saw the defeat of the oppressive Moi regime and the rise of Mwai Kibaki; however, the improvement ceased with the 2007 election (Kamungi 2009). Rhetoric that began prior to the elections had a direct hand in creating an “outsider” group of IDPs due to negative discourse that was spread through Kenyan government platforms, such as political rallies and speeches. The negative discourse reminded the IDPs of their new secondary citizenship status (Jenkins 2015, 231). A politically reinforced insider/outsider framework created a new natural order and new labels (Haugaard 2015, 153) in which the exclusion of the IDPs and violence toward them appears reasonable and acceptable to the other, non-IDP agents. This rhetoric in turn allowed the government to further highlight the “outsider” status of the IDPs, thereby fueling the ethnic “insiders” rightful land ownership claims (Jenkins 2015) that harken back to colonial-era ethnic ties to land.

The subsequent post-election violence was an explosion of ethnic tension and violently-defended political solidarity. Mirroring the historical exam-
ple set by the colonial British in their blatant economic support of European settlers, “economic prosperity and development is understood by local-level actors as being directly linked to having a member of the ethnic group in power” (Jenkins 2012, 586). It was this post-election violence that brought the number of IDPs to 663,921 (Kamungi 2013, 3). The large number of IDPs displaced, combined with an unprepared government, created a humanitarian crisis in Kenya that remains ongoing. The Kenyan government compounds this humanitarian crisis by publically propagating the IDPs as outsiders (Jenkins 2015). The government is fostering the same outsider rhetoric toward the refugees.

The vast number of IDPs and the growing accounts of violence against the refugees highlight the very real effects of politicized ethnicity, along with the insider/outsider dichotomy and its sometimes violent ends. The numbers also demand an investigation into the power struggles that created this situation. More importantly, the long history of instability in the nation, even before the first wave of IDPs in 1991 and especially before the arrival of the Somali refugees during that same year, is in contradiction to the claims made by the government that the “outsiders” are a threat to the nation. The government-led spread of autochthony towards the IDPs is in direct relation to the insider/outsider dichotomy being propagated by the government regarding the Somalian refugees. However, the Kenya government has a slightly different rhetoric when encouraging the refugees “outsider” status; by fabricating the idea of refugee-based terrorism and insecurity, the division between insider and outsider is painted as one of safety.

The political history of Kenya is so closely intertwined with its ethnic groups and the question of land ownership that the three cannot be discussed independently, because all are at the root of the power framework in Kenya. This three-headed dynamic of Kenyan power framework both explains the history leading to the struggle of all groups of displaced people within Kenya and also shows the evolution of the current framework of power that has led to government claims of insecurity within the nation. Even though at the core these issues remain three-pronged, the past’s colonial roots have metastasized in current times to include a power struggle that is fueled by layers of government instability and underscored tones of autochthony. In other words, the historical foundations of ethnic tension and autochthony have created a political and social landscape that is hostile to both the IDPs and refugees (really any “ethnic outsider”) instead of
those displaced people being the cause of the instability as is claimed by the Kenyan government. For a more thorough discussion on the IDPs and autochthony see Appendix A.

2.1.2 Somalia and political violence

The confluence of Somali peoples’ primarily pastoral lifestyle and the imposition of borders during 1884’s Berlin conference, wherein European powers imposed borders and divided up the continent into colonial territories. This action led to ethnic Somali populations spreading across what is now Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya (Horst 2006). Although the British and Italians ceded independence to Somalia in 1960, General Mohamed Siad Barre took control of Somalia by coup in 1969, and his ouster as a military dictator in 1991 spurred civil war. The first wave of Somalian refugees entered Kenya at this time, and they continued in successive waves following Somalian droughts and/or the ebb and flow of battle during Somalia’s civil war.

2.1.2.1 The accidental city’s establishment

The camp began in 1991, when Somalis who were fleeing the violence of longtime dictator Siad Barre’s ouster were provided space in the northeast, arid region of Kenya (Murunga 2005). In an area that already hosted groups of pastoral Kenyan Somalis, the Kenyan government created Ifo, a refugee camp near the small town of Dadaab (5,000 people). Two other camps, Dagahaley and Hagadera, followed in March and June of 1992 and drew more Kenyan Somalis to the town (Horst 2006, 78). These local pastoralist nomads came to the area in order to take advantage of water sources, low food prices, and opportunities to sell cattle and milk. Although located in a sparsely populated and economically distant area, the burgeoning population of both refugees and hosts became an integral (and more permanent than was originally intended) socioeconomic hub for the region (Montclos and Kagwanja 2000).

Although Dadaab town was the original permanent settlement, the refugee camps are now referenced collectively by many authors as “Dadaab,” indicating the breadth of both the societal and economic impact of the refugee camps in Northeastern Kenya. This report uses the distinguisher of “Dadaab town” when discussing the pre-camp settlement, and uses “Dadaab” to indicate all the refugee camps in that area. The Kenyan government, worried about the effect of thousands of refugees on its national economy
(i.e., worried that refugees will take limited jobs), confined refugees to the camp and barred them from getting gainful employment (Besteman 2016, 65; Hyndman and Nylund 1998). As refugees fled en masse from Somalia, they were granted prima facie status, which meant that rather than taking each individual claim of asylum on its own in relation to the 1951 United Nations (UN) Refugee Convention, the Kenyan government was able to regard them as temporary refugees (Hyndman and Nylund 1998). The prima facie designation limited both the responsibility of the government and the rights of the refugees because of what was thought at the time to be a “temporary” situation, leaving the UNHCR responsible for managing the camps. Therefore, NGOs and international aid agencies controlled these “accidental cities” (cf. Jansen 2011 for exploration of this term in relation to Kakuma refugee camp, and Appendix B of this report for a summary of research), giving these long-term camps (with over a two-decade life span to date) their own unique laws and economies—in effect, creating limited city-states within Kenya. The Kenyan governments’ arguments for closing the two decades-old “accidental city” include the threat of terrorism and continuing instability within the country’s borders (cf. Crisp 2000; Kirui and Mwaruvie 2012; Kumssa and Jones 2014; Mogire 2011; Murunga 2005; Williams 2014).

2.1.2.2 Al-Shabaab, and Dadaab as a supposed incubator for terrorism

Official Kenyan policy was that refugees remain within the camps, but it was not until al-Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassy in Kenya during 1998, and another terrorist bombing occurred at a hotel in the Kenyan city of Mombasa in 2002 that the government actively pursued this policy (Burns 2010, 9). Soon afterward came the creation of al-Shabaab, a military force that arose from the political climate of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia’s capital of Mogadishu circa 2003–04 (Ploch 2010). This militant faction was pushed into southern rural Somalia when Ethiopia invaded and claimed the Somalian capital city at the end of 2006 (Barnes and Hassan 2007). A more recent rash of terrorist attacks were spurred by Kenya’s current military incursion in southern Somalia, starting in 2011 (Anderson and McKnight 2015). According to the Kenyan government, al-Shabaab terrorists have infiltrated the refugee camps and planned attacks on Kenya from within the camp’s borders (Nyabola 2015). Although many attacks have occurred within Kenya, there is no evidence that these attacks were perpetrated by Somalis from the camps (as will be analyzed below). The prevalence of Kenyan offenders in the specific attacks demonstrates not that Dadaab is a hotbed of insecurity, but rather that al-Shabaab has been
extremely successful in recruiting disenfranchised Kenyan citizens long before Kenya’s 2011 invasion of Somalia (Anderson and McKnight 2015, 544). The Kenyan government’s insistence on confining refugees to the camps and maintaining its rhetoric that Dadaab spawns terrorism highlights the power of the nation-state, but hides layers of both institutional and social power.

2.2 Theorizing the camp as a nexus of power

The Kenyan government’s conceding of the management of refugees within its borders to the UNHCR while maintaining control of security through police indicates the state’s claim on sovereign power as a nation.* Power as a mechanism of control has been theorized from a variety of perspectives, and examining the four dimensions of power (Digeser 1992; Haugaard 2015) provides a framework leading to a nuanced examination of control in the context of refugee camps. At the root of the first dimension of power is that one person or organization of people (e.g., the Kenyan state) gets another person (e.g., the refugee) to do something they would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957). The second dimension of power is the power of an organization (or government) to exclude people from the table where decisions about their future is made. On a bit more abstract level, the third dimension of power is the internal choice by the subjects of power to accept as natural the laws and physical coercion of those in power. While the fourth dimension of power acknowledges that each person, although exposed to the first three dimensions, builds their own subject-hood by both accepting and rejecting different aspects of power impressed upon them. After situating the four dimensions of power within the context of the Kenyan refugees, the authors now return to the baseline of power.

Quite simply, the first dimension of power is the coercion, through the force of police and other agents of the state, to compel the Somali refugees to stay in the camps against their will. If the refugees are found outside the camps, they risk being thrown in jail and possibly beaten. The institutional frame of this example also highlights the second dimension of power—structural power. Although the very personal threat of violence is enough to gain compliance (i.e., first dimension), the power of institutional struc-

* The UNHCR concedes that it has limited power in relation to security within the camps because aid workers are confined to their compound at night, and both rape and banditry within the camp itself were common in the first decade of Dadaab (Crisp 2000).
ture further induces the refugee to comply. Through a lack of Kenyan citizenship and consequent lesser rights as a “temporary” refugee, the victim is aware of their position and conforms to the status quo. Although the refugee could not speak out in protest when these laws were put into place within far-removed legislative institutions, he or she still complies in order to receive the benefits of food, shelter, and relative stability outside the war zone. Rather than the emphasis on force in the first dimension, the second dimension of power highlights the structural aspect of who is, or who is not, at the table when decisions are made (Bachrach and Baratz 1962).

The consent of the refugee to stay in the camps and not seek employment elsewhere is an acknowledgement of the Kenyan government’s decision to limit the refugees’ movements, with the understanding that their basic needs will be meet by the UNHCR and various NGOs.*

In framing the terrorism as instigated by Somali refugees, the Kenyan state asserts the third dimension of power by creating a narrative of insecurity while also actively and publicly working to “fix” the problem. State propaganda frames the problem, encouraging both Kenyan citizens and refugees to accept the state’s repressive measures in hope of more “security.” Within the third dimension of power, willing subjects internalize their own domination (Lukes 2005:109), and although much harder to measure, the third dimension of power provides a theoretical explanation that moves beyond the physical reasons why refugees submit to the camps (e.g., the first and second dimensions of power).

All subjects operate within the boundaries of the nation, and interpret their situation from this perspective, understanding that once they cross this metaphorical line in the sand they are no longer in Somalia and, consequently, different rules apply. Laws are emphasized by the state through unbridled use of power as police arbitrarily detain and abuse refugees both in and out of the camps (Ghoshal 2012)—once again, the first and second dimensions of power. The power of the Kenyan state is demonstrated in providing a certain amount of stability by allowing the UNHCR to set up

* Although 54,000 refugees are registered by the UNHCR in Nairobi and are legally allowed to leave the camps (as of December 2011), many of these refugees are from Somalia, Dadaab, and the Kakuma refugee camp (UNHCR and DRC 2012:10). Therefore, it appears that most refugees stay in the camp, as required by the Kenyan government.
and manage the camps within Kenya’s borders. The refugees’ consent to the power arrangement highlights the third dimension of power, an acknowledgment of state control, because they are unable to leave the camp or to look for work within Kenya (Horst 2006, 81; Hyndman 1999) in exchange for food, a place to live, and the possibility for resettlement.*

Refugees’ freedom is limited by the ideology that the nation-states’ rules must be followed in order to reap the benefits of the camp. Notwithstanding refugees’ subjection to the third dimension of power within the camps, a variety of influences serve to build a unique sense of being. The fourth dimension of power emphasizes the creation of subjects within a particular milieu, and although the subjects may be targets of the first three dimensions of power, the building of subject-hood is more diffuse than just being constrained by state-power or UNHCR bureaucratic processes (Hyndman 2000). The focus of the fourth dimension of power is how the refugees are both dominated by the first three dimensions, but also build their own consciousness as subjects (Digeser 1992; Haugaard 2012). The following are examples of the refugees’ subject-hood: (a) refugees’ interactions with others to create livelihoods and businesses that stretch beyond the camp (Horst 2004), (b) their contact with local Kenyans (Enghoff et al. 2010; Kamau and Fox 2013), (c) their learning about human rights in UNHCR-sponsored classes (Rawlence 2016, 95 and 149), and (4) their schooling (Kamau and Fox 2013). These experiences have formed subjects who are sometimes not in subservience to either the Kenyan state or the UNHCR. The fact that these refugees have traveled from another country (Somalia) emphasizes that some of them were already at the center of migratory networks which may stretch into other parts of Kenya and even further international realms, despite rules that limit access to outsiders and deny transit for refugees within the country (Horst 2004; Jansen 2015; Lindley 2010).

On the surface, it appears the Kenyan government has successfully marginalized Somali refugees by utilizing the power of the state to limit move-

* Although beyond the scope of this paper, a variety of perspectives about the resettlement of Somali refugees have been approached by scholars, including the challenges of resettling in another country (Besteman 2016), the institutional hurdles posed by changing family dynamics (Balakian 2016), the effects of remittances from refugees settled abroad (Horst 2004, 2008; Lindley 2010), the longing for resettlement that is generated by those left in the camps (Horst 2006), and governmental private refugee sponsorship programs (Pickering and Nolin 2017).
ment and their accessibility to jobs (Horst 2006, 81). However, the refugees flex their own agency—against institutional forces of the first three dimensions of power—by using “gray” money* to travel outside the camps and pay bribes to police who stop them in order to stay out of jail (Balkian 2016). Cash money also maintains kinship associations across international and overseas distances (Lindley 2010). Remittances by Somalis who are now abroad provide crucial income for those still in the country (Gundel 2003; Horst 2004), and Dadaab’s connections to Somalia are an integral part of these diasporic links (Rawlence 2016, 46). Using social power through their networks beyond the camp demonstrates how they build their own subject-hood with the tools and situation at hand.

The fourth dimension of power is where a variety of factors constitute subjects. Refugees find themselves fleeing a civil war and famine to arrive at Dadaab, where they are imposed upon by the Kenyan state but also taught income-generating skills and human rights by UNHCR classes and workshops (Horst 2006). Refugees are cast as vulnerable victims by the UN, or as cunning crooks by the Kenyan state (Horst 2002, 242). Although the government frames them as outsiders, who are either terrorists or out to steal Kenyan jobs, the authors here argue that through the pressures of the Kenyan state, the actions of UNHCR, and the necessity of survival, the displaced Somali people constitute themselves as subjects who should be understood within the fourth dimension of power. Claims that refugees perpetuate violence as terrorists and that they destabilize the economy will be examined. Turning to the pressures placed by the Kenyan government, which are rooted in a long history of creating insiders and outsiders, an analysis will be made of how they react to or counteract the first, second, and third dimensions of power in relation to their broader marginalization in Kenya.

2.3 Economic insecurity or stability within the Kenyan state?

The Kenyan government claims the primary reason for shutting down Dadaab is because of security. Its assertions that the refugee situation is temporary and that refugees destabilize the economy will be examined to understand the extent to which political rhetoric is utilized to justify state oversight. The government’s hyperbole builds both the understanding that Kenyan citizens have certain rights, and that Somali refugees must submit to state power as outsiders. The creation of this discourse represents the

* Gray markets refer to unofficial or untaxed trade, which is where this money is generated.
third dimension of power through a concrete example. However, the refugees are active subjects who create their own world views and then operate within that understanding—the fourth dimension of power being the subconscious construction of subject-hood. To consider how various actors are complicit in their domination, but also how institutional authority is subverted, each group must be viewed through a theoretical lens that teases apart the interweaving of power. By analyzing the social relations of actors using the spaces, forms, and levels of power presented in Gaventa’s power cube (2006), we are able to disentangle how power works, both directly and through diffuse networks (cf. Barnett and Duvall 2005).

Building on Lukes’ three dimensions of power (2005),* Gaventa’s cube created a means of analysis that focuses on **spaces** (closed, invited, or claimed/created), **forms** (visible, hidden, or invisible), and **levels or places** (global, national, or local) of power (Gaventa 2006). Although visually represented as a cube, Gaventa cautions that rather than seeing each measure as a static set of categories, the spaces, forms, and levels of power should be seen as a set of interwoven relationships (Gaventa 2006, 26). In defining the levels, spaces, and forms of power, the authors here give an example in the context of Kenya and the Somali refugees to demonstrate how the power cube furthers the analysis of the four dimensions of power.

The first face on the power cube comprises the **spaces** of power (Figure 3)—the locations for opportunities, moments, and channels where citizens can act to potentially influence policies, discourses, decisions, and relationships that affect their lives and interests (Gaventa 2006, 26). The three spaces of power are **closed**, **invited**, and **claimed/created**. Refugees in Kenya find themselves in a space of power that is generally **closed** to them, because they are not allowed behind the legislative or policy doors in which decisions are made, whether these decisions and policies are made by the Kenyan government, the UNHCR, or NGOs. Some refugees are **invited** into the space of power in a limited fashion. When UNHCR funds a particular planned series of events, the refugees are allowed to give programmatic input within the camp (e.g., CARE’s Vulnerable Women and Children program in Horst 2006, 99) Because of their noncitizen status, refugees can very rarely **claim/create** power by themselves, and if so, they

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* Lukes (2005) built on the first and second dimensions of power as theorized by earlier social scientists, with the first edition of his book in 1974. He expanded to three dimensions, which were later developed by other theorists into four dimensions (Digeser 1992, Haugaard 2015).
can claim power only in the contexts of the refugee camp through appeal to the UNHCR or NGOs.

**Figure 3.** The power cube consists of interlocking faces on a side that relate to other sides and faces of the cube/aspects of power (ERDC-CERL graphic modeled after Gaventa’s power cube).

The second cube-face comprises the **forms** of power and to some degree, they mirror the dimensions of power. The forms of power demonstrate the visibility of power and how clearly that power can be seen operating. On the *visible* level, we see the Kenyan government and the UNHCR making laws and rules to order the refugees’ lives both inside and outside the camps. The *hidden* form of power highlights who sets the political agenda, which again is dominated by Kenya’s government, its agents, the UNHCR, and NGOs. However, the *invisible* form of power is the shaping of meaning and what is acceptable behind both closed doors and on the ground, outside institutions of power. When this form of power is examined in relation to all the actors involved, it can be seen that (1) *invisible* power correlates with the building of subject-hood in the fourth dimension of power, and (2) by analyzing *invisible* forms of power with the last cube face—the levels of power—then it can be seen how refugees, and those with their interests, flex informal power as they build their subject-hood and operate both inside and outside the confines of institutional power.
The levels or places of power—the last face of the cube comprising local, national, and global places—highlights how refugees utilize social power to survive within the confines of their prima facie status. On a local level, the Kenyan government claims Dadaab is a central point from which terrorists plan attacks in Kenya. The local levels of power can be examined within the refugee camp (see Section 2.4 on security within the camps). Analyzing power on both national and global levels within Kenya provides insight on how refugees’ subject-hood is built through a variety of outside agents and also demonstrates how the refugees resist institutional power.

2.3.1 Gaining an income by whatever means possible

Despite the Kenyan government’s inferences that refugees would destabilize the economy if they joined the formal job markets, upon further examination, this assertion is shown to be false, and the camp is found to be a boon to economic stability. Within the parched North Eastern Province, Dadaab generates large sources of income through the use of local Kenyan labor who build the physical infrastructure and provide the services needed for operating a humanitarian camp of Dadaab’s magnitude (Enghoff et al. 2010). The economic benefits brought to the area from camp operations have benefitted the host community with an estimated $14 million USD annually (Enghoff et al. 2010, 9). In a 50 km area surrounding the camp, researchers estimate there are 20,000 households (Enghoff et al. 2010). If each household equally benefits from the camp economically, the average annual household income of $700 USD (just from Dadaab) provides 71% of the Kenyan gross national income (GNI) per capita (World Bank nd.) (The Kenyan GNI for 2010, the same year as the Enghoff et al. report, was $980 USD.)

2.3.2 Financial interaction with local community

Due to the limitations on refugee movement, local herders provide meat and other foodstuffs not included in the UNHCR’s basic rations. The numerous informal marketplaces in the camp not only support local Kenyans, but also provide support for some refugees to start businesses. The prospective Somali business owner can either save the UNHCR basic rations that are received and then sell them in the local market, or else rely on capital generated from remittances (Horst 2006; this also happens in Kakuma camp – cf. Jansen 2011; Oka 2014; Vemuru et al. 2016). Many refugees have built up this avenue of revenue; approximately 5,000 businesses are run by refugees, some with the capital provided by NGOs
This level of financial integration alludes to a complex interplay between locals (who are mostly ethnic Kenyan Somali) and the refugees, who must balance their identity as the “border-crossing other” with their confinement in Dadaab. Seeing how people constitute themselves as subjects (the fourth dimension of power) and returning to Gaventa’s places of power (2006), an analysis of local levels of power must be done from a variety of perspectives and must be situated within ethnographic data obtained on the ground.

Although the vast majority of refugees stay in the camps, the UNHCR does allow a limited number of passes so that refugees can travel to cities for training and school. These refugees must register with the UNHCR before leaving Dadaab, allowing an understanding of how many refugees legally live in the cities. In Nairobi alone, there are 33,537 registered refugees (Kamau and Fox 2013, 10), although some of these refugees are from Somalia and Kakuma (UNHCR and DRC 2012, 10). Yet, travel to the city does not involve just those going for training, but also those who travel “illegally” for economic opportunity, as many people travel back and forth. In the camps, daily bus and taxi traffic of approximately 800 people commute to Nairobi and Garissa (Enghoff et al. 2010, 44). Consequently, the unofficial numbers of Dadaab refugees in the cities is higher, and it is impossible to calculate (UNHCR and DRC 2012, 10). Nonetheless, refugees’ travel alludes to broader economic integration within the region.

Following these widespread economic threads beyond the camp, an analysis of the national places/levels of power reminds us that informal power exists in invisible market transactions (Gaventa 2006, 27). Because the refugee camps are managed by the UNHCR, and the Kenyan government does not allow refugees to legally work, some refugees resort to gaining remittances sent from overseas to Dadaab or money brought from refugee family members who illicitly work in Kenyan cities. Using this outside money, the Dadaab refugees can pay for the trip into town (Horst 2004, 7). The national and international remittances are then leveraged as refugees travel to Nairobi for broader work opportunities.

Through the use of whatever means is at their disposal, refugees work to support their families, despite the constraints imposed by the Kenyan government and the threats of the police and military. The refugees travel to cities in order to find work, with the camps creating a base of operations. On a national level, the presence of the camps create incentive jobs and
connections with surrounding Kenyan groups, expanding the economy around Dadaab (Enghoff et al. 2010).* The remittances Somalis send from abroad to the camps provides international support and stability for refugees to build their own informal businesses (Gundel 2003; Horst 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008; Horst and Van Hear 2002; Lindley 2010). The international and local economies thrive, and sometimes they thrive in surprising directions. For example, one business owner in Dadaab sent $75,000 he had saved to the United States so that his son could buy a truck and start a shipping company there (Rawlence 2016, 205). By confining the refugees to camps and disallowing them legal work, the government is overlooking the stabilizing factor of camp economics on global, national, and local levels. And by focusing on the local level, the ethnographic evidence demonstrates how the Kenyan government’s claims that refugees are terrorists is false.

### 2.4 Physical security within the camps

Both the UNHCR and NGOs report excessive levels of violence within the camps (cf. Crisp 2000), which should certainly not be discounted. However, between the Kenyan government’s characterization of the refugee camps as training camps for terrorists and the UNHCR lumping the refugees into an undifferentiated mass of passive victims,† the refugees’ active construction of their own subject-hood is lost in the process. Thus the actions of refugees as subjects becomes critical as a unit of analysis. And with the Kenyan government claiming the camps should be shut down because they are a security threat, the security within Dadaab must be examined next.

Although many attacks occur in the camps, any analysis of security must look past the blame the government casts on the refugees to examine ethnographic detail on the ground (much like economic security within Kenya was examined). The government declared that terrorists came from the camps and attacked the nation, using Dadaab as a base during the Westgate Mall attack. At that time, while Minister Joseph Ole Lenku condemned the camps as breeding grounds for terrorists, the newspapers

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* Incentive jobs provide low-paying work to refugees in the camps by employing their assistance to international aid organizations and NGOs. Researchers examined the effect of the Kakuma refugee camp on the economy in Northeastern Kenya and discovered benefits for both refugees and locals (Oka 2011, 2014; Sanghi et al. 2016; Vemuru et al. 2016).

† Horst describes how the UNHCR and NGOs distinguish between refugees, but generally from the perspective of which victims (read: refugees) are more vulnerable or destitute than others (2006:99).
printed every rumor, including the rumor that the terrorists had trained in Dadaab and then travelled to Nairobi by helicopter. Although one Dadaab policeman claimed to have seen the helicopter, most refugees and humanitarian aid workers laughed at that ludicrous suggestion. In a crowded refugee camp with 360-degree visibility on the flat plain, it was odd that no one else had seen the helicopter. Both a Kenyan government official in the Department of Refugee Affairs and a Dadaab UN security officer dismissed the premise that any sophisticated coordination of attacks could have been planned in the closely monitored camps, especially with a lack of regular internet connection (Rawlence 2016, 331–32). Despite these officials’ tacit support of refugees against the scapegoating, an institutional bias toward UN workers, at the expense of camp dwellers, still led the UN to support further constraints on the refugees in the name of “security.”

The alignment of UNHCR’s concerns with the state security apparatus is not new, as the Head of the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit of the Office of the UNHCR stated only nine years after the establishment of the refugee camp, “As well as supporting the local police in Kakuma and Dadaab, UNHCR has attempted to establish better security arrangements within the camps” (Crisp 2000, 613). Despite the prevalence of sexual violence in Dadaab (Crisp 2000) or the purported conflict between refugees and locals (Ikanda 2008, 31; Mogire 2011, 71–77),* the continued calls for security within the camps mirrors the rhetoric the Kenyan government uses to support police and military crackdown in wider Kenya—that Dadaab is a hotbed of terrorism. In analyzing the terrorist attacks, the authors of this report find that none of the offenders were from the camps.

The government’s pointing at refugees as the source of the assaults proves to be patently false when reviewing the lack of evidence for most, if not all, of the bombings and attacks. The nature of bombings, and what makes them so appealing to terrorists, is the difficulty in tracking the actors who set them. Human Rights Watch documented 26 attacks in Kenya from October 2011 to February 2012, with 11 landmine or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) listed as the cause (Ghoshal 2012, 53–56). Even gun and grenade attacks rarely result in arrests, since most of the assaults list “unknown assailants” or the generic “gunmen” as the perpetrators (in 12

* Although both Ikanda and Mogire claim the locals see the refugees in negative terms—that the refugees are more economically advantaged because of assistance from agencies and that locals dislike the refugees because of competition for scarce natural resources—other scholars highlight the integration between locals and refugees while downplaying the conflict (Enghoff et al. 2010; Kamau and Fox 2013).
instances)—and only one example gives a clear listing of al-Shabaab as the attackers, yet no other details (Ghoshal 2012, 53–56). With few suspects having been charged in court, and none of the suspects have been Somali refugees, the onus of proving claims that refugees spur the violence should rest on the Kenyan government. In spite of claims that refugees are the main targets of terrorist recruitment (Burns 2010, 11–12), a unbiased analysis of the facts demonstrates that the Somali-based terrorist organization, al-Shabaab, finds its most willing recruits in Kenyan citizens.

Kenyan officials consistently refuse to acknowledge that the violence springs from domestic terrorism. In a country that is 84% Christian (Botha 2014, 7), the government’s heavy-handed efforts to disparage ethnic Somalis (who are often Muslim) results in political assassinations of Muslim religious leaders (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 18; Botha 2014, 3) and the continued economic marginalization of these minorities. A review of literature finds that the government provides al-Shabaab with fertile terrain for recruitment within Kenya, and the terrorist organization utilizes tactics adept at tapping into particular local Kenyan frustrations—whether economic deprivation (Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens 2014; Anderson and McKnight 2015, 543), religious frictions (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 19; Anderson and McKnight 2015, 546; Botha 2014, 9), or mistrust of the government (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 20; Botha 2014, 7–8). Once citizens feel delegitimized from the political process, they become an outsider who can be easily convinced to carry out violent attacks against what they see as a corrupt government. With attacks by domestic terrorists targeting greater Kenya, it is easy for the government to blame Somali refugees. Yet, bombings and assassinations have also occurred in Dadaab, which results in the Kenyan government, UNHCR, and NGOs reducing services or even completely withdrawing for security’s sake.

In the name of security, the following questions must be asked: Who is making the Dadaab attacks? What are the effects of the bombings and shootings? As a precursor to these questions, it should be noted that the

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* For examples of how al-Shabaab recruits Kenyans rather than refugees see Anderson and McKnight 2015, 543; Anderson and McKnight 2014, 17, 22-23, 26.

† The history of al-Shabaab in Kenya can be found in Appendix C.
prevalence of sexual violence or gender-related concerns,* health problems,† and conflict with both locals and campmates are all issues factoring into the structural violence inherent in refugee camps.‡ However, in the interest of space, only violence that appears to be terrorist-related is examined here—primarily bombings and shootings of police, military, and civilians.

A survey of the literature makes it clear there is a gap between reported attacks and the bias of the reporters or writers, as explained below. However, we can get a sense of roughly how many attacks have occurred in both Dadaab and Kenya at large. Through analysis of the sources, there is clearly a large range of what is reported. In the Kenyan Joint Committee on Administration and National Security (JCANS) report published after the Westgate Mall attack, the government-appointed group counted 29 terrorist attacks starting in October 2011, after the Kenyan invasion of Somalia, to 26 September 2013 (JCANS 2013, 11–15). In documenting the types of attacks and where they occurred, the report, which was rejected by the Kenyan National Assembly March 2014 for its “shoddy workmanship and unhelpful recommendations” (Williams 2014, 1–2), noted that only two of these attacks occurred in Dadaab. In addition to possibly undercounting the total acts of terrorism—for example, Anderson and McKnight counted 80 attacks from October 2011 to June 2014 (2014, 15)—it is clear that JCANS did not provide a complete survey of terrorist attacks that occurred in Dadaab itself.

The bias of a government agency not accounting for the terrorist activity in the camps demonstrates how the Kenyan government continues to use the refugees as scapegoats, despite the fact they are also being attacked by jihadists. The Human Rights Watch reported seven attacks within Dadaab during a much shorter time period—5 November 2011 to 1 January 2012 (Ghoshal 2012:53–56). Similar to the larger accounting of terrorism by that NGO, journalist Ben Rawlence (2016), counted nine attacks in Dadaab.

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* For sexual violence in the camps see Aubone and Hernandez 2013; Crisp 2000; Horst 2006; and Hyndman 2000. Other gender-related concerns are found in Dahya and Dryden-Peterson 2017.
† Studies on health problems in the camps can be found in: Chkam 2016; Enghoff et al. 2010; Kamau and Fox 2013; Navarro-Colorado et al. 2011; and Polonsky et al. 2013.
‡ Conflicts in the camps between groups can be found in Adelman 2005; Crisp 2000; Horst 2006; Horst and Nur 2016; Jaji 2011; Mogire 2011. Violence or conflict among refugees and surrounding Kenyan citizens is found in Crisp 2000; Enghoff et al. 2010; Ikanda 2008; Kirui and Mwaruvie 2012; Mogire 2011; and Montclos and Kagwanja 2000.
daab within the same time period the JCANS report covered. The underreporting of terrorism in the camps shows how the government shies away from the nuances of urban terror that impact this “accidental city” (Jansen 2011).

Worse yet, the actions of the police and military further marginalize law-abiding refugees. Many of the reports on terrorist attacks in Kenya and Dadaab mentioned the perpetrators as being caused by “unknown assailants,” IEDs, or landmines. Indicating the offenders were not caught, these sources pointed to the first dimension of power at play in describing how the police reacted to these bombings, since many of the attacks targeted them. In numerous instances, the police struck back by raiding local refugees’ shops, indiscriminately beating refugees, and telling them to “Go back to Somalia” (Rawlence 2020, 168–168, in Nairobi 226–227; see also Ghoshal 2012, 226–227). The crackdowns, made in the name of tightening security, instead lead only to mistrust between refugees and the police (Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom 2015, 10; Rawlence 2016, 166). In combination with public critiques that Kenyan Somalis were not loyal enough to the nation (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 21–22), the government officials’ assertions about “terrorist refugees” has perpetuated a division between Somalis—both Kenyan and Somalian—and the rest of Kenyan society.

Hearkening back to the use of autochthony in the 2007 elections and before that rhetorically divided insiders and outsiders (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005), the conflation of terrorists and refugees justifies the state’s crackdown (in the first dimension of power) and further distances the refugees from having any say in their own future (the second dimension of power). An example of this marginalization occurred within Dadaab following a flurry of attacks in 2011, as a UN security council officer announced that the youth would need to choose which side they were on (Rawlence 2016, 172). While the government and Kenyan media created an environment that demonized refugees, a closer ethnographic examination of their voices and actions provides a measure of how the interests of refugees actually lie in stabilizing the camps they live in.*

* For a comparison of the differences in what grassroots media in the refugee camps see as important, and those issues deemed press-worthy by the Western media, see Kaleda 2014.
The refugees’ vested interest in alleviating violence in the camps results from the need to make a new home, however constrained by their noncitizen status. The longer-settled refugees demonstrate powerful community-building responses by providing basic supplies and immediate food to newly arrived refugees who have just made the long and dangerous trek from war-torn Somalia (Rawlence 2016, 87). The Somali incentive workers, those lucky few who were employed by NGOs (but at a pittance because of the government’s rules on refugee laborers), provide critical connections to other refugees in the camps by generating interest in the international organizations’ classes and programs. The process of providing stability for the families in Dadaab also includes reaching out to build connections with Kenyans, such as when a refugee community leader negotiated with clans across the Somali border after a Kenyan driver was kidnapped (Rawlence 2016, 145).

As kidnappings and bombings increased, the refugees further demonstrated their commitment to maintaining the community, as shown by the examples that follow. Following the kidnapping of two Spanish women with Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), which occurred after the invasion of Somalia in October 2011, the NGOs suspended their programs in Dadaab, and the UN relied heavily on the incentive workers and many refugee volunteers to keep the camp operating (Rawlence 2016, 147–149). A landmine attack on 15 November 2011 resulted in another suspension of services, and although the refugees stepped into the resulting gap of services, police indiscriminately arrested and beat refugees to find the supposed culprits. In December 2011, three bombs in quick succession led to a decision that the temporary solution of refugee volunteers filling service gaps would become the new status quo (Rawlence 2016, 166).

Because the refugees were willing to step up and keep the camp running when the UN and other NGOs suspended services (Rawlence 2016, 137), the UN also asked the refugees for recommendations to fix the security problems. The refugees responded with many suggestions, but the more expensive ideas were rejected as the UN found money to build miles of blast walls and other infrastructure to protect their compound—a move which further distanced the purported helper from the “victims.” Volunteer refugees began street patrols (Rawlence 2016, 173). The UN and NGOs withdrew as the police wantonly beat and arrested refugees as suspected terrorists (Ghosal 2012, 40–44). The appearance of terrorism in
Dadaab and the authorities spreading (dis)order belies the fact that many refugee Somalis knew well—their community was under attack.

The refugees that either arrived at Dadaab as young children or were born in the camps know only the “temporary city” as a home. Despite the complicating factors of their noncitizen status (e.g., unable to leave the camps and not allowed to gain employment that is competitive with Kenyan citizens), these Dadaab refugees restructure their social situation in the camps to create productive political and economic configurations that are predicated on rebuilding stability so that they can progress with their lives (e.g., Rawlence 2016, 144). Their creative endeavors to build structure within the controlling confines of the camp (both the first and second dimensions of power) include the use of very limited resources to start businesses such as a small cinema, a mini-shop, or a restaurant (Kamau and Fox 2013; Rawlence 2016, 176, 206).

The investment in income-generating infrastructure indicates refugees are planning for the future, despite the government’s insistence that the camps are a temporary solution. After the attacks in the camp, with both the NGOs withdrawing and the police indiscriminately cracking down on the refugees, one youth leader, Tawane, clearly understood their dilemma. He stated, “Al-Shabaab will start bombing in the camps, pretending they are refugees, changing their clothes. The Kenyans won’t know the difference. And they will make us all suffer” (Rawlence 2016, 145). Delineating between the destructive actions of the terrorists and the clear differences between those who live in the camps and those who do not (e.g., appearance of clothing), Tawane describes how the authorities will not differentiate between people within either community or their terror-building intentions.

Despite the acknowledgment by many refugees, that they are under both the good graces of the Kenyan government and auspices of the UNHCR (the third dimension of power, as they acknowledge the power of the government and the UN), the refugees also utilize their own agency. In a building of subject-hood that resists the rules of noncitizen status (the fourth dimension), refugees maintain or create links with the outside world in an access of economic resources that funnels into better lives for them and their families in Dadaab. In some instances, families pass on their remittances in order to build constructive social structures in war-
torn Somalia—or at least to keep extended family members alive (Horst 2004, 2008).

Bridging both global and local levels of power, the refugees’ interest in stabilizing the camps is demonstrated by their negative reaction to al-Shabaab and other criminals (Rawlence 2016), and it is an interest predicated on the refugees making their own way if allowed to do so. While becoming disenfranchised with the police’s heavy handedness, the refugees take the law into their own hands. Trying to create stability in the camps means using vigilante justice to punish criminals when the Kenyan state and the UN no longer protect the refugees. Whether beating people who are hiding ammunition, an act considered a sign of possible terrorists, or killing the murderers of a police reservist (Rawlence 2016, 233, 254), the refugees demonstrate the need for consistent societal rules within Dadaab. If the Kenyan state or a range of institutions will not protect their interest in stability, then the refugees will take the moral matters of law into their own hands. Yet, the Kenyan government continues to cast the refugee camp as a breeding ground for terrorists.
3 **Harnessing the Productive Aspects of Social Power**

The analysis of government and NGO motivation does not account for the fourth dimension of power*—the passive and active construction of self-hood. Both IDPs and refugees operate within the confines of their situation as they act within but also confound the institutional forces. Often governments, the UNHCR, and NGOs maintain their own agendas and bureaucratic processes despite it not being in their subjects’ best interests.

Rather than treating mobile people as a problem (Murunga 2005, 145–148 asserts that mobility is an important aspect of Somali culture), what would happen if they are treated as a solution to the issues in the country? Rather than casting refugees as scapegoats for terrorism, the Kenyan government could utilize their social power and connections.

In arguing for a more permanent solution to the escalating worldwide refugee problem, one author asserts the following (Jansen 2015, 153):

> Refugee protection in this sense should not be reduced to a mere notion of assistance or aid, but rather approached as a form of governance, and the camp as a reflection of the relation between aid governors and refugees that, due to the longevity and intensity of the aid encounter, surpassed the temporary provision of relief.

It is important to find more enduring solutions rather than providing only provisional support until the problem “disappears.” Forcing refugees back to Somalia before the end of the war is similar to the problem of the Kenyan government pushing IDPs back into ethnic “homelands” in which many have never lived. In each case, the problems of both physical marginalization and the distinction of insiders and outsiders exacerbates the dilemma. Rather than trying to fix long-term and often structural issues from a primarily institutional perspective, a better approach to reintegrating displaced people utilizes their reframing of subject-hood and how they rebuild their own means of support.

* See Appendix D for motivations the government might have for closing Dadaab.
Leveraging localized social power through an understanding of how subjects provide for their families can be done through attention to specific contexts. Kamau and Fox recommend that, “The proposed overall objective of a livelihood programme should be, To enable Dadaab refugees to cope, adapt and thrive wherever they settle” (2013, 3 [italics in original]). In emphasizing “wherever they settle,” the authors highlight both the flexibility of movement and the use of broader networks as survival strategies for those who are displaced. Rather than waiting for a concise break between conflict and post-conflict and instead of compromising security by forcing refugees to “return,” a solution that acknowledges the mobile and transnational strategies of the displaced can provide a much more proactive approach that includes the refugees in the process (Horst and Nur 2016). Recognizing the importance of mobility and leveraging connections with local communities allows utilization of non-local resources while also offering a site of security for a building of futures.

It is illustrative to examine the treatment of the second largest refugee camp in Kenya, known as Kakuma for its proximity to the town of Kakuma. At Kakuma, the government’s response has been very different. Although many of the refugees in Kakuma also violate the prohibitions of institutional control, the government has not imposed itself as much on these camp dwellers as it has those in Dadaab. The government’s differing approach springs from the fact that the neighboring conflict in the country of Sudan, from where many of the refugees come, has not spilled over the border with Kenya to the same degree that is has with Somalia. With Kakuma being less of a war zone, the UNHCR provides significant resources there for the refugees to build their futures through job training and business ventures (see Appendix B for more in-depth information on the camp). Yet even the Kakuma refugees’ choices are constrained by the Kenyan government, the UNHCR, and other outside forces.

Arguably, the recent escalating attacks in Dadaab make it difficult to compare its experiences with Kakuma’s. However, both camps provide a stabilizing factor in refugees’ lives. Kakuma and Dadaab are different locations that are surrounded by ethnic groups that are dissimilar in Kakuma and primarily homogenous in Dadaab. Although treated relatively the same by
the UN* and in some respects by the Kenyan government, the differing approaches of security result in challenges for research. Clearly, in both cases, alternatives to waiting for (or forcing) resettlement must be found. Examining how social power unfolds on the ground provides the first step to finding alternative solutions.

* Kakuma and Dadaab are treated similarly, except in the case of the newly opened Kalobeyei integrated community in Kakuma. Analyzing the rhetoric of an integrated community of both refugees and locals is another project, one that should attend to the reported strides in incorporation that have been reported by earlier studies (Oka 2011; Vemuru et al. 2016).
4 Conclusion

Despite the Kenyan government framing the Dadaab refugee camp as a breeding ground or staging point for terrorists, a close examination of ethnographic sources and socio-historical analysis demonstrates that refugees contribute to a level of security within both Kenya and Somalia (the latter through remittances). Using a theoretical framework that places the Kenyan government, the UNHCR, and NGOs within the four dimensions of power, critically frames the refugees as both subjects of power and agentic actors within the limited confines of their prima facie status. Drawing on the example of internally displaced Kenyans, one can see how the state also attempts to constrain the IDPs’ options by casting them as outsiders, juxtaposing them against a purported autochthonous ethnic group for the purposes of claiming land and winning elections. Yet, some IDPs utilize both their mobility and legal status within the nation as bona fide citizens to reassert their subject-hood within the fourth dimension of power (see Appendix A for more).

Further unearthing of how social power works on levels unaccounted for by the Kenyan government (ostensibly invisible), the authors used the power cube model to examine how refugees access flows of economic power from global, national, and local sources. Refugees contribute financially to the region and rather than propagating terrorism within the camps, they level justice against law-breakers when the state and the UNHCR will not provide security. These actions demonstrate that much like IDPs, most people will work towards a modicum of economic and social stability when placed in untenable situations. Combining the three theoretical tools—the four dimensions of power, the power cube, and frames of autochthony—demonstrates that social power on the ground must be looked at and analyzed in order to understand the intricacies of national and international interventions.
Appendix A: IDPs and Autochthony

Stereotypes are rampant for the refugee as well, but the marked difference between refugees and IDPs lies in the fact that the IDPs have become strangers within their own land. They have to grapple with their post-displacement admittance into the “other” category through no fault of their own, but rather through a perfect storm of displacement due to post-election violence or environmental crises, an ill-equipped and unmotivated government, and non-displaced citizens who rationalize violence and ostracization by ousting IDPs from the insider category and thus perpetuating a cycle of hostility toward the IDPs (Jenkins 2015).

Forced to contend with human rights violations from an apathetic government, IDPs have fallen victim to not only this ostracization through autochthonous rhetoric in the public realm, but also through overall invisibility in the governmental realm (i.e., loss of IDP status upon forced integration). This type of treatment has direct implications on their basic survival and hope for a durable solution. In contrast, refugees within the country have drawn international financial support, resettlement opportunities, and intermittent global public attention from the UNHCR and other external entities (for better or for worse). However, to a greater degree, the ebb and flow of visibility for the IDPs is at the mercy of the current domestic political agenda; nevertheless, the insider/outsider dichotomy remains a common thread and obstacle for both refugees and IDPs.

IDPs and the dimensions of power

The plight of the refugees and the IDPs is fundamentally connected, especially when examined through the scope of the dimensions of power. Even though the roles of the actors in either arena—whether IDP or refugee—diverge based upon citizenship or lack thereof, viewing both through the lenses of the third and fourth dimensions of power captures much the same image. In each case, the power structure results from the Kenyan government asserting institutional control, but in relation to the fourth dimension, that power fluctuates in response to the survival needs of both the refugees “confined” to the physical camps and the IDPs “confined” to the whims of whoever controls the Kenyan government (and what ethnicity/political party they happen to be).
In the case of the IDPs, the Kenyan government exercises power over this group in two ways, physically and intangibly. Physically, the government provides financial humanitarian assistance allowing the IDPs to buy food and possibly rebuild homes (Kamungi 2013, 17). As aforementioned, however, this aid is not guaranteed and oftentimes is dependent on land-ownership and status, especially in the case of the integrated IDPs who lose IDP status and the attached humanitarian assistance when they integrate (Shutzer 2012, 354). Combined with this physical power and though itself intangible, the government exercise of power and control through autochthony manifests in very real violence and ostracization. Almost paradoxically, both of these forms of power are ever-present but highly provisional. Thus, the IDPs, though in search of survival and safety like the refugees, are endowed with a different role to play within the framework of the dimensions of power; that is, one in which the IDPs have to adapt to the multifaceted and ever-changing power of the government.

The adaptation to governmental control provides an example of the third dimension of power, wherein social actors make a tacit agreement that requires their actions to be organized into a natural order. This order creates reasonable and unreasonable categories of what is acceptable and unacceptable within the confines of the power framework (Digeser 1992). In other words, this agreement between the two sets of actors defines the limits of the social actors’ power and actions. In the case of IDPs, the Kenyan government is utilizing the third dimension of power to recharacterize the citizen/government social contract, in effect by creating a group of excluded legal citizens and referring to them as ethnic outsiders. In other words, by pushing the IDPs almost outside of their citizenship status, the government is attempting to justify their poor treatment of IDPs by redefining them as sub-citizens and in turn, making it reasonable to deny them the rights afforded to citizens by the constitution.* However, the IDPs are still legal citizens and thus entitled to the benefits and protections of this citizenship contract exactly the same as other citizens.

The IDPs do not have a way to resist their purported secondary status, and they struggle for survival within the third dimension of power’s framework because their voice toward the definition of the reasonable and the unreasonable is lost due to their ostracization. Instead, IDPs must use the fourth

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* Such as, but not limited to the following: the right to equality, protection of the right to property, right to a clean and healthy environment, right to economic and social rights (housing, food, water, etc.), as stated in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya (Kenya Law Report 2010).
dimension of power, which entails them internalizing the possibility of subjectification (in this case, the IDPs as citizen-subjects of the Kenyan government) and building their own identity through consciousness and self-knowledge (Foucault 1982) to resist the power framework that does not allow a durable solution. This framework is the theoretical space in which the IDPs can rearrange the power structure in their favor, as the power in this dimension is much more internal. This shift in the power structure will allow them to redefine their subject-hood and self-identity within the fourth dimension of power (which will in turn shift the third dimension) to recast their roles as agents. In other words, they capitalize on the inherent fluidity of power in order to rewrite their narrative and create a space in which to force a power shift. Another advantage afforded the IDPs is freedom of movement, as opposed to the refugees who are confined to the camps. The combination of the physical space and the fourth dimension theoretical space give the IDPs a chance to change the power structure.

**IDP “solutions”**

Besides resettlement, integration has been another government-encouraged strategy promoted as an IDP solution. Operation *Rudi Nyumbani* in 2008/9 was an attempt to “solve the IDP problem” (Shutzer 2012, 350), with the government planning to close all remaining IDP camps through resettlement or integration of the IDPs. Some landed IDPs received start-up funds to rebuild, while landless IDPs did not and were forced to form transit camps, integrate with family members, or form self-help groups in which several IDPs bought land together and thus received assistance from the government that comes with land ownership (Shutzer 2012, 350-355). However, this change in status has created a new hurdle for the IDPs. Along with the aforementioned problems with resettlement in which the IDPs dealt with ostracization and ethnic violence, the integration of an estimated 300,000 IDPs caused them to lose IDP status and become invisible. If an IDP integrated, he would lose his status as a “genuine” IDP, thereby losing claims to humanitarian aid or government compensation (Shutzer 2012, 354). Without assistance and following government-induced invisibility, the IDPs are pushed further away from a durable solution because even though they are integrated, they are lacking employment and

* Some landed IDPs were not able to return home and rebuild due to persisting ethnic tension and violence, thus they were forced to join the landless IDPs in the formation of transit camps, integration, and self-help groups (KHRC 2011).
sustainable housing, which can lead them and their hosts into poverty (Kamungi 2013, 15). Whether done with malicious intent to further ostracize the IDPs (whom the Kenyan government has historically considered a burden) or as evidence of sustained haphazard and uninformed IDP management by the Kenyan government, the results are the same—the continued stereotype that IDPs are outsiders has direct negative consequences on the attempts to “reintegrate” the IDPs (Shutzer 2012; Jenkins 2015).

The continued haphazard and inadequate support from the government prompted the IDPs to take matters into their own hands out of necessity, moving the theoretical resistance into one of application. Self-driven relocation and economically beneficial family separation are among the steps that some IDPs take in order to force a solution to their continued unstable and unpredictable situation (Kamungi 2009, 357). By restructuring traditional family dynamics (Kamungi 2013)*, resettling in ethnically neutral areas sometimes without direction by the government (Kamungi 2009), and forming self-help groups to collectively own land (Shutzer 2012, 354), the IDPs are capitalizing on one of their few avenues of resistance, the freedom of movement. Thus, some IDPs claim a measure of self-dependence, rather than subscribing to the naturalization of their marginalization (the third dimension), which creates a new identity not prescribed by the Kenya government. Also, they resist the outsider label by avoiding it altogether and settling in ethnically neutral areas, thus not making themselves a target in unwelcoming neighborhoods (Jenkins 2015, 235). By taking the initiative to shape their own future and thus capitalizing on the fourth dimension of power, the IDPs are redefining their role as subjects. Granted, this stems from necessity and the need of a safe place to live and work, so this shift in power may not be a cognizant decision by the IDPs, but nonetheless it is a decision that is very much occurring and beneficial. Whether cognizant or not of the shift in power, the IDPs are creat-

* This restructured dynamic is contrasted with the family dynamic prior to displacement in which the family stayed close in geographic proximity, with several generations perhaps living in one household. Furthermore, most land holdings stayed within either the tribe or, if the family was to relocate, the neighborhood would be one of ethnic similarity (Kamungi 2009). Now however, displaced families often choose to send one or more family members back to the region from which they left to harvest crops, check on land, etc., while one or more stays with children in the displaced location. Also, the IDPs are resettling in ethnically neutral areas, a choice that bucks tradition but garners safety. This is important as the IDPs are taking their survival into their own hands and refusing in some cases to be bound to tradition. Through these actions, families are reshaping the fourth dimension of power as they re-shape their identities and traditions out of necessity.
ing a new self-identity for themselves—an identity springing from their location in a new ethnic neighborhood (physical/external resistance) and/or an identity of self-reliance (theoretical/internal resistance).

This power reclamation opportunity and subsequent power restructuring has direct implications for the refugees as well. Even though the IDPs have the advantage of freedom of movement, the refugees have the benefit of global attention (albeit intermittently). However, the refugees are still faced with autochthony to an even greater extent than the IDPs, because the refugees are legally from another country. The Kenyan government uses a slightly different angle of stereotyping in regards to the refugees, one of the threat of blame for terrorism. By breeding a culture of scapegoating the refugees by erroneously blaming them for terrorist attacks carried out by al-Shabaab, the Kenyan government holds refugees responsible for the foreign violence in the nation, thus casting them into the outsider category for want of protection from supposed refugee-sourced violence. The violence and insecurity, the government claims, is coming from the inhabitants of the refugee camps.
Appendix B: Kakuma Camp as a Comparison to Dadaab Camp

It is illustrative to examine the treatment of refugees in the second largest refugee camp in Kenya, Kakuma, as a note for future research and to see if a more integrated approach can work. The stark differences in treatment between Kakuma and Dadaab can be marked by government threats to close Dadaab in 2015, while at the same time UNHCR announced plans for opening a new camp in Kakuma, named Kalobeyei (Nzwili 2015). The opening of this new camp in Kakuma highlighted a different approach—one of integration between refugees and locals (UNHCR n.d.). The fact that Sudanese refugees are being relocated from Dadaab to Kalobeyei (Odhiambo 2017), emphasizes UNHCR’s and the Kenyan government’s belief that alternative efforts are needed. Although UNHCR promotes that Kalobeyei’s programs are specifically tied to the camp, as a new subsection of Kakuma, there is no available research on these efforts, so we must compare the larger camp of Kakuma with Dadaab. Despite threatening to close Dadaab, parallels to how refugees flex their social power exist in both camps.

Jansen (2015) examines Kakuma, which is located in northwest Kenya and primarily houses Sudanese refugees (and to a lesser degree, Somali refugees). Those living in Kakuma fall under the same governmental restrictions of limited mobility and job opportunities as in Dadaab. Despite these restrictions, the refugees bring cultural resources with them and utilize those cultural resources to create informal economies that reach beyond the camp (cf. Oka 2014). Refugees use their identity as Somalis as a resource to maintain connections outside the camp, while those within the camp gain support for food, education, and even business. The integration of the camp in regional, as well as international, socioeconomic networks are resources that Jansen terms, “campital” (2011). For those few refugees who gain employment with a humanitarian agency, the minimal currency of employment is leveraged by having their knowledge and connections expanded through their work.

Although the UN is creating constrained subjects at Kakuma via the third dimension of power, the refugees also build identity through the outside connections they maintain, actual or rumored interactions with the state, and exchanges that take place within the camps. How subjects resist the
reification* of power (the third dimension) includes a range of practices such as saving food rations to raise capital for a business; traveling outside the country to gain more lucrative income than the limited camp jobs; staying in Nairobi or other urban areas to make money; and utilizing fictive kin† relationships for resettlement. All these activities demonstrate the refugees’ will and ability to strive for a stable future and, for some who push the boundaries, camp becomes a choice (Jansen 2015, 159 and 161).

* Reification is when something non-material is treated as a material thing.
† Fictive kin is a term used by anthropologists and ethnographers to describe forms of kinship or social ties that are based on ties not related to blood or marriage.
Appendix C: A History of Al-Shabaab in Relation to Kenya

The Kenyan government uses a slightly different angle of stereotyping in regards to the refugees, one of the threat of terrorism. By breeding a culture of scapegoating against the refugees and blaming them for terrorist attacks carried out by the Somalia-based terrorist organization al-Shabaab, the Kenyan government holds refugees responsible for the foreign violence in the nation, thus casting them into the outsider category for want of “protection.” The violence and insecurity, the government claims, is coming from the inhabitants of the refugee camps. For further understanding the terrorist group al-Shabaab, below is a history of their activities within the region, specifically focused on how their actions have impacted Kenya.

A history of Somalian and Kenyan insecurity

Rising from the Islamic Courts Union in Mogadishu between 2003 and 2006, al-Shabaab gained prominence as a militant group interested in establishing fundamental Islamic rule in Somalia. Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion of Somalia pushed the group out of the capital. Although al-Shabaab continued to make gains and losses in Somalia after the offensive, it was the July 2010 suicide bombings which targeted crowds watching the World Cup in Kampala, Uganda, that brought the group to international notoriety.

Al-Shabaab publicly declared responsibility for the attacks in the first demonstration of violence outside of Somalia, done in retaliation for Uganda sending soldiers to support Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (Horowitz 2013). Following investigation of the two attacks that left 74 dead and 70–80 people injured, the Ugandan government brought to court and charged seven Kenyan Muslims with affiliation to al-Shabaab (Anderson and McKnight 2015, 545). The Kenyan government cooperated fully in surrendering the suspects to Uganda, indicating its unease at the terrorist group striking beyond the borders of Somalia. In 2011, Kenya invaded Somalia in an effort to both push al-Shabaab out of the port city of Kismayo and to create a cushion state called Jubaland, or Azania, between Kenya and northern Somalia (Anderson and McKnight 2014).
Somalian refugees had been fleeing to Kenya in ever-increasing numbers after al-Shabaab was driven into southern Somalia by Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion (Anderson and McKnight 2015, 541-2), despite the Kenyan government “closing” the border with Somalia in 2007 (Burns 2010, 8).* Kenya’s invasion of Somalia in October 2011 led al-Shabaab to change its tactics. Although al-Shabaab had recruited disenfranchised Muslim Kenyans much earlier than the invasion,† the organization focused its wrath on Kenyan soil with 17 grenade and bomb attacks between the incursion and July 5, 2012 (Horowitz 2013, 53 Note 2).‡ In a national environment where refugees had already been accused of gun smuggling and other crimes (Murunga 2005), the escalation of attacks by al-Shabaab provided the Kenyan government an easy scapegoat.

Continuing from January to May of 2013, al-Shabaab targeted Garissa in the northeastern province of Kenya (see figure C1) with 15 shootings and grenade attacks (Rawlence 2016, 235). Garissa’s proximity to Somalia and Dadaab made it an obvious target to the terrorist group, but it was the attack on Westgate Mall on September 2013 in the Kenyan capital city of Nairobi that spurred the Kenyan government to further action. Following the mall attack, which left 67 dead and over 200 wounded, the government blamed both refugee Somalis and ethnic Kenyan Somalis alike.

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* The Congressional Research Service reports 350,000 Somalis in Dadaab’s camps circa 2010 (Ploch 2010, 50).
† Muslims in Kenya constitute a minority at only 11% of the population, with 83% of the population being Christian (CIA World Factbook accessed 30 June 2017). Al-Shabaab recruited broader constituencies through radio and internet communications, resulting in pronouncements of taking the war beyond Somalia in 2008 (Ploch 2010, 8). In 2010, estimates of al-Shabaab’s foreign soldiers included 500–700 of Kenyan origin (Anderson and McKnight 2015, 544). Although religion has been a recruitment factor that has divided Kenyan Muslims (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 19–20, Rawlence 2016, 233), economics also significantly played into recruiting strategies (Patterson 2015, 20, Ploch 2010, 16).
‡ Human Rights Watch says there were at least 24 attacks between the 23 October 2011 invasion and 3 February 2012 (in Ghoshal 2012, 53–56).
With government officials, such as Ole Lenku, the Cabinet Secretary for the Interior, claiming on national television that “Dadaab is a nursery for terrorists” (as quoted in Rawlence 2016, 331), the pressure for “fixing” the refugee problem built, so that a solution was proposed on November 10, just seven weeks after the attack. The Kenyan government, the Federal Government of Somalia, and the UNHCR signed the tripartite agreement, a document intended to encourage voluntary repatriations. When Lenku visited Dadaab two weeks after the agreement was signed, he made it clear that the refugees were to leave by saying, “There is no turning back. It is time to say goodbye and wish you the best as you go back home. Go and help your country rebuild” (as quoted in Rawlence 2016, 335). Despite the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) having captured al-Sha-
baab’s port stronghold during September 2012 in Kismayo, Somalia, instability and escalation of the civil war made it impossible for any voluntary repatriation to Somalia (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 9).*

Without the option of returning to Somalia, some Somalis in Dadaab resort to traveling to Nairobi and other major cities to obtain more lucrative jobs (Horst 2002). In Nairobi alone, there are 33,537 registered refugees (Kamau and Fox 2013, 10). In the camps, daily bus and taxi traffic of approximately 800 people come and go between Nairobi and Garissa (Enghoff et al. 2010, 44). Traveling to the cities for work not only provisions those back in the camps, but also the transnational networks of Somalis working in towns supports those in war-torn Somalia (Horst 2004). Another avenue for revenue exists in the camps; approximately 5,000 illegal businesses are run there by refugees, some with the capital provided by NGOs (Enghoff et al. 2010, 9).

The prevalence of Somalis who are creating opportunities through travel and business deemed illegal by the Kenyan government breeds resentment from Kenyans. The depth of that antipathy was clear when the attack on Westgate Mall, and attendant backlash by the government, led to public declarations of antagonism between ethnic Somalis within Kenya. As one Kenyan Somali said in reference to refugee Somalis, “Right now, I feel like they should all be sent back. Let them go and burn each other in their homes” (Verini 2013). As the Kenyan government fractured the ethnic community along nationalistic lines in a well-practiced combination of autochthonous and jingoistic† messaging,‡ al-Shabaab continued its recruitment of disenfranchised Kenyan Muslims, resulting in a continuation of attacks within the country. Less than a year after the mass murder at the Westgate Mall, the National Assembly of Kenya released a report, which

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* Three years after the Tripartite agreement was signed, the UNHCR acknowledged in announcing a new commission created to enact the agreement that, “At the moment, however, conditions in Somalia are not yet conducive for safe, dignified and sustainable mass refugee returns to Central/South Somalia” (Tripartite Commission 2015, 6).

† A derogatory adjective describing something characterized by extreme patriotism, especially in the form of aggressive or warlike foreign policy.

‡ For the many varieties of autochthony see Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005), while work done in Kenya on IDPs following the 2007 elections reminds us that anti-refugee sentiment can vary both between and within neighborhoods, depending on the context (Jenkins 2015). Although Murunga (2005, 148–149) says the refugees became “invisible” by virtue of blending in with other Somalis in the cities, the quote above highlighting some Kenyan Somalis’ nationalist fervor, and other authors’ prevalence to cite refugees’ conflicts with local hosts (cf. Mogire 2011:71) highlights the importance of examining refugee populations in context with an ethnographic approach.
noted that four attackers killed by police at the Westgate Mall were Somalis from either Somalia or Norway (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 16; JCANS 2013).

In March 2014, the Joy in Jesus church in Likoni, in the Mombasa region of Kenya, was attacked by gunmen—with the two dead suspects being neither Somali nor refugee. The attackers killed six and wounded 20 people. Minister Ole Lenku reissued the government’s relocation order for urban refugees (Rawlence 2016, 340). Much like the attacks following Kenya’s invasion of Somalia in 2011, the Likoni massacre demonstrated that Kenya had a domestic terrorism problem. The fact that the Joy in Jesus suspects were not Somali refugees added to indications mounting since the July 2010 World Cup bombings that these type of attacks continued to be carried out by Kenyan Muslim radicals (Anderson and McKnight 2015, 545).

A week after the Likoni attack, three bombs exploded in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. The bombings took place in the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh—commonly called “Little Mogadishu” because of the suburb’s large Somali population (Rawlence 2016, 340). These bombings indicated a terrorist threat against Kenyan Somalis and refugee Somalis, rather than the Somalis being the terrorists.
Appendix D: Kenyan Government and Possible Motivations for Closing Dadaab

Financial motivation as a driver of securitization for closing Dadaab

If the camps act as an economic hub and the refugees work for stability in the region, why does the Kenyan government continue to threaten closure of Dadaab? One viewpoint suggests that the Kenyan government is trying to get more money for security from the U.S. (Fisher and Anderson 2015), and Kenya’s citizens and the security apparatus garner lucrative informal incomes from the war effort (Anderson and McKnight 2014). When taking into account profits created by illicit trade, this makes sense (Rawlence 2016, 216-17; Nordstrom 2007 about wars integrated with global markets more generally). Securitization and humanitarian efforts seem to be at cross purposes in Kenya,* although it might be better to say the state is using both to the same end. Securitization as state-building ultimately supports this report’s fundamental thrust—autochthony is the dividing factor and according to government rhetoric, you are either a part of the nation or you are not. By utilizing state power to separate IDPs into ethnic enclaves or to marginalize refugees in city-sized camps via the first and second dimensions of power, the partition of people for securitization blends with segregation resulting from humanitarian “assistance” (Hyndman 2011).

The Kenyan government emphasizes securitization and seems uninterested in peace (Rawlence 2016, 183, 216, 217), with more attention paid to both financial gain and control of the border situation (Rawlence 2016, 113). Foreign governments provide securitization funding, and African governments reap the rewards of continued conflict as training and equipment bolster national militaries in the efforts of “peacekeeping” forces (Fisher and Anderson 2015). Examples abound of the Kenyan government’s self-interest, such as their 2011 invasion of Somalia to establish Jubaland as a buffer state (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 4; Bruton and Williams 2014, 61). Kenya joined AMISOM in 2012, which meant the European Union helped pay the bill for Kenyan troops on Somali soil (Ander-

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* Securitization, as an active policy to transform subjects into matters of security that governments pursue in developing countries, often results in funds garnered from Western donors to secure borders or to fight terrorism. For examples of the pursuit of securitization funding by African nations, see Fisher and Anderson 2015.
son and McKnight 2014, 6–7). In addition, the diplomatic success of Operation Usalama Watch following the Likoni attacks in Kenya resulted in gaining financial support from Western governments in 2014 for anti-terrorism (Rawlence 2016, 342-343). Springing from the increase of securitization provided by foreign powers, many authors have recently examined the Kenyan government’s new economic interest in the North Eastern Province.

The impetus for security in the northern region coincides with the discovery of oil near Lake Turkana and the planned laying of pipework from South Sudan to the northern port of Lamu. Furthermore, offshore oil deposits claimed by both Somalia and Kenya add more traction to the establishment of a buffer state (Agade 2014, 504, 511). The sugar and charcoal trades also fuel expansive economic interests, stretching from the formal concerns of government down to the informal seizing of opportunity provided by war.

In southern Somalia through the port city of Kismayo, al-Shabaab controlled an economy of sugar exports, which resulted in annual income of $800,000 USD to Kenya alone (Anderson and McKnight 2014, 9). Once AMISOM conquered Kismayo in September 2012, charcoal (the other major commodity normally shipped through the port) started piling up. The charcoal stockpile, worth $60 million USD, sat in the port as local traders, the Kenyan Defense Forces, and African Union called on the United Nations Security Council to lift the ban on trade (United Nations 2013, 38). Put in place to stop al-Shabaab’s use of this income to fund terrorism, the Kenyan Defense Forces and local militia profited from the resumption of the trade despite the UN and Transitional Federal Government’s explicit ban on the exports (United Nations 2013, 421-422). From the pursuit of profit in both the war effort and the securitization of its borders, the Kenyan government and its agents flex state power.

Following from the immediate benefits of war profiteering and the creation of a buffer state for securitization and development in Kenya, the assertion of Kenyan state control in the war effort is both reflected and magnified through the diplomatic manipulation of international security concerns. Refugees have clearly caught the attention of many nations within the past 15 years, since conflicts around the world caused escalating flows of people streaming across international borders. In 2015, a 33% increase in the number of global refugees resulted in 1.8 million displaced
people (UNHCR 2016). Following the European Union striking a deal with Turkey in March 2016—a deal outlining that Turkey would build camps at a cost of 6 billion euros for refugees refused entry into Europe—the Kenyan government announced in May 2016 that it would close Dadaab (Rawlence 2016, 363). Appeals for international refugee support are not new, and developing countries, which are most often the targets of mass refugee movements, sometimes utilize the threat of displaced people to leverage resources from developed countries (such as Turkey) that wish to maintain the integrity of their borders (Greenhill 2010).

In the Kenyan context, the state has placed pressure on Western governments to support both securitization at home and the war effort in Somalia. It threatened to close Dadaab numerous times to garner more support from the UN and NGOs, while simultaneously putting pressure on the refugees to self-repatriate. Camp resources started dwindling in 2011 as the UNHCR diverted limited funding to the Syrian crisis.* The Kenyan government’s incentives—through both veiled threats of closure and limited inducement resettlement offers (Rawlence 2016, 229, 231, 243)—encouraged the Dadaab refugees at the bottom end of the socioeconomic and power spectrums to return to Somalia (Rawlence 2016, 346).

**Government lessons learned regarding IDPs**

Similar to the diplomatic pressure the Kenyan government utilizes in the case of refugees, other nations leveraged statecraft on the Kenyan government to fix the IDP problem, although in an uneven fashion and with mixed results (Brown and Raddatz 2014). While initially meager, intensifying pressure led to the formation of the national-level Protection Working Group on Internal Displacement (PWGID), which was a crucial political step for the IDPs (Malombe and Omolo 2013). A 2010 draft policy became law when the Prevention, Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities Act was passed 31 December 2012 and made effective January 2013 (Republic of Kenya 2013). This unprecedented protection for IDPs, along with a government restructuring, fostered the relatively peaceful 2013 elections (i.e., lower levels of post-election ethnic violence; Cheeseman 2014 et. al.). The road toward possible government ideological stability benefits IDPs in that the space is created for them to continue self-driven initiatives to make themselves more visible in the political arena with the creation of IDP-focused groups such

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* There were five million registered Syrian refugees by the end of 2013 (UNHCR 2016, 13).
as the PWGID. The fluidity of the dimensions of power have been navi-
gated by the IDPs, allowing them to restructure the power framework so
that their voices are acknowledged within the political scene; however,
much more needs to be done by the Kenyan government to benefit all
IDPs, because many are still awaiting resettlement. Even though govern-
ment action toward a durable solution is sluggish, the IDPs leveraged their
own social power as citizens of the state and have instigated a shift in the
fourth dimension of power.
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Refugees Flexing Social Power as Agents of Stability: Creating Modes of Economic Livelihoods in Kenya’s Camps

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Although the United States Army recognizes the importance of the social domain in military and humanitarian aid zones, little work has been done to analyze and describe the social domain in those areas. The Engineer Research and Development Center of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is designing an interactive mapping program that provides information on social categories. It is not enough to understand who the local powerbrokers might be, because national and international connections also play into social power dynamics. More importantly, this report demonstrates how social power should be analyzed in order to understand how each situation of conflict or emergency hides threads of power that are not obvious. To establish how a social power analysis might be performed, this work discusses relevant social science theory to construct a framework for study. Using a case study of the Kenyan government’s threats to close their largest refugee camp due to their claims that the camp is full of terrorist activity, the authors demonstrate how closer analysis can provide critical understanding of a situation. That new understanding shows that refugee camp citizens harness their own social power, acting as agents of social and economic stability within the country.