




**US Army Corps  
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Engineer Research and  
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## Pre-Reconstruction Planning

Ghassan Al-Chaar, Carey L. Baxter, Ammar H. Elmajdoub,  
Kevin Cupka-Head, and George C. Calfas

February 2019



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## **Pre-Reconstruction Planning**

Ghassan Al-Chaar, Carey L. Baxter, and George C. Calfas

*Construction Engineering Research Laboratory  
U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center  
2902 Newmark Drive,  
Champaign, IL 61822*

Ammar H. Elmajdoub

*University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign  
Department of Urban and Regional Planning  
111 Temple Buell Hall  
611 Taft Drive  
Champaign, IL 61820*

Kevin Cupka-Head

*University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign  
Department of Anthropology  
109 Davenport Hall  
607 S. Mathews Ave.  
Urbana, IL 61801*

Final report

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Prepared for Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology  
(ASA(ALT))  
103 Army Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20314-1000

Under Project P2 455009, "Contingency Base – Site Identification for the Tactical  
Environment"

## Abstract

The period of reconstruction following an armed civilian conflict, military operation, or natural disaster is a critical window of opportunity to bring stability and normalcy to a region. Stability not only depends on resilient infrastructure, but also on reliable political systems, a national identity, and an able population to sustain the economy and system of governance. This report provides a guide to assist in planning the preliminary phases of reconstruction—pre-reconstruction. The pre-reconstruction phase is critically important to the success of any reconstruction effort. This report presents three foundational dimensions that contribute to creating and fostering a successful post-conflict or post-disaster environment: political reality awareness, cultural property protection, and capacity building. This work also presents a methodology that quantitatively assesses the specific elements that contribute to the success or failure of a planned reconstruction effort. Information provided in this report can be adapted to apply to different contexts (e.g., civilian, military) as well as to supplement existing military planning tools such as the Engineer Site Identification for the Tactical Environment (ENSITE).

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## Preface

This study was conducted for the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) under Program Element T45, Project P2 455009, “Contingency Base – Site Identification for the Tactical Environment.” The technical monitor was Mr. Kurt Kinnevan (CEERD-CZT).

The work was performed by the Environmental Processes Branch (CNE) of the Installation Division (CN), U. S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center – Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (ERDC-CERL). At the time of publication, Mr. H. Garth Anderson was Chief, CEERD-CNE, and Ms. Michelle J. Hansen was Chief, CEERD-CN. Mr. Kurt Kinnevan, CEERD-CZT, was Technical Director for Infrastructure for Combat Operations. The Deputy Director of ERDC-CERL was Dr. Kirankumar V. Topudurti, and Dr. Lance D. Hansen was the Director.

The Commander of ERDC was COL Ivan P. Beckman, and the Director was Dr. David W. Pittman.

## Unit Conversion Factors

Multiply	By	To Obtain
feet	0.3048	meters
miles (U.S. statute)	1,609.347	meters
square feet	0.09290304	square meters
square miles		

## Abbreviations

Term	Meaning
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
ANCBS	Association of National Committees of the Blue Shield
AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CA	content analysis
CAS	complete adaptive systems
CCOE	Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence
CIMIC	Civil Military Co-Operation (NATO equivalent [roughly] of U.S. Army Civil Affairs)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CP	cultural property
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq)
CPP	cultural property protection
CRM	cultural resource management
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN)
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DOS	Department of State
DPW	Directorate of Public Works
EK	expert knowledge
ENSITE	Engineer Site Identification for the Tactical Environment
EOI	entity of interest
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FFP	Fund for Peace
FM	field manual
FRS	Foreign Relations Subcommittee

<b>Term</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
FSA	Free Syrian Army
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	gross domestic product
GNC	General National Congress (Libya)
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HQ	headquarters
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICBS	International Committee of the Blue Shield
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICOM	International Council of Museums
ICOMOS	International Council on Monuments and Sites
IE	information engagement
IGO	intergovernmental organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Interpol	International Criminal Political Organization
IRGC-QF	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force
IS	Islamic State (also ISIS, ISIL, Daesh)
IUIC	Islamist Union of Islamic Courts
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MPICE	Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	non-governmental organization
NRHP	National Register of Historic Places
OAS	Organization of American States
OCA	Organizational Capacity Assessment
OCONUS	outside continental United States

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<b>Term</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
OEBGD	Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document
OSD	Office of Secretary of Defense
PCPMM	Protection of Cultural Property: Military Manual
PKK	Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party
PKSOI	(U.S. Army) Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time
PMU	Popular Mobilization Unit
PSUV	United Socialist Party of Venezuela
QD	qualitative data
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
S/PD	survey/polling data
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCBS	U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield
USG	United States Government
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
USSCFR	U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
WBG	World Bank Group
YPG	Kurdish People's Protection Units (Syria)

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# **1 Introduction**

## **1.1 Background**

The period of reconstruction following an armed conflict or military operation is a critical window of opportunity to bring stability and normalcy to a region. The task of reconstruction is not simple, and it extends well beyond repairing or replacing physical infrastructure, as the U.S. military has learned from previous outcomes such as reconstruction in Iraq.

Stability not only depends on resilient infrastructure, but also on reliable political systems, a national identity, and an able population that can sustain the economy and system of governance. Experience has shown that unpredictable results may emerge from reconstruction activities if the overall political and cultural factors are not taken into consideration. Such failures and inefficiencies can cost billions of dollars in wasted funds and increase frustration or unrest among the populace. The largest factors that contribute to this problem are unpreparedness, insufficient planning, and operations based on assumptions instead of empirical knowledge. Avoiding failures and inefficiencies in reconstruction will also help the United States to maintain or improve positive relations with host nations and the international community.

## **1.2 Objective**

This report provides a guide to military planners during the preliminary phases of reconstruction to address planning for and engagement in reconstruction. It addresses three areas important in pre-reconstruction planning by providing an overview of each topic and a methodology for assessing the viability of an action, based on its expected impact on different areas of interest.

## **1.3 Methodology**

Researchers performed extensive reviews of academic, military, and policy literature and incorporated the personal experience in Iraq of author and principal investigator, Ghassan Al-Chaar. By incorporating this knowledge with lessons learned from the U.S. military's past experience, a three-pronged methodology was established for assessing plans for


reconstruction and then engaging in reconstruction. The methodology consists of a rating system that evaluates the impact of an effort under consideration according to the three areas of importance: political reality, cultural property protection, and capacity building. This methodology assists planners in evaluating their approach and foreseeing the potential effects that an intervention may have. The following chapters include a detailed presentation of the three topics considered, so planners can better understand the assessment criteria within each area, as well as develop a sensitivity to and an understanding of the factors under consideration during a reconstruction.



## 2 Prerequisite Considerations toward Systematic Reconstruction

Often, preplanning for a reconstruction mission is carried out with either limited or no consideration of the nontechnical aspects of the mission— aspects that can indirectly affect the mission’s overall outcome. In this study, we present a preplanning methodology that considers a three-dimensional, interactive approach to incorporate the aspects of political reality, cultural knowledge, and capacity building (Figure 1). Without collectively considering these three areas, the reconstruction mission often results in failure and a negative return that adversely affects more than one level of hoped-for success. The preplanning (pre-reconstruction) process outlined here is designed to pave the way for a successful reconstruction mission.

Figure 1. Schematic representation of the three-dimensional view for systematic reconstruction.



This pre-reconstruction methodology establishes a system of metrics to assist in formulating the following: enumerating efforts under consideration, prioritizing the efforts, planning their implementation, and setting budget levels for selected reconstruction efforts.

This reconstruction methodology is geared toward measuring outcome-based goals or the effects of each effort under consideration. Output-based measurements are usually limited to what is being done, such as building or restoring several clinics or schools. An outcome-based measurement is therefore based on what was achieved, not what was planned. For

example, how much education or public health has improved could respectively be measured by the number of schools or clinics were built and in use. Thus, distinguishing success or failure is based on outcome instead of output, and it may be assessed based on the three dimensions presented in Figure 1 (political reality, cultural consideration and capacity building).

It is necessary to understand that reconstruction efforts usually take place while the nation state is fragile and in a phase of recovery. Thus, security is essential for sustained reconstruction, yet a level of sustainable security cannot be achieved without diminishing most or all of the conflict drivers among participants. Utilizing outcome-based metrics will provide a tool to achieve both a baseline operational-level and a strategic-level assessment tool to prioritize efforts under consideration in a manner that reduces or eliminates potential obstacles to stabilization *prior to* reconstruction efforts commencing.

Note that this chapter is not intended to provide specific guidance on actually facilitating reconstruction in the areas of political capacity, cultural change, or capacity building; rather it is focused on accounting for the immediate impacts of those areas when planning for physical reconstruction. Instead, this chapter is more about positively influencing the environment for reconstruction missions by recognizing the aspects of reality most relevant to pre-reconstruction planning and implementation. Reconstruction planning should aim for positive, productive elements that promote the devolution of the post-conflict environment and/or the stagnation of progress. Ultimately, operational and strategic reconstruction plans must contribute to the political stability of devastated countries.

A project or a program that is relevant to a sector undergoing planned reconstruction can be assessed within one of the five tiers described below, with respect to the scoring range (-2 to +2) to each assessment in questionnaires found in Table 2–Table 4):

- **Oppositional:** may contribute to open conflict, and it is assigned (-2) in the scoring questionnaires.
- **Negatively influential:** may lead to probable conflict, and it is assigned (-1) in the scoring questionnaires.
- **Neutral:** either not applicable to or has no effect on a sector, and it is assigned (0) in the scoring questionnaires.
- **Positively Influential:** indirectly provides and receives some modest level of support, and it is assigned (+1) in the scoring questionnaires.
- **Supportive:** directly provides and receives some substantial level of support, and it is assigned (+2) in the scoring questionnaires

These five tiers can be applied to conditions found within applicable sectors such as water, electricity, etc. (Figure 2) or applied to mission elements of stabilization (Figure 3). As these figures show, color-coded physical conditions (red, yellow, or green) can be assigned to each sector during a project’s or program’s execution to measure or track its effectiveness. While most sectors are expected to start in the red zone and improve with positive performance until reaching the green condition, poor performance may lead to worsening conditions and increase the probability of grievance and further instability.

Figure 2. Output on applicable sectors.





Figure 3. Outcome on major elements of a stabilization mission.



The methodology proposed herein includes three stages: pre-assessment, assessment, and data transformation and interpretation, all of which are designed to enhance the potential for improved outputs and outcomes.

Most discussion of political reality understandably revolves around the structure, function, and actions of governments on various scales (Figure 4). Political reality is a complex, challenging, and culturally motivated enterprise. A political entity can be a person or a group engaged in political behavior. A political entity also may range in scale from a massive intergovernmental organization, such as the United Nations (UN), to an individual citizen.

Several proposed models of political reality for pre-reconstruction are presented in Section 3.5.1, each with unique characteristics and implications that will affect planning and implementation. It is important to emphasize that while each model may be unique each will have some similarity to other models in terms of individual methodology components as well as to the overall pre-reconstruction methodology. Reconstruction of the political reality is a catalyst that increases the rate of political stability without being involved the political process itself. Reconstruction lowers violence and also speeds up the rate of stability. See Table 1 and Figure 5 for measurement and analysis criteria for developing a baseline assessment for pre-reconstruction planning while considering the political reality.

Figure 4. Scales of political entities.





Table 1. Planning the three stages of reconstruction, as presented by Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE).

Stage	Stability level	Description	Reconstruction
0	IMPOSED STABILITY	Drivers of violent conflict persist, requiring the active and robust presence of external military forces, in partnership with a sizable international civilian presence, to perform vital functions such as imposing order, reducing violence, delivering essential services, moderating political conflict, and instituting an acceptable political framework pursuant to a peace accord.	During this stage, reconstruction efforts must focus on delivering essential services such as lifeline systems necessary for the public's daily survival. Vague political forces, a culturally sensitive public, and poor capacity of resources exists.

Stage	Stability level	Description	Reconstruction
I	ASSISTED STABILITY	Drivers of violent conflict have been reduced to such an extent that they can be largely managed by local actors and developing indigenous institutions, enabling the reduction of outside military intervention and civilian assistance to levels that can be sustained by the intervening parties over the long term.	Merging gradually into sustainable peace. Local organizations start engaging in reconstruction, reducing the burden of the reconstruction teams. An interest competition by the internal local players is at its peak. Political forces try to influence reconstruction efforts for self-interest. In this stage, capacity building is critical toward corruption-free business conduct. Competition for power and political gain with nonviolent processes occur, and participatory institutions operate with a level of continuing international involvement and oversight that is sustainable.
II	SELF-SUSTAINING PEACE	Local institutions are able to cope effectively with residual drivers of violent conflict and resolve internal disputes peacefully without the need for an international military or civilian administrative presence.	Reconstruction efforts at this stage become sustainable by local resources. Stabilization indicators are more pronounced. Lifeline systems are fully expected to be restored.

Figure 5. Overall reconstruction mission outcome.





**Table 2. Questionnaire to use in pre-reconstruction planning for the political framework in post-conflict environments.**

Q#	Question	Rating Scale
1	Does the effort under consideration reduce the means and motivations for violent conflict?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
2	Does the effort under consideration promote building local capacity to resolve conflict peacefully and reduce conflict drivers?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
3	Does the effort under consideration promote regional stability?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
4	Does the effort under consideration promote state or society institutional capacity?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
5	Does the effort under consideration promote sustainable security and self-sustaining peace?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
6	Does the effort under consideration increase capacity of indigenous institutions to overcome their problems?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
7	Does the effort under consideration enhance prospects for attaining an enduring peace?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
8	Does the effort under consideration motivate other sectors and enhance public perception?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
9	Are the capacities of political institutions fully utilized to implement the project?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
10	Do political institutions and participatory processes function legitimately and effectively without international intervention to peacefully manage competition for power?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
11	Does the effort under consideration contribute to diminishing competition for exclusive power?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
12	Does the effort under consideration contribute to diminishing political grievances?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
13	Does the effort under consideration contribute to diminishing political destabilization?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
14	Would the peace process be strengthened?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
15	Would delivery of essential government services be strengthened?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
16	Would governmental legitimacy, responsiveness, and accountability be strengthened?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
17	Would political entities be strengthened?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
18	Would respect for minority rights and electoral rights be strengthened?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
19	Would citizen participation and civil society increase?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
20	Would a free and responsible media be strengthened?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
21	Would the government be legitimized?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2

Q#	Question	Rating Scale
22	Are the interests of international donors accounted for?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
23	Are security and safety awareness accounted for?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
24	Are access to labor, space, and materials adequate?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
25	Are dynamics between a state and its citizenry improved?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
26	Is private involvement in the public sector relatively common?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
27	Is there a balance of public and private efforts?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
28	Do the identified stakeholders and actors understand and accept the various political entities of interest?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
29	Is there a balance between centralized and decentralized political systems?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
30	Does the current political system adequately represent the political interests of minority groups?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
31	Is the environment a multiethnic and/or multinational society?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
32	Is the society familiar with Western liberal democracy?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
33	Does the effort under consideration promote establishing trust and legitimacy?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
34	Does the effort under consideration have sensitive cultural heritage relevant to any consideration of political reality?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
35	What is the degree of centralization and decentralized political systems?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
36	Is the tribal system's role in political dynamics applied?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
37	Is the political entity of interest confined by geopolitical boundaries?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
38	Are displaced populations consulted and considered during planning?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
39	Are the interests and involvement of supranational entities understood?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
40	Is the rule of law and institutions that apply it active?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
41	Are corruption controls and government transparency applied?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
42	Are state capacity and legitimacy valid?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
43	Does the rule of law deviate from cultural norms of power?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
44	Is foreign intervention accepted by the local population?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
45	Are key agencies and donors determined?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
46	Is the consensus of the public uniform and positive relevant to the project?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
47	Are resource production, distribution, and consumption adequate?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
48	Is the effort under consideration a function tied to overall society's function?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
49	Is the goal-indicator-measure established?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
50	Are ethical and logistical requirements adequate?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2



Q#	Question	Rating Scale
51	Is the level of security sufficient to produce positive outcomes in both the short and long terms?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
52	Is access to space, materials, and labor adequate for the effort under consideration?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
53	Will explicit statements, direct actions, or casual interactions be filtered through some level of media?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
54	Can social media be utilized to produce a positive outcome?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
55	Are reconstruction operations best led by the host-nation?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
56	Is the sovereignty and rule of law of the host-nation accounted for?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
57	Are considerations for local regulations, construction standards, taxes and fees, etc. accounted for?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
58	Will actions relevant to the effort under consideration promote accountability and reduce corruption?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
59	Are actions focused on committed leadership?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
60	Will the effort under consideration promote building people's trust and the legitimacy of the government?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
61	Does complex international involvement exist?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
62	Does dysfunctional leadership exist?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
63	Is there a plan to update governing policy to incorporate lessons learned throughout the reconstruction process?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2

**Table 3. Questionnaire to use in pre-reconstruction planning for cultural properties in post-conflict environments.**

Q#	Question	Rating Scale
1	Is the cultural, religious, and ethnic composition of the affected population known?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
2	Is there a possibility of cultural property's (CP's) destruction as a result of the project?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
3	Will reconstruction efforts entail stabilizing CP sites?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
4	Is the effort under consideration subject to international treaties and U.S. military directives?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
5	Does the effort under consideration have environmental aspects that are relevant under the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (OEBGD; DoD 4715.05-G)	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
6	Is the effort under consideration within the local laws and regulations?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2

Q#	Question	Rating Scale
7	Does the execution of the effort under consideration meet the cultural heritage protection standards of the host nation?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
8	Does the effort under consideration meet the criteria for United Nations Educational, Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
9	Does the effort under consideration involve a site with national cultural significance?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
10	Does the effort under consideration involve a site with global cultural significance?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
11	Is the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applicable to the site?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
12	Is the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property applicable to the project?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
13	Are any international treaties applicable to the site?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
14	Does the effort under consideration have any archaeological or other historic significance?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
15	Is the effort under consideration under preservation and management of the cultural heritage regulatory agency of the host nation?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
16	Is there a need for immediate use of forces to protect CP?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
17	Is the effort under consideration in compliance with U.S. Cultural Resource Law such as 36CFR60 or 16 U.S.C§470?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
18	Is the effort under consideration coordinated between Commanders and host-nation authorities?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
19	Should Military legal counsel be involved in any interpretation of a foreign nation's laws and treaties pertaining to this effort under consideration?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
20	No major work should be done on any CP unilaterally. Were local authorities and subject matter experts consulted? If none are available, then external agencies such as UNESCO should be consulted	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
21	Is the effort under consideration making any use of CP or its immediate surroundings for purposes that are likely to expose the property to destruction?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
22	Does the 1999 Second Hague Protocol that makes illegal any military use of CP under enhanced protection apply?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
23	Are the necessary active measures in place to protect CP from dangers resulting from military operations conducted by its own forces or the adversary's?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
24	Is there any transfer of ownership of CP?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
25	Is there any alteration or change in use of CP as result of restoration missions?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2

Q#	Question	Rating Scale
26	Is the CP and its immediate surrounding being used?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
27	Has any belligerent occupation resulted in destruction or damage to the property that would require the oversight of commanders?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
28	Have the CP sites been used as staging areas, headquarters, living quarters, or for any other purpose other than the reconstruction efforts?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
29	Are appropriate locations for day-to-day activities identified?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
30	Are local authorities consulted prior to deployment to assist in the selection of activity areas?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
31	Has the effort under consideration been coordinated with the host nation and its commander?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
32	Is the effort under consideration financially practical?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
33	Is the effort under consideration affecting any property that is labeled historic and/or contains cultural resources (e.g., museum)?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
34	Are documentations of marked and unmarked burials, burial grounds, and cemeteries sufficient to ensure those areas are protected?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
35	Does the effort under consideration include official records, library catalogs or archives that will require preservation and storage?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
36	Does the effort under consideration have religious or cultural significance?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
37	Does the effort under consideration involve properties of natural significance, including parks, forests, animal preserves, and/or recreational areas?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
38	Are there any local oral histories relevant to the project?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
39	Are GPS coordinates, survey or sketch map, and/or extensive photographs available?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
40	Is there any existing damage or any conditions that may lead to additional damage?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
41	Is a list with contact information identified to include local subject matter experts who can be contacted to help identify, evaluate, or explain cultural significance?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
42	Is the projected was subjected to looting and vandalism protection	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
43	Is authorization from the local government required to perform emergency archaeological excavations?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
44	Is the effort under consideration located near sensitive sites?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
45	Will the effort under consideration result in alteration of historic buildings,?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
46	Are the administrative authorities, police, and courts competent in their enforcement of the applicable cultural property laws?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2

Q#	Question	Rating Scale
47	Do military forces need to identify ahead of time and move swiftly to secure any buildings and sites at risk of looting or vandalism?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
48	Is there a need for occupying forces to assist in putting a stop to and, in the longer term, preventing misappropriation of cultural property during belligerent occupation by reporting any known theft of artworks and antiquities to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
49	Is there a need to coordinate with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to maintain a database of stolen works of art?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
50	Is there a need for forces to institute and maintain a regime of inspections at border posts?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
51	Is there a need to prevent the illicit export or other removal of cultural property?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
52	Are there any religious institutions that tend to occupy a uniquely powerful position relevant to the project?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
53	Have the kinds of CP been determined that are within the effort under consideration?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
54	Will a full critical inventory be determined at the earliest stages of the reconstruction?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
55	Is there a plan to examine the feasibility of using material from damaged/destroyed buildings	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
56	Has switching materials used been considered, either for ease or cost savings?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
57	Can the material for stabilization or repair be sourced, as near as possible, from the original source?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
58	What is the level of authenticity of the structure under consideration?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
59	Can traditional techniques be utilized?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
60	Can traditional materials be utilized?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
61	Is there a plan for documentation of all records in archival format, to be turned over to the site's new managers?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2

Capacity building is important in order to maintain reconstructed physical infrastructure as well as preserve post-conflict security and peace.

Therefore, capacity building should be incorporated into plans very early on because it is a gradual process and cannot be simply added later.

Capacity building is a long-term, continuing process, in which all actors contribute to enhancing the host nation's human, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities.

The main principles upon which capacity building depends are listed below:

1. Capacity building is a locally driven process, so local ownership is a critical prerequisite, and external donors' roles are limited to supporting local objectives.
2. Existing capacities must be recognized and built upon, which includes appropriate assessments of and cooperation with existing systems of capacity.
3. Capacity building is demand driven, not supply driven like traditional development. This means that the local population knows what capacity is needed, and the people also know how they think that capacity can best be achieved within their culture and context.
4. The nature of complex systems of capacity building makes them difficult to predict. This means that planning and development should have a flexible and cyclical approach that embraces trial, error and learning.
5. Capacity building is also the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations.”

**Table 4. Questionnaire to be used in pre-reconstruction planning for capacity building in post-conflict environments.**

Q#	Question	Rating Scale
1	Is the effort under consideration leading to stability by returning to pre-conflict conditions?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
2	Is the effort under consideration too complex to be able to take all variables into account?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
3	Is the effort under consideration able to provide helpful new knowledge for those who are new to this field?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
4	What is the level of unpredictability for human behavior and how does it affect the effort under consideration?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
5	Does the effort under consideration take into account that there is more to a society than physical infrastructure?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
6	Can the effort under consideration foster host-nation institutional development?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
7	Does the effort under consideration include efforts to improve governance capacity, political moderation, and good governance?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
8	Can the effort under consideration be used to strengthen managerial systems of the local government?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
9	Would the population gains the ability to observe and determine its needs and priorities, as well as the technical, organizational, as a result of the project?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
10	Are there plans for engaging the local resources to take action towards achieving the goals of the effort under consideration?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
11	Does gender or economic inequality exist such that special actions are needed?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
12	Is long-term capacity development lies in establishing the proper environment and stable context that can cultivate progress within a nation	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
13	Is a bottom-up approach being adopted instead of a top-down approach, so the development is happening by efforts of the people without their dependence on external support, which in the long run will result in a capacity that reflects the diversity of the groups in the community?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
14	A distinction between capacity development and capacity building can be made, although the two terms are often used interchangeably. Development implies the improvement of already existing capacities, whereas building is the creation of capacities that do not exist, which is sometimes called capacity creation.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
15	Is capacity building being understood in context with social and political factors, which is the reason why development should be approached at levels ranging from large institutions to the individual?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2

Q#	Question	Rating Scale
16	Does the capacity building plan enable individuals to perform their responsibilities effectively? Their effectiveness also includes values and culture that can affect the individual's performance and productivity.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
17	Capacity building plan enables the organizational structure of people that allows them to work most efficiently within an enabling environment.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
18	Capacity building plan enables institutional capacity. This includes the system of government, but governance extends beyond public institutions of law and regulation to include social systems, norms, and anything else that may influence how communities organize to achieve their goals.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
19	Are hard capacities being considered (Examples of tangible and visible hard capacities are technical skills, explicit knowledge, laws, policies, systems, strategies, structures, and systems for management, planning, finance, and mobilization of resources.)	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
20	Are soft capacities being considered? (Examples of soft capacities are intangible and invisible social skills, leadership, relational skills (negotiation, teamwork, conflict resolution, etc.), and intercultural communication. On the other hand, adaptive capacity is inwardly focused and refers to the ability to be self-aware through self-reflection, learning from experience, analyzing and adapting, and changing management.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
21	Is the capacity building plan foster leadership among the population? Examples of leadership beyond positions of authority are social and environmental movements.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
22	Are knowledge, training, education, and skills utilized? Investment in human capital results in higher levels of capacity development and economic growth that emerge from within the nation over the long term. This growth is not only due to technical knowledge or training, but also to a change in organizational culture and values.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
23	Is accountability in the capacity building plan? The ability to hold parties responsible to deliver on their obligations ensures that public officials are fulfilling the duties of the positions they hold.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
24	Are lessons learned being used in planning for a future mission?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
25	Are expectations of the public reasonable about the extent of reconstruction efforts?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
26	Does the reconstruction plan focus on gaining the trust and cooperation of the indigenous people?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
27	Are political and social factors analyzed to determine which parties should be supported and what the implications of such support will be?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
28	Can adaptability and self-organization be measured?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2

Q#	Question	Rating Scale
29	Can the <i>ability</i> of the public to interact be measured?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
30	Can the <i>capability</i> of the public to interact be measured?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
31	How positive is the balance of Governance and regulation?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
32	Can the diversity of elements in the public be measured?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
33	Can the stability of the public be measured?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
34	Has local understanding of the benefits of the effort under consideration been established to gain the support and commitment of the population and stakeholders?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
35	Is there a single assessment that can be applied to evaluate the status of required prerequisites, capacity levels, as well as social, political and cultural context before any planning activity begins?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
36	Has a sufficient security level been achieved before attempting to implement any capacity building efforts in order to efficiently direct attention to more critical needs as well as to reduce waste and inefficiencies?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
37	Are local traditions, norms, and religious practices understood and not overstepped upon?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
38	Challenging culture is generally results in additional resistance and potential conflict. Is a positive influence approach being adopted?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
39	Cultural assessment is necessary to adapt methods to become compatible to local contexts and achieve the highest level of effectiveness. Is a cultural assessment included in the pre-reconstruction planning?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
40	Is there an understanding of local etiquette, traditions, and taboos in order to gain the cooperation of indigenous people and communicate effectively?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
41	Is proper communication employed to win the perception and desires of locals?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
42	Is an understanding of how society is structured adequate to avoid reinforcing discriminatory systems by supplying funds that may empower a specific class that already has exclusive access to resources? The same question applies to actions relating to gender and minority equality.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
43	Is the context of existing exogenous or endogenous sources conflicts between tribes, ethnicities, classes understood?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
44	The term conflict transformation not only refers to peacebuilding and conflict resolution, but also converts the energy of conflict into more positive processes related to reconstruction and change.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
45	Culture-based practices change in culture-based behavior is difficult to achieve	-2 -1 0 +1 +2



Q#	Question	Rating Scale
46	Has the assessment of existing capacities considered all types of capacity, hard and soft?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
47	Do the people have the attitude and desire for change?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
48	What is the people's level of demand for change, and is the demand large enough to overcome the status quo?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
49	Do the right conditions and resources exist to support change? Such conditions include organizational management tools, available staffing with trained personnel and available financing.	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
50	How willing are the people to cooperate with foreign parties?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2
51	Do the people have a clear vision for the change they desire? What is their vision, and does it agree with the goals of the stakeholders?	-2 -1 0 +1 +2

Finally, the scores from these questionnaires can be averaged for each dimension, and the resultant score can be merged into the sum of the squared root. The best result for a reconstruction mission is where the resultant score falls between +1 and +2.

### **3 Political Reality and Pre-Reconstruction: Consideration of Impacts on Construction Missions**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

In a post-conflict or post-disaster environment, an unstable political situation has the potential to derail an otherwise well-planned construction mission. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of political reality is critical to satisfying short-term objectives and promoting positive long-term outcomes. That said, political reality is a deceptively simple term that encompasses a complex nexus of diverse political, sociocultural, historical, economic, and physical phenomena—the interpretation of which is dependent on context and the perspective of the observer. Evaluating political reality is further complicated for the post-conflict or post-disaster environment, where any semblance of normal order is likely compromised, limiting the reliability of conventional knowledge and historical data. Nevertheless, a focused, detailed assessment of the relevant political reality is necessary to inform planning during pre-reconstruction. In this chapter, we are primarily concerned with evaluating relevant political structures and systems, their component political entities, and key relationships between them to maximize partnerships and minimize obstacles during reconstruction.

Various parties (e.g., political scientists, news media, and international donors) engage in political assessments at different scales and to diverse ends. The result is a vast (though convoluted and redundant) pool of data readily available for consultation. This is both boon and curse for the narrowly focused evaluation proposed here, as it is no small task to filter the noise from extant data and then to distill reliable and relevant information. Converting any assessment of political reality into useful information requires some fundamental knowledge of political systems theory. To this end, a basic primer on political systems is provided here, but readers are encouraged to further educate themselves by consulting outside sources.

Political reality can have wide-ranging implications for the planning and implementation of reconstruction efforts across sectors. As discussed in Chapter 2, disruption in the government sector may cause components in

other sectors—especially sector headquarters (HQs), the military, and much of the economic sector—to either not function or to require major independent components in order to maintain operational characteristics. The political situation can impact a given construction mission in various ways, the most significant being safety and security; access to labor, space, and materials; and public perception. Physical reconstruction often parallels political reconstruction, and—especially in a post-conflict environment—the political reality encountered on the ground likely will not resemble the pre-conflict political situation, and the new reality may mean substantial effort is required to reconstruct the capacity for effective governance. This reality presents a significant challenge during planning, as it is difficult to predict the rapid trajectory of political rearrangement that is typical of a volatile post-conflict environment. This burden is often lessened for the post-disaster environment, where reconstruction is likely to occur within the current political milieu; however, local political authority may still be disrupted.

Unfortunately, examples of past failures are more common—or at least more obvious—than successes. Most recently, post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in a plethora of accounts of lessons learned (e.g., U.S. GAO 2005, 2006). Furthermore, recent history demonstrates that when these lessons learned are not adequately incorporated into operational planning and implementations, they tend to become lessons forgotten.

The U.S. Army's experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq culminated in the preparation of Field Manual (FM) 3-07 (2008). This document should be a key starting point in pre-reconstruction planning, as well as a useful reference to consult throughout the process. At a minimum, an awareness of Penner's (2011) model of stability operations end-state conditions (i.e., safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable governance, sustainable economy, and social well-being; Figure 6) provides a potentially useful heuristic organizational tool. A firm grasp on the political reality of the post-conflict environment is necessary to achieve each of these desired end states. Other extant models adopted by the Department of Defense (DoD) that may be useful for reference include the MPICE metrics framework and the PMESII-PT literature (Agoglia et al. 2010; Ducote 2010).

Figure 6. FM 3-07, stability operations end-state conditions (Penner 2011).

- **Safe and Secure Environment**
  - **Rule of law**
  - **Stable Governance**
  - **Sustainable Economy**
  - **Social Well-Being**

Every political situation is unique, and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to assessing or interpreting the political reality applicable to every mission. Any methodology will need to be adaptable, with interchangeable and independent components that may be applied as necessary. However, the degree to which any methodology will require tailoring is largely dependent on the geopolitical scale of the mission. Significantly, there are key areas of emphasis with wide ranging applicability at the national, regional, and global levels. One of these fundamentals is the imperative that a host government ultimately cultivate legitimacy and trust in its institutions (UN DESA [Department of Economic and Social Affairs] 2007). To illustrate, various case studies are presented for nations and regions most likely to require some degree of reconstruction in the near future. These case studies serve as the foundation for several proposed models of political reality for pre-reconstruction, each with unique characteristics and implications that will affect planning and implementation.


Note that this chapter is not intended to provide guidance for reconstruction of political capacity, but rather it is focused on accounting for the immediate impacts of current political reality when planning for physical reconstruction. To this end, a comprehensive and adaptable methodology component is proposed in this chapter to incorporate an awareness of the complex political milieu and navigate the necessary political structures to the benefit of the mission and the long-term success of reconstruction efforts. The proposed methodology includes stages of pre-assessment, assessment, and data transformation and interpretation that are designed to enhance the potential for improved outputs and outcomes.

### 3.2 Evaluating the political reality

It is always problematic for an external actor to accurately plan to navigate a foreign political system. Before evaluating any political reality, it is important to establish a modest baseline of fundamental definitions and concepts. The evaluation proposed here is primarily concerned with how political structures and systems—and the relations between them—affect reconstruction missions. First, it is necessary to offer a working definition of political reality in the context of this report. Within this text, political reality refers to a complex, networked system of governance and power that exists across multiple scales. Furthermore, political reality is a dynamic spatiotemporal domain, existing in a state of constant fluctuation through time and across geographic space. As such, any assessment of political reality must be evolving and applicable across the broad geopolitical spectrum.

The fundamental unit of political reality is the political entity. Any person or group of persons engaged in political behavior may be classified as a political entity. A political entity may range in scale from a massive intergovernmental organization, such as the U.N., to an individual citizen. Political entities never operate in a vacuum, but cultivate dynamic relations with other entities across multiple scales. Such relations are complex, but will always exist (in general terms) along a continuum of support/opposition (Figure 7). Furthermore, political relationships tend to be hierarchical, with one entity acting as superior and another as subordinate. There are myriad dependencies and interdependencies among political entities.

**Figure 7. Continuum of opposition to support in political relationships.**




The character of any political relationship may vary depending on context, and it will fluctuate over time. The relationship between the United States and China is a good example. The two powers sustain a complex economic partnership alongside a degree of oppositional political, regional, and humanitarian interests. Thus it can be seen that political relationships may

be based on diverse economic, strategic, or cultural circumstances, and the character of the relationship between two entities may depend on which circumstances are under scrutiny.

As stated above, the character of any political relationship may vary depending on context, and it will fluctuate over time. But there will certainly be some oppositional relationships even within relatively stable states (e.g., political parties). Understanding the relationship between 'official' or 'authorized' political entities and the general population is fundamental to evaluating the political reality of any locale. Conflict most often stems from tensions surrounding the dynamics between a state and its citizenry (Khouri 2017).

In order to effectively describe political reality at various project scales, it is necessary to understand the classification and characteristics of political structures and systems. As mentioned above, the scale range of political entities spans the individual through the global. The hierarchy of possible geographic scales is presented in Figure 8. Although entities tend to scale geographically, certain entities (e.g., tribes, religious sects, displaced peoples) may exist outside conventional geopolitical boundaries.

Figure 8. Scale range of political entities.



It is important here to also consider that a form of political entity—the community or culture—can exist across traditional geopolitical scales. Especially with the global interconnectedness afforded by modern information and communication technology, communities can maintain strong bonds, even when people are displaced and scattered by conflict.

Furthermore, many entities typically perceived as extra-political, or non-political (e.g., large corporations, religious institutions, some nonprofits) often act as political entities. Private involvement in the public sector is relatively common, as is public control of the private sector. Depending on the laws and customs of the host nation, it may be difficult to determine the extent to which any overlap of public or private efforts might impact the mission. Religious institutions tend to occupy a uniquely powerful position in many fragile states. It is inevitable that religion and politics will be deeply intertwined, further complicating the political reality and adding another layer to consider during pre-reconstruction.

In order to better identify stakeholders and understand the various political entities of interest (EOIs) to a given mission, a review of basic political systems is warranted. At the national and subnational levels, basic political systems may be either centralized or decentralized. Most discussion of political reality understandably revolves around the structure, function, and interactions of centralized governments on various scales, ranging between chiefdoms, municipalities, provincial authorities, and sovereign states. The nation state is the political form of utmost importance to regular foreign affairs. A nation state joins the political entity of a centralized, sovereign state with the cultural entity of a nation. However, it is important to consider that a nation state may not adequately represent the political interests of minority groups, and endorsing the nation state at the exclusion of other internal political EOIs may be especially problematic when evaluating multiethnic and/or multinational societies.

Historically, sovereign governments have taken various forms, with the most common being authoritarian, monarchy, or democracy. Most troubled nations have a long history of authoritarian rule, totalitarian at the most extreme. For many citizens of these states, Western liberal democracy may be unfamiliar and a poor fit without significant educational programming and a long process of establishing trust and legitimacy. Most monarchies today are constitutionally governed, and the

monarch may or may not share in the rule of the state. However, a few states—notably Saudi Arabia, Vatican City, Swaziland, Oman, and Brunei—are ruled by absolute monarchy. For the purposes of pre-reconstruction, a monarchy would add an additional element of cultural heritage sensitivity to any consideration of political reality.

At the level of the sovereign state, contemporary political scientists tend to support some form of federal democracy as an ideal system. However, without legitimacy and accountability, long-term stability is unlikely when transitioning to a democratic system. In a post-conflict environment, sudden political decentralization can support (or threaten) newly established institutions. The degree of centralization in a democracy can vary. In most cases, routine subnational elections with a degree of decentralization makes for a more likely transition to stable government. Some research suggests that this strategy is easier to achieve in cases of opposition/rebel victory, but is not routinely utilized in cases of regime continuity (Aalen and Muriaas 2017). Ultimately, any efforts to transform a historically authoritarian or nondemocratic state to a federal democracy will require substantial work to educate the public and shift the popular mindset. Reconstruction should be a productive, positive element in this process, but poor planning and implementation has the potential to be counterproductive, promoting the devolution of the post-conflict environment and/or stagnation of progress.

In evaluating and planning for the political reality, it is also vital to consider the role of uncentralized political systems. Uncentralized political systems are a critical component within many fragile states. These systems tend to be more-or-less democratic/egalitarian, and component entities are generally classified as either bands or tribes. Tribes especially have played a significant role in recent political dynamics throughout the Middle East and South Asia. With this situation in mind, it is important to consider the role of displaced populations as political entities. As mentioned above, a political entity need not be confined by geopolitical boundaries. Displaced populations need to be consulted and considered during planning, and they may be easier to access and work with than local groups within the post-conflict environment. It is equally important not to overly emphasize the stakes of these displaced groups over other, less readily available stakeholders.



Political systems also exist at the supranational (e.g., regional and global) level. There are plenty of historical examples of empires and colonial powers, but few contemporary examples. However, the modern super powers (e.g., the United States, China, Russia, Iran) are supranational entities with subordinate sovereign states whose existence depends upon support and other intervention from more powerful allies. In contrast to empires, leagues are coalitions of sovereign states with a common interest. Essentially, these coalitions are the regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]), and the UN. Understanding the interests and involvement of supranational entities is critical for coordination and consensus during pre-reconstruction. Reconstruction does not occur in a vacuum, and external politics will have impacts on, and be impacted by, the operations and outcomes of localized reconstruction missions.

### **3.2.1 Measuring stability, risk, and accountability**

Any assessment requires some framework of measurement and analysis. Several existing metric frameworks have been prepared and/or utilized by various United States Government (USG) agencies and institutions. Furthermore, a great deal of research has been published criticizing past assessment and planning operations, with some providing alternatives that deserve consideration. This section explores common measures used in approaching political assessment and provides a brief overview of existing frameworks and promising alternatives.

An effective and stable government should demonstrate a convincing level of sovereignty. Establishing measures of sovereignty for conflict environments can be particularly difficult. Sovereignty can be either *de jure*, *de facto*, or both. Once sovereignty is recognized by a majority of the world's nations, it is generally difficult to lose in a strictly legal sense. Sovereignty is ostensibly the great equalizer of global politics, at times serving to obscure unequal state capacities and to shield against responsibility and accountability.

Sovereignty tends to be assessed on a scale of good governance through political capacity. The Good Governance agenda stresses the importance of state capacity (with necessary bureaucracy), civil participation and engagement, institutions and rule of law, and corruption control and transparency (Goldfinch and Derouen 2014). According to Barakat et al.

(2012), Good governance is not the same as legitimate governance. The researchers point to a 2005 RAND study (Rathmell 2005) that found the Good Governance model will fail to achieve a positive outcome when it undermines state capacity and legitimacy through poor cultural fit. In such cases of failure, the rule of law deviated from cultural norms of power. It is important to consider that a legitimate state may not necessarily be a moral or just state in the traditional sense of Western neoliberalism.

It is more critical that the local perspective on the political reality be weighed against the perspective of the outside observer. For example, what may be seen as a corrupt or unstable political situation when viewed from outside might not be seen that way or in those terms by the local population (Funaki and Glencorse 2014). The locals most likely want a stable government, but it is difficult for their government to manage with any sense of legitimacy in the face of substantial foreign intervention—locals will not be ignorant of this. While the fact that the host nation ought to be the leader in any reconstruction mission is a commonly held concept among key agencies and donors, such leadership will often lack legitimacy if forced to operate outside local cultural norms. Accountability systems are crucial in the transition from conflict to stable peace, but unless they are adapted to the particular custom of the host population, they may work to the detriment of long-term success.

Consider stable examples in the region, not necessarily Western examples, when making comparisons during evaluation. Remember that no community is truly monolithic. While it is important to identify and work with all scales of leadership, take care (as much as possible) to avoid alienating opposition groups and minority stakeholders. The ultimate goal in accounting for diverse local interests and values is the promotion of consensus, or at least the promotion of an environment that is conducive to consensus building. Also note that there are explicit, public political structures and often there are unseen, implicit, or even hidden ones. This is one reason why an external evaluation will often be restricted through a dependence on historic analysis. Emphasis on the most current and comprehensive data, obtained from the most reliable of local and/or expert sources is critical.

### *3.2.1.1 Existing methods for political reality assessment in pre-reconstruction*

Many talented minds have considered the importance of developing useful, accurate, and accessible systems for assessing the conflict and post-

conflict environments. While most of these systems are not specifically tailored to evaluating the political reality, or considering reconstruction missions in particular, they do provide a useful basis in formulating a dedicated methodology. Two such systems (PMESII-PT and MPICE) are briefly discussed below.

*Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT)*

Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT) is a linear methodology developed by the military as an “analytical start point to assess an operation environment” (Ducote 2010). This methodology revolves around describing each of the PMESII-PT variables for a given environment, as follows:

- **Political** – encompasses distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance.
- **Military** – includes military and paramilitary capabilities of relevant actors.
- **Economic** – comprises behaviors related to resource production, distribution, and consumption.
- **Social** – has a cultural, religious, and ethnic composition; includes associated beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors.
- **Information** – includes nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of actors who collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
- **Infrastructure** – comprises basic facilities, services, and installations required for the functioning of society.
- **Physical environment** – includes geography and man-made structures, as well as climate and weather.
- **Time** – involves timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions; perception of timing and duration.


This approach to analysis can help define complex systems, but it is unable to go beyond that description to cultivate the rich understanding of systems. In other words, PMESII-PT is a simple narrative that does not include the critical explanations useful in planning to operate in a dynamic environment. Instead, scholars and other evaluators have relied on ontological/holistic approaches that do succeed in providing the necessary rich understanding. Despite this shortcoming, PMESII-PT offers a useful methodology for describing the key elements of a post-conflict

environment, and it sets the stage for a more narrowly focused and deeper assessment and interpretation (Ducote 2010).

*Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) metrics framework*

MPICE is a “hierarchical metrics system of *outcome-based* goals, indicators, and measures” established through a joint effort led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the Fund for Peace (FfP), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of State (DOS; Agoglia et al. 2010). The MPICE metrics framework uses a simple goal, indicator, measure hierarchy to evaluate progress (Figure 9). This hierarchy is built on a set of core methods that may be used independently or in combination as needed. Basic methods of measurement include content analysis (CA), expert knowledge (EK), quantitative data (QD), and survey/polling data (S/PD). All of these methods are useful in specifically evaluating the political reality, and they should be included in any pre-reconstruction tool kit.

Figure 9. Example of MPICE metrics framework hierarchy (Agoglia et al. 2010, xvi).



MPICE provides an excellent example and template of interagency coordination, which is crucial to success during the planning process. With respect to political reality, coordinating with agencies and organizations engaged in political reconstruction will be key, and it should be the first

step in any approach to evaluating the political reality of a post-conflict or post-disaster environment. However, the relevance of the MPICE framework to the methodology proposed here is limited. MPICE was designed to measure progress based on outcomes, but here we are concerned with developing a baseline assessment for prediction and planning purposes. While elements—especially data collection methods—introduced by MPICE are clearly appropriate to this end, the MPICE system and metrics framework is too broad and progress-oriented to be fully adaptable to pre-reconstruction.

#### *3.2.1.2 Participatory research methodologies and other alternatives*


A complete understanding of the current political reality of a given locale is challenging—if not impossible—without reliable, up to date information derived from participant observation of the local population. Political reality is a complex, culturally motivated enterprise. As such, quantitative measures alone cannot contribute an accurate, comprehensive assessment of the political environment. To date, most qualitative metrics are based on data derived from indirect sources (“experts”) or survey/polling data (see the discussion of MPICE above). While both are important, and should be utilized in any evaluation, they are not without serious limitations. External observations, no matter how well informed, are not an adequate substitute for reliable local knowledge. A key goal in reconstruction is a preference for local leadership. In order to plan for local leadership, one must first understand the needs, customs, and values of the local population.

Several IGO and nongovernmental organization (NGO) agencies have demonstrated a degree of success with various participatory research methodologies (Bowd et al. 2010). Participatory research methods are used to supplement the more conventional methods presented above, and are largely adapted from cultural anthropology and social network theory. Anthropologists have a long tradition of using participatory observation as a primary method when conducting ethnographies. By inserting themselves into the daily lives of their subjects, a more accurate, rich understanding of local knowledge should emerge. This approach is complicated and may be limited by security, ethical, and logistical concerns. Furthermore, any researcher attempting participatory research should be suitably trained for the work.

A network diagram is a basic product that may be generated through a participatory research method and supplemented with additional qualitative methods. Visualizing the complex, multi-scalar web of political entities and relationships is important for project planning and implementation. Borrowing the heuristic device commonly employed for social networks and applying it to political networks is a tool that will be universally appropriate. Data visualization is a powerful aid in planning, and distilling a complex political network into a graphic presentation of nodes (EOIs) and edges (relationships) can simplify the conceptual environment. An example of a political network graph prepared by using free open-source software (Gephi) is shown in Figure 10.

Still, other researchers argue for incorporating additional theoretical approaches and associated methods, largely borrowed from academia. For instance, Ducote (2010) concludes that the linear methodology encompassed in PMESII-PT is not sufficient to assess and convey understanding of a complex environment, and he proposes incorporating identity theory and narratives to fill the gap between PMESII-PT and holistic approaches.

Figure 10. Example of a political network diagram for Syria.



### 3.3 Political reality and reconstruction missions

This section considers the aspects of political reality most relevant to pre-reconstruction planning and implementation, specifically tailored for construction missions. In this context, the relevant political reality involves much more than the built environment of the government sector discussed in Chapter 2. Physical reconstruction occurs after (or in some cases during) a climactic episode (e.g., end of violence, natural disaster), and the political reality of a post-conflict or post-disaster environment likely will vary substantially from the political reality of a stable environment. Understanding the history of the political reality leading up to and during this climactic episode can inform operational planning, but real time, ground-level data should be prioritized over historical data whenever possible.

It is important to emphasize there is no one-size-fits-all model of pre-reconstruction, and this is true for individual methodology components as well as for pre-reconstruction methodology as a whole. For a construction mission, the political reality has the potential to impact several key

operational interests, including safety and security; access; public perception; and project design, cost, and timeframe (Figure 11). Each of these key interests and associated considerations for pre-reconstruction are presented in Figure 12 and discussed in sections 3.3.1–3.3.4 of this report.

Figure 11. Potential impacts of political reality on key operational interests.




Figure 12. Summary of political reality considerations for key operational interests.

Safety and Security	Access	Public Perception	Cost, Design, Time Frame
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Minimizing violence and environmental threats</li> <li>•Capabiliites of local authorities/host nation</li> <li>•Sequencing of political and physical reconstruction tasks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Capability of existing institutions to provide legitimate permissions</li> <li>•Materials, space, and labor</li> <li>•Sequencing of political and physical reconstruciton tasks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Coordination with IE operations</li> <li>•Cultural understanding</li> <li>•Media capabilities, structure, and reliability</li> <li>•Social media engagement and monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Respect sovereignty and rule of law (if present)</li> <li>•Local customs, regulations, taxes and fees, construction standards</li> <li>•Cost/benefits of operating within existing political structures</li> </ul>

### 3.3.1 Safety and security

Security is perhaps the most critical area in which a well-informed navigation of political reality will produce positive outcomes in both the



short and long terms. It was widely reported that the lack of security proved a serious obstacle during recent reconstruction operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Instability leads to insecurity through the erosion of the rule of law, economic collapse, sociopolitical fragmentation, etc. Minimizing the impact of ongoing violence (e.g., continued insurgent presence, looting, vandalism) as well as environmental threats to the safety of personnel, equipment, and materials is key to mission success.

Local authorities may or may not be able to offer substantive support to the mission, regardless of the nature of their relationship to the pre-reconstruction team. In many cases, it may be necessary to delay physical reconstruction until political reconstruction has proceeded sufficiently enough to provide security. If this delay is not feasible, security may need to be provided by the military until a peaceful transition of power is possible. It is important to understand any potential threats that are posed to the construction mission by the local environment and to plan to mitigate these threats in advance, preferably with the assistance of local security agents.

### **3.3.2 Access**

Existing and developing political institutions may control access to space, materials, and labor necessary for mission success. Access may be limited or enhanced depending on the nature of relations between the USG and the relevant political entities. Again, sequencing may play a role here. If political reconstruction has not progressed sufficiently to ensure that an institution is in place with the capacity to grant access, it may be worthwhile to delay the reconstruction mission until a legitimate local authority is established. Assuming permissions due to an absence of authorizing institutions puts the project at risk of damaging public perception and inadvertently escalating tensions or prompting renewed conflict.

### **3.3.3 Public perception**

Popular support is crucial to mission success. Therefore, engaging with the public and monitoring shifting public opinion should be a priority during pre-reconstruction. Information Engagement (IE) has long been recognized as a critical component of stabilization and reconstruction operations. General guidance on IE is provided in FM 3-07 (2008).

Monitoring and influencing public perception is a complex domain that requires mastery of diverse techniques in public affairs, psychological operations, and strategic communications, with a critical eye toward ethics and local custom. Common IE tasks include identifying or establishing outlets for news media; providing factual, accurate info to the media and controlling disinformation; issuing information promptly and in local languages; assisting transitional authorities with new public information programs; synchronizing messages with operations; tailoring IE strategy to host nation capacities; and integrating cultural understanding.

Most attempts to engage the public, be it through explicit statements, direct actions, or casual interactions will be filtered through some level of media. Existing and developing political structures will impact the degree to which media is controlled or censored by the state, and thus, the media may broadcast information that is counterproductive to mission success. News media, be it private or state-run, presents a critical communication node between political entities and the general public. It is important to understand and utilize the local media to establish trust and to cultivate mission support among the host nation's population. The news media is also a critical source for general information on recent events that are relevant to the political reality of a given mission.

For the foreseeable future, all reconstruction projects will occur in the world of social media such as Facebook and Twitter. Social media was largely responsible for the rise of independent youth as a mobilized political force in the Middle East and elsewhere, and social media's potential to support swift, widespread fluctuations in popular opinion cannot be overstated. Social media provides a platform for the rapid deployment of information that may benefit or damage the public's perception of a reconstruction mission. Social media has also demonstrated its utility as a source of real-time data on sociopolitical events and conceptual trends that may have project implications. As such, active engagement and monitoring of relevant social media platforms and communities should begin as early as possible in the pre-reconstruction process.

### **3.3.4 Project costs, design, and time frame**

The operations of existing and developing political structures may present additional unanticipated obstacles for a given reconstruction mission. Because reconstruction operations should be led by the host nation, it is

imperative to respect the host nation's sovereignty and rule of law (to the degree it is present and functioning). With respect to reconstruction missions, this respect may entail additional considerations for local customs, permits and regulations, construction standards, taxes and fees, etc.—all of which will affect the costs, design, and time frame of a project in various ways and at various scales.

In most cases, the post-conflict environment will suffer from a leadership vacuum and will require considerable effort and time to re-establish capacity for public administration and rule of law. Nevertheless, attempts to adapt the mission to best fit the local culture are vital to success. In some cases, this adaptation may involve interaction with illicit or corrupt authorities and engagement in alternative forms of exchange to procure necessary security, access, materials, and labor. While promoting accountability and reducing corruption are critical goals of any reconstruction effort, such work takes time. Project leadership may need to weigh the cost and benefits of operating within existing corrupt political or economic structures in order to achieve successful, timely outputs against the potential damage to long-term outcomes.

### **3.4 Regional examples, projections, and implications**

The relevant political reality faced by each reconstruction mission will be unique. However, with respect to reconstruction, there are some key areas of emphasis with wide-ranging applicability across geopolitical space. Any reconstruction operation should require some variation of the following political factors, regardless of specific context (from UN DESA 2007):

- Focused and committed leadership
- Security
- Solid government structures providing basic services
- Building people's trust and legitimacy
- Information dissemination
- Sound civic dialogue.
- Mediation and community participation

Specific to the political reality, it is imperative that the host government cultivate legitimacy and garner public trust in its institutions (UN DESA 2007). The need for the host nation to be perceived as the primary authority is one of the few universal standards applicable across the geopolitical spectrum.

No political entity is identical, and political systems do not exist in a vacuum nor do they remain static over time. Nevertheless, an attempt is made here (Sections 3.4.1–3.4.4) provide a broad sample of the current understanding of political realities for some of the most likely candidates for reconstruction, based on current states of conflict and environmental threats. Additionally, implications on potential reconstruction operations are projected for each regional example.

### **3.4.1 Middle East and North Africa (MENA)**

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is no stranger to conflict and the political climate has changed and continues to change rapidly following the widespread protests of 2011, collectively referred to as the Arab Spring. This period has witnessed the seemingly inevitable collapse of authoritarian governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. Initial optimism and hope for democratization was met with violent suppression in Syria, Libya, and Bahrain and a string of electoral victories by conservative Islamist groups in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco (Alkebsi et al. 2017). The always dynamic and sometimes volatile nature of political reality is perhaps best illustrated in the recent history of this region, especially with regard to previous U.S.-led reconstruction efforts and complex international involvement.

The recent history of the MENA region provides a clear example of the extent to which failed states tend to disrupt beyond their borders (Lynch 2016). Changes throughout this region after 2010 include: the emergence of new political actors and the transit of old political actors to new roles, fluctuating balances of power, struggles to adapt to new legitimacies and new accountabilities, and escalations of external intervention. As a result, many states in the region have experienced a rapid increase in sectarian tensions and internal conflict (Khouri 2017). While many nations could provide excellent case studies for this region, we have selected Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Overviews of each are presented below in Sections 3.4.1.1–3.4.1.4.

#### **3.4.1.1 Iraq**

Prior to the 2003 invasion by the U.S.-led coalition, Iraq was not a strong state. The centralized government lacked the social depth to support legitimacy, and the rule of law was drastically eroded. Although projecting a modern appearance on the world stage (see North Korea 3.4.4.2), the

state was in fact quite fragile (Rathmell 2005). Reconstruction in Iraq was crippled by a lack of “realistic and fact-based plans” that emphasized the Iraqi perspective rather than that of outsiders (Cordesman 2007). With no cohesive national character, Iraq remains a poor candidate for establishing a stable, peaceful, liberal democratic state (Rathmell 2005). Prior to the “escalating repression” of the Ba’ath party and Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq experienced decades of internal sectarian violence and coups. Following the end of British colonial rule, the British supported a Hasemite monarchy in conflict with the Kurds, Shi’a tribes, and mullahs. As a result, Iraq had never established a strong national identity.

The fundamental problem of poor cultural fit was exacerbated through the process of de-Ba’athification, which forced a complete reconstruction of political structures and was managed by an inefficient transitional government (the Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA]). Instead of fortifying pockets of productivity, ministries were allowed to collapse and become subject to looting and destruction of potentially useful property (Cordesman 2007). This collapse reflects a lack of planning, poor collaboration, and a reliance on baseless, unrealistic assumptions. Even when effective planning was accomplished, the lack of coordination between agencies allowed critical advice and information to go unheeded (Rathmell 2005).

Fortunately, the humanitarian crises predicted to follow the invasion never materialized. However, the coalition leadership was not prepared for the total collapse of Iraqi institutions after the removal of the Hussein regime (Rathmell 2005). The degree of centralization was underestimated, and without leadership from the executive in the capital of Baghdad, the entire existing political structure ceased to function. This cessation resulted in numerous problems for initial stabilization and reconstruction efforts, the most significant of which was a complete lack of security and rule of law. The resultant insurgency was also not predicted. The poor planning and poor implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations following 2003 has directly contributed to an environment of sustained political instability and renewed internal conflict.

While ostensibly a liberal democratic state (as established by constitution), sectarian conflicts persist through varied geographical and political scales. The Shi’a Da’Wa party, under the leadership of former president Nouri-al-Maliki, has *de facto* control over the military, intelligence, and judiciary,

despite the efforts of opposition groups led by Muqtada al-Sadr and Ammar al-Hakim. Thus, the government is unable to secure legitimacy or consensus among the population. Security concerns persist as the struggle continues to reclaim territory from Islamic States (IS). Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi lacks an effective power base, and the attempts at reconciliation with Sunni Arab and Kurdistan Regional Government leaders have been compromised by Shi'a Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU) militias critical to military success against IS forces (IHS Markit<sup>1</sup> 2018a).

With the successful operation to reclaim Mosul from IS forces in the summer of 2017, the end of direct conflict with IS in Iraq seems to be rapidly approaching. With this impending victory, a second wave of post-conflict reconstruction will likely be necessary, especially in the areas most heavily impacted by the fight against IS. This reconstruction will be a major test of U.S. post-conflict reconstruction capabilities, as the lessons learned from previous experiences in Iraq will be applied to Iraq. The future viability of stabilization and reconstruction operations as currently structured will depend on a measurable improvement in outcomes this time around.

#### 3.4.1.2 *Libya*

Following the Arab Spring, which began in early 2011, a violent crackdown on protests led to civil war and the overthrow of the long-tenured regime of Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi (who was commonly referred to as Colonel Gaddafi). The revolution was managed by the Free Libyan Army and the National Transitional Council. Following their victory, a weak centralized government (the General National Congress [GNC]) was established. The situation in Libya, however, is a clear example of how a substantial change in government (e.g., a forced transition from authoritarian regime to liberal democracy) will provide little more than illusory authority and will lack legitimacy unless it is preceded by a shift in popular mindset (Khouri 2017). Despite seemingly better prospects for reconstruction when compared to other post-conflict societies in the region, reconstruction and stabilization in Libya has not progressed as planned (Chivvis and Martini 2014). With no functioning central authority, jihadists have thrived, the regions of Sahel and Maghreb have grown more unstable, and the south has become a sanctuary for

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<sup>1</sup> A global information provider based in London, the firm was formed from the merger between IHS Inc. and Markit Ltd. In July 2016.

al Qaeda groups fleeing the neighboring Republic of Mali. Key problems contributing to the prolonged turmoil are a lack of security, a stalled process of political reconciliation and reconstruction, and an international community that has been either reluctant to intervene or simply disinterested (Chivvis and Martini 2014).

The security crisis in Libya cannot be understated. Although portions of the country have become havens for terrorist groups, political violence remains more common than terrorism. Between 2011 and 2013, approximately 51 political assassinations were reported (Akanji 2015). The GNC has been subject to attacks, and the embassies of the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, and France have been assaulted, as has the International Red Cross. The security crisis has resulted from the proliferation of unguarded weapons by various sectarian groups, a leadership vacuum that has allowed the growth of sectarian groups, and insufficient or ineffective international intervention on the part of NATO and the UN (Akanji 2015). Without adequate support from the international community, the new government has failed to control militias or to establish the rule of law. Internal political divisions, widespread corruption, and incoherent legislation have hampered the political reconstruction process.

The successful reconstruction and stabilization of Libya is dependent on achieving a national reconciliation, improving national security forces, providing stronger border security, and establishing a greater capacity for public administration (Chivvis and Martini 2014). As of May 2017, opposition leader General Khalifa Haftar (head of the Libyan National Army) had agreed to negotiations with Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj (for the Government of National Accord), illustrating a possible shift to cooperation with the UN-backed Government of National Accord—although peace remains unlikely (BMI 2017a). However, Libya's oil production has restarted and as oil revenues return to the country, it is possible that relative economic stability will accelerate political stabilization.

#### 3.4.1.3 Syria

Discontent with the Assad regime among the Syrian people is historically rooted in the Bashar al-Assad's succession following the death of his father in 2000. The Assad family are members of the minority Alawite Shi'a sect, which established itself at the head of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in

Syria and promoted a more-or-less secular Arab Nationalist agenda for decades. Under Assad, long-standing sectarian tensions escalated and became increasingly polarized (Farouk-Alli 2014). The Alawites were enmeshed as the central authority in Syria by the French during the French Mandate Period after 1923, and this connection to colonial rule only serves to exacerbate underlying religious tensions. The case of sectarianism and opposition to the Alawite authorities is an example of how political reality is always intertwined with religious concerns. In Syria, as in Iraq, an authoritarian secular state has now turned sectarian.

The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011, has already entered its seventh year and in many ways, peace seems as unattainable as ever. The current conflict emerged from the Arab Spring protests in 2010–2011 that were violently suppressed by the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, first in the city of Deraa and then elsewhere. The violent response from the central authority led many protesters to take up arms, forming hundreds of rebel brigades. The opposition groups include a tentative alliance of Sunni factions including the Free Syrian Army (FSA), as well as the mostly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Salafi jihadists (e.g., al-Nusra Front), and the IS. The resulting interventions of regional and world powers (e.g., Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States) have transformed Syria into a “proxy battleground” and drastically complicated the conflict.

The Syrian army is receiving substantial support in the form of Shi'a militias from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen, as well as support from Iranian and Russian military and intelligence. Iran continues to finance Assad's government and provide military advisers, cheap weapons, oil, and combat troops. Syria is an important regional ally for Iran, specifically as a strategic transit point between Iran and the Hezbollah group in Lebanon. The close ties between Iran and Syria stem from the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), when Syria was Iran's only regional ally and the first Arab country to officially recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is important to understand, however, that Iran's close ties are to Syria, but not necessarily to the Assad regime. Iran's main goal is the survival of the ruling Ba'ath party. Under General Qassem Suleimani, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF) has become the dominant leader of Assad's forces but in recent months, Iran has increasingly looked to Russia to lead their complementary interests in Syria (Yolcu 2016).



Russia also has substantial strategic and economic interests in Syria and the region. The Assad regime is a key ally for Russia, which has conducted air strikes against IS and SDF forces in Syria since September 2015 and provided crucial military support that culminated in the successful siege of rebel-held eastern Aleppo, which fell in December 2016. Russia's interests in Syria ranges from attempting to recover some of what it has lost from recent U.S. sanctions, protecting energy investments in Syria, positioning itself in a position of leverage against the West, and restoring regional stability in the Middle East (Kozhanov 2016).

On the side of the opposition, the United States, largely in response to atrocities committed by Assad's forces, has supported the so-called moderate rebel groups (e.g., the SDF alliance) and conducted air strikes against IS targets in Syria since September 2014. The scale of U.S. intervention escalated, beginning with an attack on a Syrian air base following a deadly chemical attack by government forces on the Syrian town of Khan Shaykhun in April 2017. The United States also began supplying arms to Kurdish forces fighting IS in Syria.

In addition to the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey positioned themselves as key allies of the opposition in Syria. Saudi Arabia, posturing against rival Iran, provided major military and financial assistance to the rebels, largely without regard for the rebels' degree of radicalism. Turkey actively supported some rebel groups, but openly opposed the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) militia included in the SDF alliance. Turkey considered the YPG an extension of the banned Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This understanding further complicates matters for the SDF, as Turkish troops control approximately 772 square miles on the Syrian side of the border with Turkey, in the vicinity of SDF-controlled Manbij, a city in northern Syria. To prevent clashes between Turkish forces and YPG fighters, the United States deployed troops to Manbij (Bennis 2016).

Some experts have already developed projections for the resolution of the current conflict in Syria. According to IHS Markit (2018b), as support from Iran and Russia increases, the survival of the Ba'athist government (if not the Assad regime itself) becomes more likely. It is possible that President Assad may become a bargaining chip for Russia and Iran as they seek to secure their interests in Syria and the region. It is also possible that a negotiated settlement could be reached between Assad and the U.S.-

backed opposition, but such a settlement is likely one to two years removed from present day. Given the current situation, it seems unlikely that Assad's forces will secure a total military victory or recapture the whole country. However, it appears even less likely that the U.S.-backed Sunni opposition will eventually defeat Assad's forces without a substantial escalation of intervention by the United States and her allies. Considering this, any post-conflict reconstruction in Syria is likely to involve competing interests among the United States and her allies, Iran, and Russia.

#### *3.4.1.4 Yemen*

During the uprisings of 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh relinquished power to Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi (Juneau 2016). The Houthi movement's followers, who favor Yemen's Zaidi Shi'a minority, launched a violent rebellion against Hadi's regime. In 2014, the Houthis succeeded in seizing the Yemen capital of Sanaa, but President Hadi managed to escape south to the port city of Aden the following year. He was soon forced into exile by an alliance of Houthis and security forces loyal to former President Saleh (Juneau 2016).

Intelligence suggested the Houthi coalition was receiving support from Iran, so Saudi Arabia and eight other Sunni states entered the conflict, conducting air strikes and supporting a restoration of Hadi's government. To this end, the Saudi coalition has received logistical and intelligence support from the United States, United Kingdom, and France. As a result of the coalition's intervention on behalf of President Hadi, the Houthi advance on Aden was halted, and Houthi forces were pushed back. President Hadi and his government returned to Aden, but fighting continues throughout the country with little hope of resolution.

The tensions in Yemen stem from a complex historical network of "overlapping layers of control and prohibition" (Khouri 2017, 9). These networked stimuli have combined into a complex milieu in which conflict was all but unavoidable. Understanding the many layers of conflict is important to understanding the current environment and developing well-informed plans for future intervention. Khouri (2017) identified the following seven layers in Yemen:

1. Family and community
2. Wider tribe or clan

3. State's civil laws
4. Overarching security agencies
5. Monarchical rule
6. Ethnic, sectarian, or religious definitions of appropriate or unacceptable behavior
7. Sustained indirect impact of three powerful regional geostrategic or ideological tides related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Cold War, and oil-fueled economic systems

According to the UN, Yemen currently faces “total social, economic, and institutional collapse” (McKirdy 2017, 1). The country has been decimated by two years of civil war that left approximately 7 million near famine, and it is also struggling to cope with a massive cholera outbreak. Fighting persists between the forces of President Hadi and the Houthi rebels. The turmoil and leadership vacuum have allowed Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to reinforce its presence in southern and southeastern Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition is enforcing a sea, land, and air blockade on Yemen that it began in 2015, which left an estimated 18.8 million persons in need of humanitarian aid.

The experience in Yemen has shown the impact that “mobilized publics” can have on a state’s domestic environment (Alwazir 2016, 170). Several new actors (e.g., the youth-oriented community group Marib Cause, and the political party Al-Watan) gained entry to the national political sphere when political stability was compromised during the transformation period. These new actors have not made a major impact on the immediate situation, but their long-term impact, especially with the rise of the Independent Youth Movement, has the potential to be significant. This is an excellent example of the power of new information and communication technology—specifically social media—to rapidly influence public opinion and precipitate the emergence of new political entities.

### **3.4.2 Horn of Africa**

Like MENA, the Horn of Africa is a region of normalized conflict where deep sectarian divides and vestiges of colonialism continue to contribute to instability and violence, seemingly without end. In recent history, especially post-9/11, this region was largely relegated to the periphery of U.S. foreign affairs, but decades of civil war and humanitarian crises make several of the nations in this region likely candidates for reconstruction in the near future. A trend in intrastate conflict in this region is a general

north-south divide between Muslims and Christians or Animists. This is the oversimplified root of recent conflicts in Sudan/South Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic, etc. In recent history, USG interest in this region has focused primarily on counter-terrorism (e.g., Nigeria, Somalia) and humanitarian crises or genocides (e.g., Darfur, Somalia, Eritrea). While many nations could provide excellent case studies for this region, we have selected Somalia as an example (3.4.2.1), largely due to its history of U.S. intervention and the availability of historical data.

#### *3.4.2.1 Somalia*

Somalia's recent history is fraught with conflict and unsuccessful foreign interventions. In 1960, Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland merged to form the United Republic of Somalia after gaining independence from their respective colonial rulers. Between 1969 and 1991, the nation was ruled by the authoritarian socialist government of Mohamed Siad Barre, under whom much of the economy was nationalized. The ouster of Siad Barre in 1991 resulted in civil war when former British Somaliland declared independence from the Republic. The U.S.-led UN peacekeeping mission to Somalia failed during the mid-1990s, and the northern region of Puntland also declared its independence in 1998. An internationally backed unity government established in 2000 also failed, and Somaliland and Puntland continued to break away. Troubles in the nation persisted, and between 2005 and 2012, pirates operating out of Puntland upset shipping lanes off the Somali coast.

Significantly in 2006, militias supporting the Islamist Union of Islamic Courts (IUIC, a coalition promoting Sharia Law) captured the city of Mogadishu, but the militias were subsequently defeated by Ethiopian forces. The rise of the IUIC prompted a somewhat brief renewal of U.S. interest in the nation, which was rapidly becoming yet another haven for terrorist groups. Between 2007 and 2011, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) deployed forces to Somalia, and Kenyan forces intervened to halt the advance of the militant group Al-Shabab in the southern and central portions of the country. The year 2012 saw the first parliament established in over 20 years and the first presidential election held since 1967. With the new, internationally backed government installed, Somalia seems to be slowly approaching stability under President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda and Al Shabab insurgencies remain active in the country.

Following the 2006 seizure of Mogadishu by the IUC, the United States began to re-examine interests in Somalia and plan for possible intervention in support of stabilization and reconstruction. In a 2007 Foreign Relations Subcommittee (FRS) session, then-U.S. Senator Russ Feingold claimed “Somalia represents the new types of challenges that face our country and our friends and allies around the world.” (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations [USSCFR] 2007, 1) The ongoing crises in Somalia provide an excellent example of the impact of displaced people on international politics. For instance, in 2007, approximately 70,000 Somalis were living in Minnesota (USSCFR 2007). That same year, Michael Hess from United States Agency for International Development (USAID) noted that many of the displaced Somalis—especially the women—did not wish to return home, even after peace was restored (USSCFR 2007).

The situation in Somalia, as with many other failed or failing states, showed that a regional approach to reconstruction is critical, because instability in Somalia has dire consequences throughout the Horn of Africa region. The degradation of security, movement of militias, access to cheap weapons, and support for terrorism has made instability a national export from Somalia.

But there is reason to be optimistic that the program set by the interagency policy team working in Somalia after 2007 is slowly yielding positive outcomes. In 2007, the Department of State (DOS)-led policy team, working with the International Contact Group on Somalia (comprised of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Ghana, Yemen, and Tanzania), established the following priorities for reconstruction and stabilization (U.S. Senate FRS 2007):

- Support inclusive dialog among Somali stakeholders.
- Mobilize support for capacity building of transitional federal institutions.
- Development and humanitarian assistance.
- Deploy African stabilization force.
- Continue tracking and prevention of terrorism.

Furthermore, the State Department stressed that post-conflict reconstruction is a “locally led enterprise,” an assertion that is fundamental to our approach here as well.

### 3.4.3 Latin America

While this region boasts several politically stable states, there are still pockets of instability and unrest. This region is also prone to natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes that have resulted in humanitarian crises and social and political upheaval in recent history. Historically, the United States has taken a significant leadership role in the region. When planning future reconstruction missions, the lessons learned during interventions in Haiti in the 1990s and Colombia in the 2000s should not be ignored. Both cases offer rare positive examples of effective detailed, long-term planning and international coordination (Crane and Terrill 2003). Furthermore, the current turmoil in Venezuela threatens the stability in the region, and it deserves scrutiny and consideration as a potential candidate for future reconstruction and stabilization operations. Case studies for Colombia and Venezuela are presented below in sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2, respectively.

#### 3.4.3.1 Colombia

Colombia experienced a great deal of internal conflict, largely connected to the trade in illicit drugs, during the 1980s and 1990s. In 2000, the United States committed to Plan Colombia, a “bilateral effort...to address...challenges and strengthen the Colombian government’s ability to establish peace, law, and order in its national territory” (Meachem et al. 2014, v). The Plan Colombia program was widely seen as a success. From 2000 to 2008, the Colombian government regained control of 90 percent of the country’s rural areas and destroyed a majority of the insurgency’s leadership. The success reported by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was based on measured improvements in homicide rate, kidnappings, and the public use of highways (Meachem et al. 2014). These have all proven to be worthwhile measurements for assessing security and the public perception of security. Once security was restored in Colombia, the program was able to switch its focus to economic interests.

The United States remains a “key regional security partner” of Colombia (Meachem et al. 2014, iv). However, the nation is still recovering from almost 50 years of fighting and widespread violence in the rural areas. Most recently, the biggest conflicts have been between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Continued stability in Colombia is closely tied to the stability of neighboring Venezuela, which is experiencing rapidly escalating tensions

in the wake of President Nicolas Maduro's establishment of a new constituent assembly. The apparent success of Plan Colombia is viewed as a litmus test for the efficacy of the bilateral security partnership model employed by the United States throughout the globe. Considering this, any regression in the stability and security of Colombia (as is currently occurring in Iraq) might be perceived as an indictment of U.S. foreign policy.

#### 3.4.3.2 *Venezuela*

Currently the country is divided between Chavistas, loyal to the socialist policies of the late President Hugo Chavez (including the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and supporters of the opposition-led National Assembly, who claim that under the PSUV, democracy has eroded and the economy has suffered. President Maduro, who was elected in 2013, claims to carry on the policies and ideology of Chavez, but has struggled to charm the Chavistas like his predecessor. Falling oil prices have hurt the country's economy and affected the viability of its key social programs.

In March 2017, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice ruled to take over the powers of the National Assembly, the first major step toward an authoritarian state under Maduro. The ruling generated widespread protests, and the court ultimately reversed the ruling. In response, the opposition stressed its desire for general elections, humanitarian aid, the release of political prisoners, and the removal of Supreme Tribunal justices who had voted to remove the National Assembly's powers. Maduro then announced the establishment of a constituent assembly with the objective of drafting a new constitution, presumably to grant him sweeping executive powers and to undermine his opposition. Understandably, the National Assembly, led by Julio Borges, strongly opposes this move.

Earlier this year, the Organization of American States (OAS) failed to pass a declaration demanding an end to violence in Venezuela, largely due to the sensitivities of Caribbean nations that rely on cheap oil from Venezuela. Nicaragua, a major ally of Venezuela, opposed the OAS crisis meeting. The U.S.-based investment banking company of Goldman Sachs recently came under fire for buying government bonds from the Maduro government (Thomas 2017). This is an excellent example of an extra-political entity influencing political reality.

According to BMI (2017b), Venezuela poses a high political risk due to the shortage of goods and the ongoing conflict between the PSUV and opposition. This risk is exacerbated by a weakening democracy and substantial military involvement in politics. Furthermore, Maduro has a dismal approval rating, crime and corruption are on the rise, and the private sector is struggling. A potential internal conflict between Maduro and the Chavista-aligned Bolivarian Militia also may complicate the situation further.

### **3.4.4 Asia**

This super-region is a microcosm of global politics, with a few key super powers (e.g., Russia, China) attempting to influence the region's political sphere to best fit their interests, while diverse smaller states struggle with various levels of internal and external tensions and conflicts. In recent history, U.S. interests in the continent have been primarily economic and humanitarian, with the exception of Afghanistan and the larger War on Terror, which has been ongoing since 9/11. While many nations could provide excellent case studies for this region, we have selected Afghanistan and North Korea. Overviews of each are presented in sections 3.4.4.1 and 3.4.4.2, respectively.

#### *3.4.4.1 Afghanistan*

Afghanistan boasts a history dating back to antiquity and a substantial amount of cultural diversity. Approximately 45 living languages are spoken, with Pashtu and Dari being the two most prominent. In recent decades, the nation has struggled with a series of conflicts since at least the Soviet invasion of 1979. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, a series of civil wars culminated in the Taliban movement seizing control of approximately 90 percent of the country from 1996 until the end of 2001. After the events of September 11, 2001, with intelligence linking the terrorist attack in New York City to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda militants living in Afghanistan, a U.S.-led coalition began air strikes eventually toppling the Taliban regime. After the defeat of the Taliban, an interim government was established. In December 2004, Hamid Karzai was elected president; he won a second term in 2009. Under Karzai, relations with the United States began to deteriorate, culminating in the contested election of 2014. After the transition to a new unity government was brokered by the United States, Ashraf Ghani was elected president,



and Abdullah Abdullah was established as chief executive (CountryWatch 2017a).

Despite over a decade of sustained U.S. and international donor presence, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Frustratingly, the Taliban seems to be experiencing a resurgence, and provincial instability (especially in the south and east) is a major concern. U.S.-led NATO forces continue to operate in the country against militants associated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Half of the nation's gross domestic product (GDP) is related to the drug trade. Many rural areas experience regular famine conditions, and corruption is rampant (CountryWatch 2017a).

Like Iraq, Afghanistan is a case of hard lessons learned. The 100 billion-dollar reconstruction and stability project operated for more than a decade continues to show poor outcomes. In preparing for this operation, little forethought or consideration was given to the importance of culture, religion, and political traditions. In Afghanistan, as elsewhere, role conflict caused substantial organizational inefficiencies. The "whole-of-government strategy promoted by planners collided with the particular objectives of individual agencies (Keane and Wood 2016).

#### *3.4.4.2 North Korea*

Under the oppressive totalitarian rule of Kim-Jong Un and his father before him, North Korea has become a fragile state bolstered by economic and political support from neighboring China (CountryWatch 2017b). Like Iraq prior to 2003, the nation maintains a veneer of modernity under a centralized, autocratic regime. Unlike the other nations discussed here, North Korea is a nuclear power and its continued escalation of aggression towards the United States and U.S. allies in recent months has dramatically increased the potential for conflict.

Tensions among North Korea, the United States, and the Republic of South Korea rapidly escalated during the first months of U.S. President Donald J. Trump's administration (CountryWatch 2017b). Despite increased economic sanctions and renewed diplomatic pressure, North Korea shows little sign of slowing or ceasing its nuclear ambitions, and new weapons tests occurred almost every week during that time. If the U.S. and South Korea's diplomatic approach fails, and China is unable or unwilling to effectively diffuse the situation, a military confrontation

would be almost certain. While all projected models of such a confrontation indicate a clear and decisive U.S. victory, the Korean peninsula would likely require significant social, political, and physical reconstruction. Although the UN and China may occupy significant leadership roles in any reconstruction, the United States should assume that the bulk of stabilization and reconstruction will become her responsibility.

### **3.4.5 The external actors: world powers, IGOs, and NGOs**

This section considers the interests, as well as past and continuing interventions, of prominent external actors with regard to post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction. These external actors range from world powers—largely consisting of the nations that permanently sit on the UN Security Council—to IGOs and NGOs. Understanding the motivations and actions of external partners and rivals is critical to coordinating a coherent, realistic plan for reconstruction operations. Foreign donors and intervening actors are rarely involved solely for the benefit of the host nation. Typically, economic interest or power calculations underlie these actors' interventions, and understanding this subliminal layer will be important to accurate and effective consideration of the political reality.

It is important to recognize the role of the USG as a powerful political entity and to be aware of the impact of current attitudes towards the USG among host-nation populations. The United States is a leader in post-conflict reconstruction operations across the globe. Key agencies involved in these missions include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the DOS, the DOD, and USAID, among others. Project leadership should plan to coordinate as early as possible with these agencies, as well as partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

The UN should be a major partner in any reconstruction project, and consulting UN stakeholders during pre-reconstruction is critical. Specific UN agencies likely to be involved in reconstruction in some capacity include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and World Bank Group (WBG), among many others. For NATO operations, early coordination with its Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) and Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) personnel is encouraged. Furthermore, it is

important to consider the interests and activities of other IGOs acting as an Entity of Interest (EOI) in the mission's political reality. Examples of possible external IGO EOIs include Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and OAS. While coordination with IGOs and international NGOs (such as the Red Cross or Catholic Relief Services) will be important during pre-reconstruction, heavy reliance on IGOs or NGOs can be problematic due to the potential lack of accountability. National NGOs often have developed political relationships and interests that need to be understood in advance of collaboration (Penner 2011).

### **3.5 Discussion and recommendations**

According to Blair et al. (2014), past reconstruction projects suffered from dysfunctional leadership, impotent and corrupt administration, widespread poverty, and significant ethnic, religious, and/or tribal divisions. When lessons are learned, efforts must be made to incorporate those lessons into policies and procedures for future planning and implementation. Again, there are already numerous examples of previous post-conflict and disaster reconstruction operations, with Afghanistan and Iraq being the most obvious. By considering in historical context how the political reality produced unanticipated problems, it should be possible to plan for similar problems when given similar conditions. Even when short-term objectives are met, decisions made without accounting for the political reality can have negative long-term outcomes.

The importance of sequencing should not be overlooked. If political reconstruction, especially with respect to security and the rule of law, does not occur prior to or alongside physical reconstruction, satisfying mission objectives may become more difficult or impossible, and positive outcomes may be less likely. The identification of "pockets of productivity," where security is ensured and political structures maintain may help accelerate this process (Brinkerhoff et al. 2009). Again, coordination as early as possible in planning with the DOS, allies both internal and external, IGOs, and NGOs, will allow for a better understanding of the diverse agents, objectives, and operations and improve scheduling/sequencing capabilities.

The importance of national political support and quality leadership for successful reconstruction cannot be overstated (Kadirova 2014). Post-conflict/disaster reconstruction typically involves "overlapping public


bureaucratic structures” (Coyne 2008). Without a proper foundation of culture, knowledge, and skill, these necessary but perhaps unattractive institutions will falter. Assessing the political reality can help underscore institutional strengths and weaknesses for consideration during mission planning.

The political situation of a target locality may impact a construction mission by permitting an unsafe or unsecure environment; denying access or authorization of access to labor, space, and materials; influencing public perception; and creating additional obstacles to project costs, design, and timeframe. In order to best prepare for the potential impacts of a given political reality, a series of models are presented based on real world examples, followed by our proposed component methodology.

### 3.5.1 Political reality models for pre-reconstruction

To streamline the planning process and assist in tailoring pre-reconstruction to a specific political reality, several models are proposed (Figure 13). The models are not tailored to every possible situation, but they are intended to provide a base for emphasizing key considerations and associated methodological components. These models are primarily focused on contrasting political structures at the national level, but they are also differentiated based on relevant subnational characteristics.

Figure 13. Political reality models for tailoring pre-reconstruction to political reality.



### *3.5.1.1 Unified Public model*

The Unified Public model refers to states with a clear national identity, relatively stable institutions, and a degree of political division readily managed by regular dialog through conventional democratic processes. The political reality of a unified public is further characterized by reduced complexity and clearly defined, legitimate EOIs. In a post-conflict environment, this model will rarely apply, but it may prove relevant in a post-disaster setting. One exception that is an excellent example of the model is Kuwait following the Gulf War, where the presence of a unified public greatly enhanced the progress and outcomes of reconstruction operations.

The implications of a Unified Public model for pre-reconstruction are wholly positive. If planning to operate in such an environment, expect better prospects for consensus and less chance of disruption from renewed or novel internal conflicts. Obtaining reliable and current data from media, experts, and locals should also be easier, allowing for more detailed planning and support for positive long-term outcomes.

### *3.5.1.2 Secular/Religious Division model*

The Secular/Religious Division model is quite relevant to current events in the MENA region and elsewhere, following the Arab Spring. The current situation in Iraq is a clear example. The essential characteristics of this model stem from widespread conflict between secular and religious institutions. This conflict could take the form of a secular or nationalist government threatened by militant religious opposition, or a religious authority opposed by a mobilized, secular public. With religious institutions elevated to the prominence of national politics, an environment fitted to this model will almost certainly present serious complexities and obstacles to pre-reconstruction. Furthermore, this model suggests a strong likelihood for the presence of EOIs that exist beyond conventional geopolitical boundaries (e.g., displaced peoples, religious institutions, and sects) and ongoing sectarian violence.

The implications of the Secular/Religious Division model for pre-reconstruction are significant. When planning reconstruction operations in such an environment, obtaining reliable and current data will prove to be as difficult as it will prove vital, especially with regard to local knowledge. Depending on the specific context of the secular/religious

division, existing political structures may or may not be supportive of the reconstruction mission. Again, obtaining accurate data will be crucial to understanding this context and overcoming likely obstacles. Security will almost certainly be an issue, especially when the process of political reconstruction cannot precede physical reconstruction, and caution will be needed to avoid the renewal or escalation of violent conflict.

#### *3.5.1.3 Religious Division model*

The Religious Division model is similar to the Secular/Religious Division model, with the exception that core conflict(s) are between religious groups and institutions with no strong secular opposition. As such, this model is also associated with a complex political environment that is characterized by diverse EOIs with diverse interests and a likelihood for ongoing sectarian violence. A post-conflict environment in a state fitting this model will almost certainly require substantial political reconstruction and a prolonged cultural program to cultivate public trust in new institutions. Recent and ongoing conflicts in Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic (where Islamist authorities are opposed by Christian and traditional religious groups) are exemplary of the Religious Division model.

The implications of the Religious Division model for pre-reconstruction are nearly identical as those of the Secular/Religious Division model. Reliable and up-to-date local knowledge will be extremely beneficial, yet difficult to obtain. It is likely that existing political structures will be more detrimental than beneficial to the mission, and plans should focus on minimizing and mitigating religious and political obstacles. Security will again be a major concern, and extra care will be needed to avoid unnecessarily triggering an escalation of tensions.

#### *3.5.1.4 Minority vs. Majority model*

The Minority vs. Majority model is characterized by a government or key authority that represents a minority of the public and engages in active suppression of popular opposition. Typically, this model applies to states under authoritarian rule, but it may broadly encompass conflicts between minority rebel groups and fragile governments (e.g., Yemen) or ostensibly democratic states where overwhelming internal corruption erodes the rule of law (e.g., Venezuela). In cases of a minority rebel group, the minority group is likely to be supported by some foreign agent (e.g., Iran's support

of Houthi rebels). This support further complicates the political reality and sets the stage for proxy battles between regional powers.

The implications of a Minority vs. Majority model for pre-reconstruction will vary depending on specific context. The complexity of the national and subnational environment may be less extreme than in the previous two models (Secular/Religious Division and Religious Division). The viability of repairing and using existing political structures to the benefit of the mission will be dependent on the direction, duration, and strength of the conflict. The role of rival foreign powers in the conflict and post-conflict environment may also have a major impact on the capabilities of any U.S.-led reconstruction operations. Early coordination with partner EOIs will be important in planning an optimal sequence of political and physical reconstruction tasks.

#### *3.5.1.5 Client State model*

Political realities fitting the Client State model are characterized by a complete dependence on political, economic, and military support from a foreign government. Also referred to as puppet states or satellite states, such models were more common during twentieth century, especially with regard to Soviet-influenced satellite states during the Cold War period. Examples today include Russian-backed Abkhazia and Turkish-backed Northern Cyprus. One common characteristic of states fitting this model is a lack of sovereignty as recognized by the international community.

The implications of the Client State model for pre-reconstruction depends entirely on the state's benefactor and the identity and interests of any oppositional EOIs. It is likely that in a post-conflict situation, a client state will need to be reintegrated into a larger political body. Its institutions will need to either be dismantled and rebuilt or reincorporated into the sovereign state. If feasible, coordination with the benefactor nation should be implemented early on, and the benefactor should be afforded a leadership role in the reconstruction process. Security will again likely pose a problem, as will the risks of escalating tensions and renewed conflict. Depending on the stakes and disposition of the benefactor, access may be especially difficult in a client state situation, and cultural fit may be an added burden.

### *3.5.1.6 Ethnic/Tribal Conflict model*

The Ethnic/Tribal Conflict model includes states where sectarian divides tend to fall most prominently along the limits of decentralized ethnic/tribal identities. This model has the potential to present some of the most complex challenges to any pre-reconstruction project. The tribal situation in Libya, for instance, is a major contributor to the ongoing conflict and the stunted reconstruction of that nation following the fall of Gaddafi. In Libya, the society is largely composed of more than 20 tribal groups and four major ethnicities (Arab, Berber, Tuareg, and Toubou). All of these EOIs have their own interests, external and internal conflicts, and relationships that must be researched and accounted for during pre-reconstruction.

Working within the complex terrain of ethnic and tribal relations has the potential to create additional unwelcome difficulties for a construction mission. Conducting participatory research to gather a deep understanding of local political structures, needs, customs, values, etc. is perhaps most critical with this model when compared to any other. The prospects for consensus are likely to be restricted, while the potential for renewed or novel conflict is likely to be high. Cultivating an inclusive dialog is absolutely critical, however, including that certain groups will certainly offend other groups—a reality to prepare for. As with other models, culture fit may be especially problematic, and sequencing should be optimized to allow for the development of the proper public perception and mindset to establish trust in new institutions prior to major physical reconstruction operations, without sacrificing necessary short-term objectives.

### *3.5.1.7 Totalitarian State model*

The Totalitarian State model refers to an environment of long-tenured, oppressive authoritarian rule, typically under a single hereditary regime. North Korea is a classic example of a Totalitarian State model, with elements of a Client State model due to China's continued support. It will be difficult, if not impossible to obtain sufficiently reliable and fine-grained data concerning local political realities within a Totalitarian State. It is also likely that public opinion will be heavily manipulated by state-run media and censorship prior to any post-conflict reconstruction operations.



Additional implications for post-conflict reconstruction in a Totalitarian State model include the likely need for complete political reconstruction and extreme efforts to educate and reform public society to accept new federal democratic institutions. A transition to local leadership and local labor as quickly as possible will be important in order to reduce security concerns and accelerate the process of legitimizing new authorities.

#### *3.5.1.8 Composite model*

While the above models present a wide range of possible political realities common to fragile and failing nations, most reconstruction missions will occur within a complex political environment that includes elements from multiple models. Even when a model is fitted to a state, it is likely that elements of other models also will be relevant. For instance, states fitted to the Religious Division model will almost certainly have some elements of the Ethnic/Tribal Conflict model, and vice versa. Such states will fit a Composite model that is defined primarily by a lack of fit for any one model. In essence, the above models are components that will typically be combined into a Composite model that is tailored to a given mission environment. Furthermore, the methodology presented below is also intended to be adaptable to any Composite model of political reality.

The situation in Syria provides an excellent example of a complex political reality that defies simple classification, and it is best fitted to a Composite model. Syria simultaneously exhibits characteristics of the Secular/Religious Division, Religious Division, Minority vs. Majority, Client State, and Ethnic/Tribal Conflict models. As such, the special considerations and implications for each of these models will apply to a pre-reconstruction project for Syria. It is worth noting that Syria is an especially complex situation, and that most political environments that fit a Composite model will likely only exhibit significant characteristics of two or three of the above models.

### **3.5.2 Political reality component methodology**

The methodology proposed here is intended as a component of the comprehensive pre-reconstruction methodology presented in Chapter 2. Obviously, any methodology for assessing the political reality and predicting effects on infrastructure reconstruction must be broadly based and adaptable at a variety of scales. Refined methodologies may be prepared for specific regions and/or localities, utilizing the various

political reality models discussed in 3.5.1, wherever reconstruction appears imminent. Ultimately, the goal of this methodology is to provide basic guidance and tools to gather reliable, relevant, and current data on the political reality of a given locale with respect to potential impacts on a given reconstruction mission. Furthermore, suggestions are provided for filtering and transforming complex political data into meaningful, quantifiable metrics for utilization during pre-reconstruction planning. The proposed methodology is divided into the following three stages:

1. Pre-assessment coordination
2. Assessment/data collection
3. Data transformation and interpretation.

#### *3.5.2.1 Pre-assessment coordination*

The first stage revolves around identifying other agencies and donors engaged in parallel pre-reconstruction efforts. Establishing a system of coordination and a consensus on leadership and responsibilities should be accomplished as early as possible. Relevant here, it is critical to identify the entities who will take the lead on political reconstruction. Most likely this will include the DOS as well as a coalition that may include USAID, relevant IGOs, and possibly NGOs. These entities are likely to have the best data and analysis in hand concerning the political reality of the target post-conflict environment. Efforts should be made to determine what data has been collected by these partners, and what can be made available to the pre-reconstruction team.

Ideally, early interagency coordination will foster clear delineation of roles and objectives for each partner and a preliminary consensus on the structure and implementation of collaboration. By understanding the details of the planned political reconstruction, it will be easier to plan for the evolution of the political reality alongside physical reconstruction operations.

#### *3.5.2.2 Assessment/data collection*

The second stage entails the bulk of the data collection and preliminary assessment of the specific political reality. Political assessment tends toward measures of stability, risk, and accountability. Several third-party economic think tanks produce quarterly and annual reports on the political and economic situation and the outlook for most nations (e.g.,

CountryWatch, BMI Research, and IHS Markit). Such reports provide an excellent source for basic data, but they are typically tailored for business and investment interests. Of course, politics is also widely reported in the news media, but ensuring accuracy of the reporting can be problematic, especially in regions with state controlled media.

The principle task to accomplish during this stage is the identification of all key political stakeholders (EOIs) and the mapping of all relevant political network(s). This stage is further subdivided into a series of tasks that may or may not apply to a specific mission, as outlined below:

1. Review reliable media reports.
2. Consult experts.
3. Obtain local knowledge.
4. Identify EOIs.
5. Assess EOI capabilities.
6. Identify opportunities and obstacles.

Even before a specific pre-reconstruction operation is approved, it is recommended that the pre-reconstruction team maintain a routinely updated catalog of politically oriented new media from vetted international and local sources focused on all fragile and failing states, as well as states most at risk for crises following natural disaster. Regular media reports allow basic real-time monitoring of relevant IGOs, NGOs, and foreign powers engaged in international affairs. Monitoring local media during pre-reconstruction may also be useful for planning Information Engagement operations. An effort should also be made to monitor relevant social media and mine aggregated social media data to examine relevant trends in public perception among local groups.

Media reports should be supplemented through the consultation of experts. Experts may be academics, representatives from partner agencies/institutions, private researchers, or anyone determined to have unique, detailed, and reliable knowledge of the relevant political reality. Consultation may simply entail reviewing published reports or may involve contracting independent reports or interviews tailored to the specific mission. Similar to media reports, the team is encouraged to maintain a subscription to regular reports on stability and risk for relevant states. When key information is identified, attempt to consult with report authors and other experts early in the pre-reconstruction process.

No media report or expert opinion can replace authentic local knowledge. However, obtaining ‘authentic’ local knowledge is an exceedingly difficult task that requires more than phone interviews and survey/polling data. When possible, using some form of participatory research method is recommended to get firsthand, experiential information concerning the current political situation on the ground. In identifying local stakeholders and potential contacts for participatory/local research it is important to remember that a community is not a monolith. Seek to identify and establish an inclusive dialog with all stakeholders. Obtaining a broad spectrum of current and reliable data at the local level will be extremely beneficial to planning.

Beyond local stakeholders and interagency/international partners, it is important to identify and understand all political entities of interest to the mission. Using the data gathered in the above steps, project leadership should familiarize itself with the relevant political entities and how they relate to each other and especially to the predicted role of the project team during reconstruction. Utilizing basic knowledge of network theory, the relevant political network comprising all of the political EOIs identified above should be diagrammed (see Figure 10).

At this point, a rough sketch of the political reality should be understood, but additional effort is needed before the data can be made useful. First, it is important to assess the capabilities of all relevant EOIs. The following questions have been formulated to provide general guidance in such an assessment: (1) how can each EOI support the mission? and (2) how does the mission fit the interests of each EOI? Finally, identify key allies and likely adversaries; predict political opportunities that may be exploited and political obstacles that will need to be mitigated.

### *3.5.2.3 Data transformation and interpretation*

The final stage of this component methodology is concerned with transforming the broad dataset obtained in Stages 1 and 2 into useful data, and interpreting the data in a manner that allows for incorporation into wider project planning and implementation. During this stage, efforts should be made to predict necessary contributions from the identified allies to achieve desirable mission end states. If possible, the probabilities of potential opportunities and obstacles should be projected. Utilizing existing tools and metric frameworks (MPICE, ThoughtWeb, etc.), the data

should be quantified and applied to a geospatial domain for incorporation into GIS based and other proprietary planning tools as needed.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

The political reality encountered in a post-conflict or post-disaster environment has a substantial influence on the outcome of any reconstruction mission. Without considering the likely impact diverse political entities may have on reconstruction operations, an otherwise well-planned mission may be compromised by unanticipated obstacles. To this end, cultivating a thorough and accurate understanding of the political reality is vital during pre-reconstruction. This document provides a set of models and component methodology for use during pre-reconstruction. While each mission will encounter a unique political environment with unique challenges, the information presented above should provide a useful and meaningful base for the consideration of political reality impacts. Through coordination with key partners, completion of a tailored, independent assessment of the relevant political reality, and incorporation of the resultant data into project planning and implementation, the potential for significantly improved project outputs and outcomes is enhanced.

## 4 Planning for Cultural Property Protection during Reconstruction

### 4.1 Introduction

Reconstruction (in military terms) is the process of going to a location after a conflict or natural disaster and assisting the local population and/or authorities in recovering, repairing, and/or rebuilding infrastructure and structures to enable the region to return to a stable state.

Recent conflicts have occurred in countries such as Iraq and Syria that contain a large number of cultural property (CP) items and sites. In addition to collateral damage, some CP sites have been deliberately targeted for destruction and/or looting (UNESCO 2014; UN Resolution 69/281). Reconstruction efforts will entail stabilizing CP sites (including World Heritage Sites) as well as construction activity in communities with centuries or millennium of continuous occupation. It is inevitable that CP will be encountered during these reconstruction efforts, regardless of who participates in the reconstruction. This is not just a problem in the Middle East. Conflicts in Libya, the former Yugoslavia, and Mali as well as natural disasters in Haiti, Japan, Nepal, and the Philippines have also involved damage to CP.

This problem space falls, to some extent, into a gray area between various international treaties and military directives. International laws and treaties focus on the protection of CP during times of conflict and belligerent occupation (when the military forces are the *de facto* authorities in the area). Military activities on military installations outside the continental United States (OCONUS), forward operating bases, base camps, contingency bases, engineering bases, etc., are directed by the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (OEBGD) that is periodically updated by the DoD. The OEBGD assumes that there is host nation installation commander or appropriate authority to coordinate with, and it focuses on avoiding adverse effects. In the aftermath of a calamity, however, the usual local authorities, security, and regulatory bodies may not be in place or available. Additionally, most of these documents state what you should do—not how to do it.

Reconstruction work on and around CP items and sites poses a unique set of problems. Not only do these sites frequently fall under different sets of laws and regulations as other construction sites, they also have significantly more meaning to the local population and misuse/misappropriation of these sites can have a significant effect on local sentiment (Foliant 2015; Rush 2012). Unlike infrastructure systems, when working on CP the focus should be on preserving and stabilizing—not improving—the CP. Traditional materials and techniques should be used, and all work on the site should (as much as possible) be reversible. Finally, work on CP will require more access and input from the local community and authorities.

## **4.2 What is cultural property?**

The term cultural property is defined in the 1954 Hague Convention as “movable or immoveable property, whether secular or religious and irrespective of origin or ownership, which is of great importance to the cultural heritage of a state” (The Hague 1954). Examples include buildings and other monuments of historic, artistic, or architectural significance; archaeological sites; artworks; antiquities; manuscripts, books and collections of the same; and archives. The term also encompasses buildings for preserving or exhibiting CP and for refuges to shelter movable CP.

The question as to if or how something is of importance to the cultural heritage of a state should be decided by the state on whose territory it is situated (UNESCO 2016 §45). If the state, in good faith, considers something to be of great importance to its cultural heritage then it should be considered CP, regardless of the opinions of the U.S. military personnel on site. Additionally, note should be paid to the CP associated with disenfranchised or oppressed minorities, which may not receive adequate protection from the nation state in which they are found.

CP is classified into multiple levels of significance. Of most significance are those designated as UNESCO World Heritage Sites. These sites, which can be cultural or natural sites, are judged to be of outstanding universal significance or importance to all of humanity. World Heritage sites must be unique or exceptional examples of site or structure types, cultural or historic events and traditions, and/or human creative genius. An example of a World Heritage Site in the United States is Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, which was nominated as the site of debate and

signing of both the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, documents which have served as inspiration to democratic-based governments throughout the world. Another example is the Monumental Earthworks of Poverty Point, Louisiana, which is one of the largest (if not the largest) hunter-gatherer settlement and monumental earthwork sites in the world. World Heritage Sites are officially recognized and protected under international treaty. Deliberate damage or destruction of World Heritage Sites is prosecutable in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Inclusion on the World Heritage list is adjudicated by the World Heritage Programme and administered by the World Heritage Committee, which is selected from member states of the UN General Assembly.

One level of significance below World Heritage Sites are sites of national significance. These are sites that are considered significant to the nation in which they are found, but they do not have global significance. In the United States, these sites are those included on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP), as created by the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 and administered by the National Park Service. Many nations have similar lists of CP along with the governmental agencies and departments that maintain and monitor the sites. Examples of NRHP-listed CP in the United States are Arlington National Cemetery, the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, and the Birmingham Civil Rights National Monument.

Beneath the sites of world and national significance levels, there will be sites of regional or local significance. These sites may be formally listed and protected by laws and ordinances at subnational levels of government, or these sites may be locally generated and maintained. In the United States, these types of sites may include state museums and parks, local places of worship, community historic society archives, etc. While not rising to the level of federal or international protection, this type of site may have the most emotional impact on the local community due to proximity.

### **4.3 Why is cultural property protection important?**

During conflict and natural disasters, or in the reconstruction efforts afterwards, one might question if cultural property protection (CPP) should be included as part of the USG's efforts in a foreign nation. Recent experiences of U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have



demonstrated that CPP is a key element in the operational environment, as evidenced by the points outlined below, each associated with drivers from references Foliant 2015, 15; Rush 2018, 1:

- CP is part of the common property of humanity, and its protection preserves national identity and the common human heritage.
- Looting and illegal sale of cultural heritage objects (antiquities, art and historic documents) is often a source of funding and perpetuation of armed conflict, criminal organizations and/or extremist groups.
- Failure to protect CP can lead to a decline of goodwill from the local population toward the United States in general and the in-theater military personnel specifically.
- CP is frequently important to the economic stability of the region as a source of income from tourism.

#### **4.4 Legal issues and ramifications**

The United States is party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954, and the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Under these international treaties, the following conditions are in effect:

- The destruction, damage, and/or misappropriation of CP (including places of worship) during international armed conflict, belligerent occupation, or non-international armed conflict can amount to a War Crime and may be prosecuted by national courts and the International Criminal Court (Protection of Cultural Property: Military Manual [PCPMM; UNESCO 2016] § 14; Article 53 of Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions; Article 16 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention). Criminal responsibility falls not only on the people who directly commit the crime but also on those who intentionally participate in any aspect of the act (including ordering the action or contributing to a common plan). Additionally, military commanders who fail (intentionally or through neglect) to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress such acts or to submit them to the competent authorities for the purpose of

- investigation and prosecution can be held criminally responsible for the war crimes of their subordinates (PCPMM §17).
- CP of any kind may not be used to support a military effort (Article 16 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention).
  - Intentional destruction of CP on discriminatory grounds can also constitute a Crime against Humanity of Persecution (PCPMM§18-19).
  - The World Heritage Convention obliges states to protect any heritage sites on their territory and obliges them not to take any deliberate measures that might damage, directly or indirectly any protected sites situated on the territory of another state party (UNESCO 1972, Article 6(3)). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has treated the presence of a site on the World Heritage List as an aggravating factor when sentencing those convicted of war crimes for the destruction or damage of CP.
  - Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (UNESCO 1970) makes illicit the import, export, or transfer of ownership of CP effected contrary to the provisions adopted under the Convention. Party states agree to impose penalties or administrative sanctions on any person responsible for infringing the prohibitions against illicit movement of CP. The United States is party to this convention. (An example is the Hobby Lobby judgment, July 2017.<sup>2</sup>)

#### **4.5 Who should be tasked with cultural property issues?**

Assessing the significance of CP is not within the training of most military personnel. Many military service men and women may recognize places and objects of cultural significance within their own culture, but they will struggle to fully understand the significance of CP in other nations or cultures without guidance. A recognized expert in the local region or nation is person best suited for this endeavor. Most countries in the world have at least one government entity that deals with historic preservation, antiquities, or cultural preservation and education issues. These government agencies should be approached for guidance and oversight of all reconstruction efforts where CP is involved. If government agencies are

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.foxnews.com/us/hobby-lobby-to-pay-3m-to-settle-claim-it-illicitly-imported-iraqi-artifacts>.

not in existence or not available, then places of historical and cultural education (such as universities or museums) should be contacted. The U.S. military employs a wide range of persons who are specifically trained in the management of the cultural resources of the United States. These subject matter experts should also be consulted in conjunction with local community experts, or they may be the sole consultant if (and only if) no local community experts are available.

The following specific guidance is given to U.S. military personnel:

- “During hostilities, assessing the cultural significance of an object, structure or site across which military forces come and in respect of which they are uncertain is a job for experts, as is ascertaining the geographical extent of archaeological or other historic sites whose perimeters may be ill-defined. To these ends, occupying forces should have recourse in the first instance to the competent national authorities, meaning the civilian authorities of the displaced sovereign responsible for the preservation and management of the cultural heritage in question. If these authorities are unavailable, the task should fall to any specialist service or personnel within the occupying forces for the protection of CP. These services and personnel may in turn find it advisable to call in help from civilian professionals, such as archaeologists and art historians, and local communities, including their religious and other leaders. It is also good practice to seek advice or other assistance of UNESCO or some other appropriate organization or institution.” (PCPMM§178)
- “Installation commanders shall ensure that personnel performing historic or cultural resource functions have the requisite expertise in world, national and local history and culture. This may be in-house, contract, or through consultation with another agency. Government personnel directing such functions must have training in historic or cultural resource management.” (OEBGD C12.3.3).

#### **4.5.1 What this means – practically**

OEBGD states that installation commanders shall coordinate with host-nation installation commander or similar appropriate host-nation authorities to establish guidelines and Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) regarding CP. This will likely happen through Civil Affairs (CA) or

CIMIC. Military legal counsel should be involved in any interpretation of laws and treaties pertaining to a foreign nation.

Every CONUS installation has a Cultural Resources Management (CRM) office that is responsible for ensuring the installation is compliant with U.S. cultural resource and preservation laws. CRM office staff usually consist of archaeologists, historians, and/or archivists. Some installations also have architectural historians, depending on the resources at that location. In the Army, this office is part of the Directorate of Public Works (DPW) Environmental Branch. The CRM office, while not typically staffed for assisting in deployment outside the continental United States (OCONUS), can still be a valuable resource of expertise.

At a higher organizational level, each military service branch and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have historic preservation staff whose mission is to oversee all CRM issues within each service. These offices can be reached through each service's HQ or the OSD.

#### **4.6 Decision making concerning cultural property**

The ultimate decision regarding CP is made by the civilian authorities of the host nation. U.S. military authorities in an area of endangered or threatened CP are bound by treaties and international law to act in a meaningful way to preserve and protect the CP. The military authority may act unilaterally if host-nation authorities are unable to fulfill this obligation. Even in this scenario, U.S. military authorities must make every effort to uphold the CP protection laws of the nation they are operating in. If no host-nation authority exists, U.S. CRM authorities and/or international cultural organizations such as UNESCO or ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) should be consulted.

Supporting text from the PCPMM document (PCPMM§145–146) is given below:

“Any decisions [concerning CP] required preferably should ultimately be taken by civilian authorities, and any measures of removal or *in situ* protection required may and should end up being taken by those authorities or other experts. But military forces may find themselves faced in the first instance at least with the obligation's demands and may be called on to assist in their execution. Again, the limitation of the obligation to what is feasible does not mean that a party to a conflict is

free to do nothing or to make no more than a cosmetic effort. The obligation is a genuine one, even if what it requires may vary with the military situation and capacity.”

“...unless absolutely prevented from doing so, the occupying power must leave in place and abide by any laws for the protection and preservation of immovable or movable cultural property applicable in the territory prior to the onset of the occupation. This logically implies that the occupant must allow the competent local authorities to fulfil any duties or exercise any rights they may have under such laws.” (PCPMM§171)

#### **4.6.1 What this means – practically**

No major work should be done unilaterally on any CP except in cases of extreme military necessity. Local authorities and subject matter experts must be consulted. If none are available, then external agencies such as UNESCO or ICOMOS as well as U.S. military CRM staff should be consulted.

### **4.7 Identify cultural property in project or deployment area**

- “...the most basic preconditions to protecting cultural property during belligerent occupation are to identify what and where the cultural property to be protected is and to communicate this information effectively to those engaged in the military aspects of the occupation”. (PCPMM§177)
- Installation commander must take into account the effect of any action on any property listed on the World Heritage List or on the applicable country’s equivalent of the National Register of Historic Places for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects (OEBGD 2010)

#### **4.7.1 What this means – practically**

The first task of a reconstruction planner is to check the UNESCO World Heritage list of sites that are under standard and enhanced protection.

U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield<sup>3</sup> builds and maintains cultural heritage inventories for the purpose of no-strike lists and these list provide another inventory of sites that should not be disturbed by reconstruction. The mission CA or CIMIC should be used to contact CP experts in the deployment area to determine if an equivalent to the NRHP exists.

Mission planning tools such as ENSITE cultural no-build zones, including buffer zones, have been identified as follows (Fay and Calfas 2017):

- Museum
- Library
- Archive
- Zoo/Aquarium
- Ruin/Archaeological Site
- Public Art
- Monument
- Stadium
- Mausoleum/Memorial
- Auditorium/Theater
- Community Centre
- Shipwreck
- Cemetery/Graveyard
- Observatory/Planetarium
- Religious Building Site/Historic Battlefield Site
- Heritage Landscape
- Viewshed/Viewpoints
- Nature Preserve/Reserve
- Park/Playground
- National/Regional Park
- Wildlife Sanctuary
- Botanic/Public Garden
- Protected Area

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<sup>3</sup> A nongovernmental, not-for-profit organization. The International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS) and its affiliated national committees work together as the cultural equivalent of the Red Cross to provide an emergency response to cultural property at risk from armed conflict. In principle, these groups, along with the Association of National Committees of the Blue Shield (ANCBS) are the successors to the U.S. Army's Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives section of the Civil Affairs division that worked to protect and preserve cultural property during World War II (U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield (USCBS) website, "About USCBS," <https://uscbs.org/about-us.html>).

## 4.8 Site utilization

Military planners should avoid sites that have cultural significance or contain cultural properties. These areas should not be used as base camps, staging areas, storage facilities, transportation hubs, or any similar activity. The only activity that should happen at CP sites is the work needed to stabilize and protect the CP items in situ. No activity should occur at these sites that may make the sites a more likely target for military, insurgent or terrorist strike. The 2016 UNESCO “Protection of Cultural Property: Military Manual” (PCPMM) describes a military commander’s responsibility in the following sections:

- § 130 – A further fundamental rule on respect for cultural property during hostilities prohibits parties to a conflict from making any use of cultural property or its immediate surroundings for purposes likely to expose the property to destruction or damage unless such use is imperatively required by military necessity.
- § 139 – ...it is absolutely forbidden for parties to the conflict bound by the 1999 Second Hague Protocol to make any use of cultural property under enhanced protection or its immediate surroundings in support of military action. No considerations of military necessity may legally justify such use.
- §142 – Each party is also under a positive obligation to take the necessary active measures, to the maximum extent feasible, to protect cultural property under its control against the dangers resulting from military operations conducted by its own forces or the adversary’s.
- § 172 – ...Where a legal regime on archaeological excavation is in place, an occupant may not engage in or sponsor digs in the territory except in accordance with the applicable law. Nor may it usurp the authority of the competent local authorities by purporting to authorize digs itself. The same is the case, *mutatis mutandis*, for any existing laws on the export, other removal, or transfer of ownership of cultural property and on the alteration or change of use of cultural property.
- § 183 – Ensuring that cultural property and its immediate surroundings are not used during belligerent occupation for purposes likely to destroy or damage the property calls for foresight and

planning on the part of commanders. Prevention of such use may require commanders to place buildings and sites off-limits to troops.

#### **4.8.1 What this means – practically**

The above-described guidance was for military activities during time of war; however, the basic principles still apply for reconstruction activities. CP sites should not be used as staging areas, headquarters, living quarters, etc. The only post-conflict activity at a CP site should be reconstruction efforts. In the case of reconstruction activities where local governments are functioning, local authorities should be consulted prior to deployment to assist in selection of activity areas.

A remote site identification tool such as ENSITE should be utilized to locate appropriate locations for day-to-day activities. In the case of complete government collapse, the U.S. military authority should make these decisions guided by the principles of minimal interactions with the sites and upholding preservation laws and practices of the host nation.

### **4.9 Site inventory**

The Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (OEBGD; DoD 4715.05-G), issued by authority and requirement of Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 4715.15, with reference to site inventory as shown below:

Installations shall, after coordination with the host nation installation commander or similar appropriate host-nation authorities, and if financially and otherwise practical: Inventory historic and cultural resources in areas under DoD control. An inventory shall be developed from a records search and visual survey. (OEBGD C12.3.4–C12.3.4.1)

#### **4.9.1 What this means – practically**

The local authority should be consulted, preferably before deployment, to determine if any inventory of CP exists within the project area (examples include museum collection records or library catalogs). CP evaluation and



inventory should be included as part of any Environmental Baseline Survey to include the following information:

- Documentation of marked and unmarked burials, burial grounds, and cemeteries.
- Documentation of areas of religious or cultural significance.
- Documentation of areas of natural significance including parks, forests, animal preserves, and/or recreational areas.
- Existence of local oral histories.
- Documentation of sites with name, geographic location (GPS coordinates), survey or sketch map, extensive photographs, 3-D scan if available, complete description of site condition to include any existing damage, and conditions that may lead to additional damage.

Additionally, all efforts should be made prior to deployment to identify a list and contact information for local subject matter experts who can be contacted to help identify, evaluate, or explain cultural significance.

#### **4.10 Looting and vandalism protection**

Looting and deliberate destruction of CP is a significant issue in international CP efforts. Looted CP material is frequently smuggled out of conflict areas and sold internationally. This type of sale may be a major revenue source for criminal and insurgent groups (ISIS is a recent example), so the protection of these items may form a necessary part of the military or reconstruction mission.

In addition to the monetary value that these items have, they also frequently are a source of pride and identity of the local population. Anti-American sentiment may be fostered in the local population if it is observed that American personnel are either destroying or stealing CP. In military and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions, a commander must also remember that the mission's personnel (either military or civilian) may be the only form of authority present. In such a situation, a failure of authorities on the ground (including U.S. personnel) to prevent the crimes of others is as serious a failure as if the crimes were committed by U.S. personnel themselves.

The UNESCO (2016) “Protection of Cultural Property: Military Manual” describes a military commander’s responsibility in the following sections:

- § 154 – Parties to a conflict are absolutely prohibited during hostilities from engaging in all forms of theft, pillage or other misappropriation and of vandalism of cultural property. No pretext of military necessity can legally justify such conduct by the military forces or any party to a conflict. Conduct of this sort constitutes a war crime.
- § 157 – In addition to their obligation to refrain themselves from all forms of theft, pillage or other misappropriation and of vandalism of cultural property, parties to an armed conflict are obliged during hostilities to prohibit, to prevent and, if necessary, to put a stop to the commission of all such acts by others, including by organized criminal groups.
- §174 – To begin with, an occupying power must ensure, as far as possible, that any existing laws prohibiting misappropriation or vandalism of cultural property in the territory are enforced. The same goes for laws for the preservation more broadly of cultural property, such as local planning laws regulating construction on or near sensitive sites, laws on the upkeep and alteration of historic buildings, laws pertaining to the authorization of archaeological excavations, and laws governing the trade in art and antiquities, including export controls. Putting it simply, where the second general obligation (§171) requires an occupying power, unless absolutely prevented from doing so, to leave in place and abide by the territory’s cultural property laws itself, the first general obligation requires it to ensure, as far as possible, that others abide by them too. What this means in practice will depend on the circumstances. It may involve as little as not interfering with the competent administrative authorities, police and courts in their enforcement of the applicable cultural property laws. It may involve assisting them. It may even, *in extremis*, require the occupant to enforce the cultural property laws itself by way of inspecting premises, seizing cultural property of doubtful provenance, arresting suspects, and in the event of the failure of the local courts adequately to discharge their functions, prosecuting persons in its military courts.
- § 189 – The further obligation on an occupying power to prevent and put a stop to all forms of theft, pillage or other misappropriation and of

- vandalism of cultural property means that occupying forces must take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to these ends. They must, in other words, do everything they can. As during hostilities, commanders should underline to subordinates that preventing and, if need be, putting a stop to all forms of theft, pillage or other misappropriation and of vandalism of cultural property in occupied territory is an essential element of mission success.
- § 190 – Preventing and putting a stop to theft, pillage or other misappropriation and of vandalism of cultural property during belligerent occupation demand measures on the part of commanders such as declaring off-limits to the public and posting armed guards on museums, galleries, libraries and other collections, as well as archaeological sites and historic buildings; mounting patrols to deter and, if necessary, stop looting; outlawing the sale and purchase within the territory of local antiquities, artworks, manuscripts and so on; inspecting premises, including the homes, of persons suspected of stealing, illicitly excavating or illicitly dealing in movable cultural property; and seizing cultural property suspected of having been stolen, illicitly excavated or illicitly dealt in. In the event that a belligerent occupant of coastal territory exercises the requisite control over the territorial sea, the measures required to prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to all forms of theft, pillage or other misappropriation and of vandalism of any underwater cultural property on the territorial seabed might include, as necessary and feasible, the imposition of maritime exclusion zones around wrecks and submerged structures and the institution of regimes of visit and search and search at sea and of inspections in port.
  - §191 – Prevention of misappropriation and vandalism of cultural property in occupied territory can also benefit from communication and cooperation between occupying forces and the local populace, including its civic and religious leaders. Local people and their leaders may be prepared to provide intelligence on such acts, especially when those involved are outsiders, and to bring social pressure to bear on any persons within their communities known or suspected to be involved in them. This is likely especially to be the case where occupying forces do all they can to protect the local cultural heritage

- and exhibit cultural sensitivity when guarding buildings and sites, especially religious ones, and searching premises, especially homes.
- § 192 – A simple but important way in which occupying forces can help to prevent all forms of misappropriation of cultural property is by not providing thieves and traffickers with a market. Military forces in occupied territory should refrain from buying movable cultural property, and commanders should make clear to their subordinates the possibility and in many cases probability that purchasing a ‘souvenir’ undermines their own security and the security of the inhabitants of the territory, whose welfare is their responsibility. Commanders should also seize and, where possible, return to its rightful owner any trafficked cultural property purchased by their troops.
  - § 193 – Preventing and putting a stop to theft, pillage or other misappropriation and of vandalism of cultural property during belligerent occupation calls for foresight and thoughtful planning on the part of commanders in advance of the establishment of control over the territory. Military forces need to identify ahead of time and move swiftly to secure any buildings and sites at risk of looting or vandalism. This may involve considering whether and which religious or other minorities may be targeted in the course of any temporary unrest.
  - § 194 – Occupying forces can assist in putting a stop to and, in the longer term, preventing misappropriation of cultural property during belligerent occupation by reporting any known theft of artworks and antiquities to UNESCO, which publicizes international alerts regarding stolen cultural property; to INTERPOL, which maintains a database of stolen works of art; and to the International Council of Museums (ICOM), which disseminates “Red Lists” of cultural objects at risk of illegal sale or purchase.
  - §204. In practical terms, preventing the illicit export or other removal of cultural property from occupied territory logically requires the occupying forces to institute and maintain a regime of inspections at border posts, ports and airports and to seize any cultural property either lacking the requisite certification or otherwise suspected of being destined for illicit export or other removal. Any such property should, where possible, be returned to its rightful owner. Insofar, moreover, as the obligation to prevent the illicit export or other removal of cultural

property from the territory presupposes an obligation on the occupying power not to engage in such acts itself, commanders must seek to ensure that military personnel do not smuggle artworks and artefacts out of the country, if need be by instituting baggage and body checks of those departing on leave or at the end of their deployment.

#### **4.10.1 What this means – practically**

- Determine what kind of CP are within the project area (see Section 4.9). This will inform staffing requirements to ensure that §190 and §204 can be accomplished.
- Whenever possible, security of sites and movable CP should be handled by trained military or civilian police and not by combat soldiers (Rush 2012, 7).
- Particularly in areas with moveable CP, a full inventory is critical at the earliest stages of the reconstruction. Any preexisting inventory of CP (generated by host country) must be checked against current conditions. If an inventory does not exist, one should be conducted by competent personnel at the earliest possible stage. Without a comprehensive inventory of CP and its condition, then ongoing looting and destruction may not be recognized.
- Once an inventory has been established, it should be periodically checked to ensure that removal or damage of CP is not occurring.

#### **4.11 Identification and utilization of traditional construction techniques**

In many (if not most) cases, sites of cultural significance or sites containing CP are historic in nature, and they do not contain modern construction materials or utilize current building practices. When possible, original construction practices should be followed in reconstruction efforts. This effort requires extra planning since the construction material and personnel brought to a site for reconstruction may not be trained in the techniques or familiar with construction that uses appropriate materials.

Reconstruction of CP sites is an extremely long and complicated process; a well-known example is the restoration of the Acropolis in Athens, which

has been ongoing since 1975 (UNESCO 2018a). This very large scale of effort will fall outside the scope of normal reconstruction projects. Mission planners should remember that the major focus of their efforts in regard to CP is the stabilization of the site and not complete reconstruction.

#### 4.11.1 What this means – practically

- Materials
  - *Reclaim or recycle materials.* Examine the feasibility of using material from damaged or destroyed buildings. When possible, reuse existing material. Identified remains of damaged or destroyed buildings (including rubble) should be set aside for preservation and not disposed of or utilized in other construction efforts. This material should be identified to local authorities at the time of site hand over.
  - *Use appropriate, traditional materials.* Switching materials used, either for ease or cost savings, should not be done; walls originally constructed of granite cannot be rebuilt from concrete block or brick.
  - *Use original sources whenever possible.* When possible for CP, material for stabilization or repair should be from sources, as near as possible, to original sources.
- Techniques
  - In some instances, understanding traditional techniques is necessary. For example, some Shinto shrines in Japan are periodically torn down and rebuilt—in some cases, as frequently as every 20 years. By Shinto tradition (and by international law), the sites do not lose their authenticity/integrity so long as the traditional construction techniques are maintained (often done by the same family for centuries). An example is the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Kasuga-Taisha Shinto shrine, part of Ancient Nara. The UNESCO site description (UNESCO 2018b) states that “the level of authenticity of the various buildings on the property is high from the view of form and design, materials and substance, traditions and techniques, and location and setting. Japanese conservation principles have ensured that replacement of damaged or degraded architectural elements has respected the materials and techniques used by the original builders.”
  - When possible and appropriate, stabilization and preservation techniques should be made to be reversible. For example, the re-varnishing of the Sistine Chapel ceiling was done with a chemical

that could be removed in the future without the use of harsh solvents.

- CP work should be made discernable. Some nations require that reconstructed work at historic sites be clearly marked. Such rules should be adhered to. Examples include that new stones used in Parthenon stabilization/restoration must be stamped with year of installation, Mexico requires a specific pebble to be used in the mortar for reconstructed features of Teotihuacan to distinguish modern reconstruction from original work.

Note should be made of any special techniques and materials needed for CP stabilization or preservation prior to issuing any contract or agreement for reconstruction. If the site requires traditional construction techniques or materials, then all construction workers should be evaluated to ensure they can meet those requirements.

#### **4.12 Preparation for handover to local civilian authorities**

The ultimate goal of managing CP properties should be to promptly hand over these sites in a stabilized condition to the local authorities. These sites often take on a significant role in local identity and history. Thus, the reconstruction effort will become part of that history and should be documented accordingly.

Project managers must recognize that every decision concerning CP, including the decision to do nothing, is significant and must be documented. Minutes of every meeting and communication should be recorded and kept with the project files. Names, titles and contact information for all local authorities and/or experts should be recorded. Project managers should remember that these records will become part of the site archive and may be referenced for decades or centuries to come.

##### **4.12.1 What this means – practically**

All work done by Pre-Reconstruction must be fully documented in archival format, and all records listed below must be turned over to the site's new managers:

- What work was done?
- Under what authority were the actions taken?
- Who did the work?
- What materials, and from what source, were used?
- Which techniques were used?
- Why decisions were made (justification or reasoning)?

Project managers should be aware that these documentation requirements exist and prepare accordingly. Sufficient materials should be brought for this level of documentation and record storage. One person at each meeting should be tasked with note taking and after-action reports from all personnel should be required at every stage of the project. Copies of all documentation should be archived as part of the project record in the event that the documentation handed over to the host nation is lost.

#### **4.13 Summary**

CPP forms an integral part of any military and reconstruction project wherever sites or objects of cultural significance occur. Protection of CP is required by international treaties that the United States is a member party to. Recent examples have demonstrated that inadequate attention to CPP can facilitate criminal activity and/or foster hostile local sentiments that may prove detrimental to the mission.

Reconstruction project managers must take the presence of CP within the project area very seriously. The presence of CP will influence the decisions made in every stage of the project, from the level of effort of reconstruction, materials utilized, local contractors used, and the amount of security needed for the project. Proper planning to identify CP and the authorities within the host nation is essential to ensure mission success in these kinds of endeavors.

This task, however, is not impossible. Host nations also have a vested interest in CPP, so the local authorities should have ultimate responsibility for these sites, except in cases of extreme emergency during which relevant authorities are not available. Project managers should remember that CPP is an ongoing effort within military installations throughout the United States; thus, personnel experienced in Cultural Resource Management and CPP are available for consultation in every branch of the U.S Armed Forces.



## **5 Capacity Building and Pre-Reconstruction Planning for Post-Conflict Environments**

### **5.1 Introduction**

Human conflict has the potential to destroy decades of infrastructure investment, leading to instability and difficulty in returning to pre-conflict conditions. Destruction and displacement impacts much more than the physical aspect of society, including the loss of organizational systems that once managed people's lives and the technical expertise that worked within those systems. The challenge associated with reconstruction is that each environment (both natural and built) and conflict is unique, which makes it impossible to establish a general formula that is applicable in all cases. This chapter serves to explain the concept of capacity building in the context of post-conflict reconstruction. It is not meant to be a comprehensive guide, as this topic is too complex to take all variables into account within the scope of this work. It should serve instead as a helpful introduction for those who are new to this field, as well as shed light on new approaches and methods for capacity building, such as the concept of Complex Adaptive Systems.

General guidelines and practices are also presented to assist planners during the pre-reconstruction planning phase. The primary focus of reconstruction has thus far been physical infrastructure with very little funds invested in other, critical aspects of nation building. There is more to a society than physical infrastructure, and this point is where the role of capacity building becomes apparent. Oftentimes, the greatest difficulty in reconstruction and nation building is the unpredictability of human behavior. Without a capable and organized society, physical infrastructure cannot be fully utilized, and it will not be properly maintained and preserved without the engagement and technical skills of the indigenous population.

The guidelines here do not discuss specific reconstruction activities because such activities are innumerable; instead, it focuses on the contextual factors that play a role in capacity development. The goal is therefore to make the reader aware of these factors and to incorporate them in planning activities.

## 5.2 Defining capacity

According to FM 3-07 (2008, p 1-8, sec 1-35), capacity building is:

...the process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems. It includes efforts to improve governance capacity, political moderation, and good governance—ethos as well as structure—as part of broader capacity-building activities within a society. Supported by appropriate policy and legal frameworks, capacity building is a long-term, continuing process, in which all actors contribute to enhancing the host nation’s human, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities.

However, this definition focuses more on specific practical aspects such as managerial systems and governance. There is no denying that these aspects are types of capacities, but the definition of capacity should not be limited to these aspects. A more general definition of capacity building for our purposes would be the following:

*Capacity building is the process by which a population gains the ability to observe and determine its needs and priorities, as well as has the technical, organizational, and institutional foundations to take action towards achieving its goals.*

This definition implies that capacity building is an innate process that all communities are capable of, based on the natural instinct for survival and self-improvement. However, the process is not a simple linear path to achievement for all communities, but often is a combination of trial, error, adaptation, and learning, and then growth. Problems arise when this natural process is disturbed or prevented from occurring. Examples of such obstructions include armed conflict, centralized control by undemocratic governments, lack of education, gender inequality, or severe economic and natural disasters that result in debilitating conditions such as mass hunger or health crises. Therefore, the ultimate goal for long-term capacity development lies in establishing the proper environment and stable context that can cultivate progress within a nation.

This definition also implies a bottom-up approach instead of a top-down one, so the development originates from the people without dependence

on external support in the long run, which results in a capacity that reflects the diversity of the groups in the community.

A distinction between capacity development and capacity building can be made, although the two terms are often used interchangeably. *Capacity development* implies the improvement of already-existing capacities, whereas *capacity building* is the creation of capacities that do not exist and is therefore sometimes called capacity creation.

### 5.2.1 Levels of capacity building

Capacity building cannot be considered in isolation due to its connectedness with other social and political factors, which is why development should be approached at various levels ranging from large institutions to the individual, as outlined below and shown in Figure 14.


**Individual.** This level includes the specific skills and knowledge that enable a person to perform their responsibilities effectively. This level also includes values and culture that affect an individual's performance and productivity.

**Organizational.** The organizational structure of people is what allows them to work most efficiently within an enabling environment.

**Institutional.** Institutional capacity is the framework within which the other two layers of capacity function. This level includes the system of government, but governance extends beyond public institutions of law and regulation to include social systems, norms, and anything else that may influence how communities organize to achieve their goals.

It should be noted that the three levels mentioned above are not independent of each other. The type of institutional capacity in existence will influence the way that organizations are formed and how they behave, which in turn will influence the individuals that perform within those organizations. This type of influence is not a single-direction relationship, however, because an educated and trained population will have the capacity to change organizations and institutions. But due to this interdependency, an educated and skilled population can be debilitated with low productivity if it exists within a system of weak institutions and governance.

Figure 14. Layers of capacity



Thus it becomes increasingly difficult to change the system in countries under totalitarian regimes with centralized control, and the capacity to self-organize and function within the system can be completely lost. Individual capacity development in this case is not effective, and a more systemic and strategic plan is necessary. An example of this ineffectiveness was experienced with projects in Iraq, where technical training was widely available and knowledgeable engineers existed, but the lack of a clear system for contractual arrangements made it extremely difficult for those technical capacities to be effective and productive.

### 5.2.2 Types of capacities

Capacity is most commonly thought of as technical skills and abilities, but the capacities needed for productivity extend beyond such abilities to include less tangible aspects that are still necessary. Therefore, capacities can generally be divided into two categories: hard and soft.

**Hard capacities.** Hard capacities are tangible and visible. Examples of this type of capacity are technical skills, explicit knowledge, laws, policies, systems, and strategies. At the organizational level, the capacity to function, structures, systems for management, planning, finance, and mobilizing resources are also hard capacities.

**Soft capacities.** Soft capacities are intangible and invisible social skills, and they can be divided into operational and adaptive capacities.

Operational capacities are more outwardly focused, and they refer to the abilities of individuals and organizations used in interactions, such as organizational culture, leadership, relational skills (negotiation, teamwork, conflict resolution, etc.), and intercultural communication. On the other hand, adaptive capacity is inwardly focused, and it refers to the ability to become self-aware by using abilities such as self-reflection, learning from experience, analyzing and adapting, and changing management.

### **5.2.3 Capacity building, core issues**

When considering the specific issues that capacity building entails, four core categories are found to be the most effective at influencing the layers of capacity (UNDP).

**Institution Building.** As mentioned before, this not only refers to government institutions, policies, and legal systems, but also to general values and unwritten codes of conduct that encourage cooperation and performance.

**Leadership and Government.** Leadership is not specific to an individual person in power, but a more general sense of leadership can exist amongst the population. The desire and willingness to make progress and change can be an individual or organizational effort, and that kind of initiative to encourage others to follow the same path is leadership. Examples of leadership beyond positions of authority are social and environmental movements.

**Education and Skills.** Knowledge and skills are the most direct capacities needed for a society to function. Although training and education are critical to changing a society's practices and habits, it can be very difficult to modify a society's existing way of doing things. However, investing in providing high-quality education has an excellent return on investment when provided to the younger generation. This investment in human capital results in higher levels of capacity development and economic growth that emerges from within the nation over the long term. This growth is not only due to technical knowledge or training, but also to a change in organizational culture and values. Education also does not refer only to practical skills for productivity and economic stability, but also it refers to the understanding of democratic principles that allow the population to become informed and engaged in the political process. This capacity is not limited to the individual level of knowledge, and knowledge

can exist at the organizational level and be learned through practice as well as through formal education systems.

**Accountability.** Accountability is the ability to hold parties responsible to deliver their obligations. Therefore, accountability ensures that public officials are fulfilling their duties in the positions they hold. Accountability is important because it allows organizations to monitor, learn, self-regulate, and adjust their behavior. Accountability is critical to ensuring protection against corruption in the public sector as well as transparency to ensure the government represents the needs and desires of the people. Efforts such as decentralization and local ownership make it easier for individuals to interact with their representative and with local governments. Such participatory democracy allows for a system of direct accountability to exist between people, and it forms the foundation for accountability at larger scales.

## **5.3 Importance of capacity building planning**

### **5.3.1 Importance for infrastructure**

Capacity building is sometimes seen as a secondary concern compared to more critical issues related to physical infrastructure; however, that vision is flawed because the two concerns are interdependent. Capacity building is important for maintaining reconstructed physical infrastructure as well as for preserving post-conflict security and peace. For example, past efforts in Iraq focused on physical infrastructure, with very little funding allocated to capacity building or facility maintenance training. This flawed allocation led to quick deterioration of facilities after they were transferred to Iraqi control. Therefore, capacity development should be incorporated into plans very early in the reconstruction process, because it is a gradual process that simply cannot be added later.

### **5.3.2 Traditional development methods**

After the Second World War, development greatly expanded but had little success to mention. Development was seen as a mechanistic process with linear, well-defined steps based on European and American experience. The Rational Analytic Model (McEvoy, Brady, and Munck 2016) assumes linearity and direct causal relationships, an approach that has led to unintended consequences due to the unaccounted-for complexities in systems. The approach that has been adopted by development

organizations to solve these previous failures has been to simply provide more funding, but only to be faced with additional failure. The reason for these failures is due to addressing problems based on donor assessments without local input, attention to context, or consideration of other factors that influence outcomes. It is easy to point out what is lacking, such as saying that an organization lacks planning skills or other vital skills, but such a lack is simply the consequence of a combination of other causes and factors. To attempt to solve the capacity issue with direct training or a planning system—without first understanding why the issues occur—would not address the root cause of the problem and therefore, would not solve anything.

Past experience shows that successful capacity building must be endogenous and must be fueled by local ownership and desire for capacity development, with external influence being site-specific and only playing a supportive role. Fragmented and supply-driven support efforts are not effective at meeting local needs and developing capacity as a whole. A more comprehensive approach must be implemented to address demands, and that approach must involve coordinating efforts with other parties, making contextual assessments of capacity, and implementing strategic development plans.

### **5.3.3 Lessons learned**

Oftentimes development plans can fail due to unexpected factors such as conditions on site or unpredictable responses from the population. The lessons learned from these cases are valuable when planning for a future mission. In the case of Iraq, reconstruction efforts happened in a climate of political unrest and security risks that led to many limitations and failures. The degree to which authority was centralized was underestimated, so much so that the removal of the dominating Ba'athist government led to the collapse of much of the country's systems. Without a strong rule of law and security system, unaddressed ethnic and sectarian conflicts emerged that had simply been repressed by the government, resulting in the security challenges that reconstruction faced.

It is a common misconception that nation building from a new start would be an effective and simple task, but transitions of existing governments and systems to new ones can take many years to stabilize. The sudden de-Ba'athification of the Iraqi government led to the complete collapse of government and the erosion of many functional and experienced units that

could have been useful. Instead, the Coalition Provisional Authority that was in charge at that time was faced with the daunting responsibility to establish a new system and train a new civil workforce. Combined with a lack of planning and coordination between agencies that were involved, the result was not the resilient and efficient system desired. This example shows that decisions were not evidence-based and were made with a lack of understanding of the nation's systems and society.

The developmental policies and practices in Iraq created unrealistic expectations and more challenges by giving the wrong impression of the role of the United States in reconstruction. The local population came to believe that the United States would rebuild their country, which is a very broad and impossible task. This belief also hindered the population's belief in the need for their engagement in reconstruction. The importance of local engagement cannot be emphasized enough.

#### **5.3.4 Army approach and interests**

There are many different approaches and theories of development that agencies follow to fulfill their goals within the unique contexts of their project areas. As a foreign entity, the U.S. Army should first and foremost focus on gaining the trust and cooperation of the indigenous people before adopting any approach. This focus influences the ways in which assessments are conducted, how information is communicated with the local population, and how development activities are conducted. The main purpose is to give a clear message that does not incite any kind of suspicion and that encourages cooperation.

### **5.4 Planning**

#### **5.4.1 Systematic approach to understanding capacity building**

Money is not an absolute problem solver, and it should not be generously used across the board with the assumption that all problems occur from a lack of funding. Political and social factors should be analyzed to determine which parties should be supported and what the implications of that support will be. Capacity building as an evidence-driven process is one that is data driven and free of bias and stereotyping, with the understanding that each community is different and has a unique set of needs. This understanding is easier said than done, as social and political



systems are extremely complex and perhaps impossible to model. Section 5.4.2.2 below elaborates on this challenge.

#### **5.4.2 Types of capacity building plans**

Context plays the most important role in determining the methods to be used in capacity building. Although this means that plans should not be rigid, it is necessary to classify two different approaches to development, based on the stability of the area.

##### *5.4.2.1 Short-term or transitional plans*

Fragile states that have been through conflict or periods of poor governance will have critical needs that should be prioritized over all other needs. The priority could be to secure the health and safety of the population, but it is also very important in order to foster longer term development goals and to insure stability. More deaths in conflict areas result from malnutrition and disease rather than from direct violence, so direct humanitarian aid becomes necessary. The objective of post-conflict aid should be to prevent mass casualties as well as to assist displaced persons to return to their home communities or to settle in new areas.

Conflict can be a constructive resource due to the population's desire for change and development after the conflict ends. This period of high morale immediately following times of instability is a window of opportunity, and it should be given the highest amount of attention. Early engagement for post-conflict areas is critical in order to avoid the eruption of new conflict. The population will expect a change in circumstances and the ability to participate in decision making and reconstruction. If this expectation is not met and basic needs are not satisfied, then frustration and resentment result and can lead to protest and violence. In cases of crisis, immediate material aid is necessary for survival, but early aid efforts should not be viewed as only material inputs, and inputs should not exceed needs as that could weaken existing economic and organizational capacities.

A stable transitional environment ensures the cooperation of the population and their readiness for change and development. People will not care about the state of their transportation or energy infrastructure if they are at the edge of survival without access to food, clean water, and health care. However, this type of aid must be short-term only, as there is

a risk of developing a dependency culture if the population is not engaged in development activities.

In order to avoid the risk of a dependency culture, every area suitable for local decision making and engagement should be pursued. This means focusing on the existing strengths of the population and giving them as much control as possible over any resource allocation that involves self-organization and growth instead of making them do simple labor while fulfilling their needs for them. The goal of any capacity development is to strengthen the host nation's ability to legitimately rule, offer adequate protection, provide essential services, and allow the population to flourish.

Security can be an urgent need, especially following counterinsurgency missions, and fragile states may not be able to provide that kind of protection. What remains of the existing infrastructure that sustains a nation can be an attractive target for enemies. The U.S. Army can, unilaterally or as part of a coalition, provide protection for critical infrastructure, reconstruction projects, and the population. However, training and preparation to hand this responsibility to local forces as soon as possible is essential to give the government legitimacy. The ability of the state to manage this responsibility increases the people's confidence in authorities, and it develops capacity that encourages independence.

The same principles of short-term development apply to infrastructure reconstruction projects. The focus should be on meeting the minimum requirements for essential infrastructure that will establish a basic level of service. Engagement of local competencies in these projects can be used as a form of training and development. As mentioned in "Lessons learned" (section 5.3.3), it is not reasonable for the population to expect the U.S. Army to rebuild their country, because that goal is a very long-term one and takes the cooperation of the entire population. An example of such a project is the rebuilding of the electrical production and distribution system for the city of Kabul, Afghanistan. While the ultimate goal would be to provide access to power for the whole population, it would be impossible to achieve that goal during the transitional period after a conflict. It is much more reasonable to focus on providing power to industrial zones as a first step in stimulating economic activity.

Planners should be aware of the immediate needs of a nation, and responsibilities should be allocated as part of a coordinated effort with

other parties. The U.S. Army is much more capable of providing reconstruction assistance of economic-related infrastructure, whereas humanitarian aid could be provided by other humanitarian organizations. This coordination of activities provides the best way to divide responsibilities according to capabilities and experience.

Short-term plans are definitely a tradeoff between long- and short-term goals, because in cases where the population does not have the ability to reconstruct or assist in reconstructing critical infrastructure, it becomes necessary for external sources to complete that work, but there is risk

associated with this action. However, this smaller period of training and engagement that is lost will ensure a more stable and cooperative society for other long-term plans.

#### 5.4.2.2 Long-term plans

There are many different methods and theories of development, with complex adaptive systems (CAS) being the newest and least familiar. It should be understood that CAS is not a universal solution, and it is not meant to replace existing methods and theories; instead it attempts to shed light onto other aspects of human systems and how they interact, thereby supplementing other methods during the planning period.

Nations and communities are extremely complex systems, whereby complex is defined as impossible to understand each component of the system or to predict its behavior. Complex systems can only be defined by characteristics such as adaptability, self-organization, and distributed control (decentralization). Agents within the system act and react to each other's behavior, creating feedback loops that result in unpredictable outcomes. The constantly changing conditions result in the emergence of

#### **Box 1**

Some examples of complex adaptive systems include the human body or the economy. If we look at either of these two systems, we can see that they are composed of a collection of individual components interacting with each other in a complex and chaotic way. This chaos is hidden by the overall trends and traits that emerge to hold the system together in a stable manner. As long as the proper conditions are preserved, then the system should be able to evolve sustainably.


endogenous organizational patterns. The unique property of emergence means the creation of certain traits that are attributed to the system as a whole but that do not exist in any of its individual components. An example of CAS can be found in Box 1 above.

CAS presents a new way of understanding society from a systems point of view. It is impossible to understand every causal chain in society, so targeted projects that aim for a very specific outcome can unexpectedly fail if other, more general factors are not taken into consideration.

CAS is more a perspective and way of thinking than a specific formula that can predict outcomes or optimize inputs. At the core of this perspective is the understanding that all people and behaviors function within a complex network of human systems which, if understood, can assist in understanding behavior at the different levels of capacity. How this perspective varies from traditional methods is that the focus is placed on how human systems actually work, compared to focusing on the predictable aspects of development without regard to the ever-changing and disorderly aspects of development.

Viewing a nation as a single system is much too simplistic, of course. Just as capacity interdependently exists within different layers, so do systems. Complex systems include the individual, family, neighborhoods, organizations, institutions, and countless other systems (Figure 15). All these complex systems are constantly interacting to form higher levels of complexity.

Figure 15 .Visualizing the interdependent types of complex systems.



From the information presented above, the required conditions for a CAS to function properly can be determined to be those shown below:

- **Ability to interact.** The elements of the system must be able to freely interact. This necessary interaction can be disrupted by overly centralized or tyrannical governments.
- **Capability to interact.** This condition means that the population is prepared and able to interact effectively. This interaction includes education and culture that encourages peaceful and productive connections in all aspects of life.
- **Balance of governance and regulation.** Laws must be simple enough to keep the system flexible and easy to navigate, while also preventing chaos. Regulations that are too rigid will force the system to behave in a specific way that may not be the most appropriate for the constantly changing contexts.
- **Diversity of elements.** Diversity brings about different perspectives and allows the system to be more resilient and able to be creative in finding solutions. This condition includes ethnicity and religion, as well as other forms of diversity. Freedom of speech and education also play

a large role in ensuring the development of different points of view within a peaceful environment.

- **Stability.** Stability is a very general term to use, but it refers to the specific enabling environment mentioned in section 5.4.3.

Given that the proper enabling environment and boundary conditions are provided without obstructions to the natural process of development, then the system should be able to develop, fail, learn, and grow on its own. At that point, external aid would only serve to assist and accelerate the achievement of local goals and aspirations.

### **5.4.3 Stability prerequisites for capacity building activities**

The prerequisites needed for a society to build upon and to develop its capacities refer to the enabling environment. The enabling environment describes the contextual factors needed for development to happen and succeed. This environment includes institutional, political, social, and economic factors in the country as well as the state of the surrounding nations and the country's relationship with them. These requirements are also capacities, and they approach maturity over time, but a minimum of each is required in order to form a foundation for development to begin. As discussed in the Political Reality chapter (Chapter 3), sequencing plays an important role in making sure that activities are completed at the right time to be most effective. Development activities are better off delayed if requirements such as security and rule of law have not already been met.

According to FM 3-07, the end-state conditions for a nation to be considered stable are outlined in Sections 5.4.3.5 and pictured in Figure 16. The descriptions below are brief summaries. A more in-depth discussion can be found in the *Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix* (U.S. Department of State 2005).

#### *5.4.3.1 Safe and secure environment*

A secure area with a well-established police force in order to protect investments and increase the cooperation of locals when there is a lower risk to their lives and livelihoods.

#### 5.4.3.2 Rule of law

“For the United Nations system, the rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.” (UN 2008, 1)

The rule of law establishes the boundaries and responsibilities of citizens and their relationship with the government. It is necessary to limit the power of government, preventing it from developing into authoritarianism, as well as protecting the rights of citizens, thereby maintaining peace and stability.

Rule of law establishes principles that limit the power of government by setting rules and procedures that prohibit the accumulation of autocratic or oligarchic power. It dictates government conduct according to prescribed and publicly recognized regulations while protecting the rights of all members of society. It also provides a vehicle to resolve disputes nonviolently and in a manner integral to establishing enduring peace and stability. In general terms, the rule of law exists when the following occur (FM 3-07: 3-100):

- The state monopolizes the use of force in resolving disputes.
- Individuals are secure in their persons and property.
- The state is bound by law and does not act arbitrarily.
- The law can be readily determined and is stable enough to allow individuals to plan their affairs.
- Individuals have meaningful and timely access to an effective and impartial legal system.
- The state protects human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- Individuals rely on existing legal institutions and the law during their daily lives.

In the post-conflict period, rule of law ensures preservation of security, which is necessary for humanitarian reconstruction activities and political reform. Rule of law does not mean simply stopping warring factions, but also it means developing a legitimate system that is able to conduct civilian policing, arresting, detaining, and trying offenders fairly according to the law. This accountable legal system would also include an open judicial

system, fair laws, humane corrections systems, and formal and informal mechanisms to resolve grievances arising from conflict.

#### *5.4.3.3 Stable governance*

Stable governance is in the form of democratically elected representation that works for the interest of the population. A stable system of government ensures trust in the legislative process and therefore, cooperation with the rule of law. In order to build resilience against authoritarian and centralized government control, local engagement in government is necessary—engagement that allows the population to control their own interests and to engage in making progress towards development and maintenance of a stable government. By having local forms of governments that can meet the demands of their constituents effectively, the legitimacy of the government increases. Centralized and national-scale governments may be out of touch with locals and their demands, which could lead to national polarization and the emergence of destabilizing divisions within society.

Other characteristics of a stable government include effective ministries and civil service personnel, free and responsible media, political diversity, accountability, and civic participation and empowerment.

#### *5.4.3.4 Sustainable economy*

Populations need to exist in a functional economy to be productive and able to develop their skills and other types of capacity. A sustainable economy and fulfilling work is just as important to peacekeeping as is fulfilling basic human needs. Engagement of locals, especially young people, to reduce unemployment is crucial to reducing the likelihood of recruitment to terror organizations or the development of gangs and militias.

The role of the U.S. Army is to build a sustainable foundation so the economy can thrive. This foundation includes physical infrastructure to support economic activity, economic policy to manage growth, and the presence of environmental and fiscal regulations. All of the foundation's underpinnings exist to support a sustainable market economy.



#### 5.4.3.5 Social well-being

Many needs of a nation after a conflict are tangible and detectable. But a nation also will carry many hidden scars that need to be addressed before the population can return to a functioning civilian life. Humanitarian needs extending beyond the physical needs of sustenance are necessary to help resettle displaced people and refugees as well as to address traumas and abuse experienced during the conflict. Long-term support programs are better established by local initiatives, but immediate external support is necessary to ensure all parts of society are incorporated in the reconstruction of that society.

The Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix that has been compiled by the U.S. DOS is an excellent tool for planners. It addresses the stability categories mentioned above (Sections 5.4.3.1–5.4.3.5) in more detail and provides detailed guidelines for each aspect of reconstruction.

Figure 16. End-state conditions for nations.



## 5.5 Methodology

Before going into the specific steps and procedures necessary, it is important to emphasize the following main principles upon which capacity building depends:

- Capacity building is a locally driven process, so local ownership is a critical prerequisite, and external donors' roles are limited to supporting local objectives.
- Existing capacities must be recognized and built upon, including appropriate assessments and cooperation with existing systems.
- Capacity building is demand driven, not supply driven like traditional development. This means that the local population knows what capacity they need and how they think it can best be developed within their culture and context.
- Nothing is certain. The nature of complex systems makes them difficult to predict. This inherent unpredictability means that planning and development should have a flexible and cyclical approach that embraces trial, error, and learning.

### 5.5.1 Initial communication with stakeholders

Establish a local understanding of the project's benefits to gain the support and commitment of the population. This sense of commitment is most strongly established when it is a product of the local population's effort through stakeholder engagement in planning, design, and implementation of the project. Stakeholders include anyone who has authority or is impacted by changes to a certain sector such as citizens, clients, government officials, lobbyists and interest groups, management, staff, experts and academics, and media representatives.

### Box 2

An example of economic hardship causing radicalization is the Nigerian organization Boko Haram, whose members were mainly unemployed youth who include high school and university graduates as well as children. "Surveys, interviews, and focus groups conducted in Nigeria in 2013 suggest that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures make or contribute to making young men vulnerable to radicalization." (Onuoha)

All these parties have some amount of interest or valuable information that should be taken into account during the planning phase. The importance of engaging all stakeholders is apparent due to the failure of management by exclusive elites in authoritarian regimes.

### **5.5.2 Contextual assessment**

The most critical part of pre-reconstruction planning is the development of an understanding of preexisting conditions on site. The goal of capacity building is not to impose a new system but to reform and correct existing behaviors and institutions through significant involvement from the indigenous people, who will eventually become independent. The ultimate goal of capacity building should be kept in mind, which is the creation of an independent society that can productively function within an organization and under the rule of law. Therefore, indigenous individuals should be encouraged to engage in rebuilding activities as much as possible in order to prevent any kind of dependency culture.

There is no single assessment that can be applied to all missions, but whatever method chosen should make sure to evaluate the status of required prerequisites, capacity levels, social, political and cultural context before any planning activity begins.

It is assumed that a certain level of security is achieved before attempting to implement any capacity building efforts in order to efficiently direct attention on more critical needs as well as to reduce waste and inefficiencies. Basic needs and infrastructure should also already be in place.

The types of assessments and the means in which they are conducted will vary drastically based on the site and context. Some areas may have statistical and historical data to refer to, whereas others may not have any at all, in which case much more fieldwork and direct assessment would be necessary.

Challenging culture is generally not recommended, as it can result in additional resistance and potentially conflict. Local traditions, norms, and religious practices should be understood and not overstepped. It can be easy to view certain oppressive practices as being a result of religion or tradition and try to immediately “liberate” or correct certain behaviors, but a better approach would be to view these practices as symptoms or results

of other factors in play. For example, developing communities often have high birthrates even when facing economic hardship. This may seem like a contradiction at first, but this practice is derived from agricultural communities where larger families are a source of labor and production, so a high birth rate is still observed in urban areas where children are made to work at an early age to support the family. At first glance, the impulse to solve a family's economic hardship may be to simply provide birth control or family planning education. However, this will not be effective if it does not solve the root cause, which is poverty. Parents will continue to reproduce if they have no other means to secure themselves in old age. An alternative solution would be to tackle poverty with better education and training, as well as social services for those in need.

### **5.5.3 Assessment methods and techniques**

- Existing tools such as:
  - Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)
  - USAID Organizational Capacity Assessment (OCA)
  - EuropeAid Toolkit for Capacity Development
  - EuropeAid Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development: Why, What, and How?
  - Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency: Analysis of Needs for Capacity Development
- Data mining through online sources and existing documents
- Surveys
- Interviewing groups and individuals
- Participatory research methods

#### *5.5.3.1 Cultural assessment*

Aspects of culture can change dramatically between countries or even between different groups of people within the same country. Different beliefs relating to ownership, social hierarchies, or justice can have a dramatic effect on the people's response to development efforts. For this reason, a thorough cultural assessment is necessary in order to adapt methods that will be compatible with local contexts and to achieve the highest level of effectiveness.

### *5.5.3.2 Cooperation and communication*

Understand local etiquette, traditions, and taboos to gain the cooperation of indigenous people and communicate effectively with them. The ability to make any impact also depends on the local desire for change. It would be impossible to achieve any success if faced with resistance from locals. Proper communication can, of course, change their perception and desires. Media and public relations can play a big role in this as is shown in the conflict resolution section below (5.5.3.5).

### *5.5.3.3 Social structures*

Understanding what the population values and how its society is structured is important in order to determine the distribution of resources and power. This is important in order to avoid reinforcing discriminatory systems by supplying funds that may empower a specific class that already has exclusive access to resources. The same applies to actions relating to gender and minority equality. Understanding social hierarchy also enables better communication with leaders of communities such as tribes.

### *5.5.3.4 Local conflicts and consensus*

A big part of challenges that arise when attempting to construct a nation with a unified people are the existing conflicts between tribes, ethnicities, classes, etc. The sources of these problems can be classified as either endogenous or exogenous. Endogenous sources emanate from within the nation due to diverse ethnic groups with strong identity and cultural, customary, and linguistic pride. There may be a history of distrust due to past conflicts, resource distributions, or issues relating to political power. The exogenous source of difficulty in consensus building is the colonial legacy or failed foreign intervention. Artificial regions, states, and borders that separate groups of people make it less likely for tolerance to develop and allow for differences to be accentuated. Addressing the root cause of conflicts will help reduce tensions between people, as well as foster consensus and cooperation. The influence of local cultural and religious authorities should be respected and used as an advantage to gain the trust and cooperation of the people. For example, continuing communications with important figures such as tribe leaders and religious figures will help to develop treaties and influence the population.

The importance of understanding the context of local conflicts also relates to different models of government. For example, although decentralization and localization of government has many benefits, it can be catastrophic if applied to an area that is politically fragmented by ethnic and sectarian rivalries. This was very evident in the case of Iraq, where the removal of the centralized Ba'athist government made it possible for the different factions of Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis, and others to compete for dominance instead of cooperating to stabilize the country. This situation only led to more complications and development of more armed militias and entities such as IS (Islamic State).

#### 5.5.3.5 *Conflict transformation*

Long-existing societal conflicts can pose a huge challenge to development, because these conflicts are often a distraction from other issues that need attention. The term conflict transformation not only refers to peacebuilding and conflict resolution, but also to the conversion of conflict energy into more positive processes related to reconstruction and change. FM 3-07 (2008, 1-6) discusses this topic and defines conflict transformation as follows:

...the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations.

The first part of this method would have to be understanding the root causes of conflict through participatory research methods, conflict mapping, and a study of the history of local or national conflict. By pointing out the reasons for conflict through these assessments, planning efforts will focus on primary reasons for conflict origins instead of simply trying to stop conflict activities. External military operations may be needed to halt violent activities, deliver essential services, and institute an acceptable political framework according to a peace accord.

A main part of this initiative would also require the development of new outlets for competitive energy and for disagreements on topics such as economic prosperity. Economic development can ease tensions related to resource distribution and can also serve as a medium for peaceful competition. Trust in the rule of law and effective government would need to be established, along with resilient systems able to fulfill the needs of the population and to deliver justice and order. Peace is then able to be

sustained when the drivers of conflict have been reduced to such a degree that remaining conflict can be managed by local institutions.

#### *5.5.3.6 Media*

It is no longer possible to exclude the influence of technology and social media from analyses related to conflict, peacebuilding, and development. Today's technology allows for a vast amount of information exchange, and that exchange could be a cause for political action or conflict. This exchange could be seen as a source of power and an opportunity to reach the population on a large scale in order to gain credibility, strengthen legitimacy, and discredit hostile opposition through propaganda that reinforces the value of peace and the achievements of reconstruction. By publicizing the assistance that the United States provides to nations, it would also encourage local participation and reduce their suspicion and resistance. Although a much more difficult goal to achieve, an analysis of the massive amount of raw data from social media could utilize modern data science to help understand the public's opinions and desires for development.

#### *5.5.3.7 Culture-based practices*

The concept of "path dependency" (continuation of a certain practice due to cultural beliefs even when a better alternative is available) indicates a resistance to change despite understanding a need to change. One common example is the education of women. Many communities understand the value that education can bring them, but they continue to prohibit girls from getting an education due to tradition or taboo. This issue can be found all around the world due to the power that culture has on the behavior and thinking of people. Although it may be frustrating to deal with path dependency, change in culture-based behavior is difficult to achieve. Implementing culture change, while at times is necessary, is also dangerous and saddled with ethical baggage. In cases where deeply rooted cultural beliefs and practices pose direct obstacles to capacity building success, qualified professionals such as applied sociocultural anthropologists should be consulted.

### **5.5.4 Assessment of existing capacities**

Questions to consider in assessing existing capacities are listed below and then their understanding is expanded in the paragraph that follows.

- What definition of capacity is being used?
- Is there a large local demand for a specific sector or capacity?
- Have all levels of capacity been assessed?

A “zoom in and zoom out” approach should be adopted to ensure that an issue is being considered at the higher organizational level, as well as at the individual level. An example of this approach is education. Zooming out includes the assessment of education policy at the national or provincial level, whereas zooming in is looking at the state of local schools and teachers.

- Assess all types of capacity, hard and soft.
- How are these capacities distributed geographically and socially?
- Do certain areas receive more funding or attention?
- How does gender play a role in capacity differences between gender identities?

All levels of capacity must be kept in mind. In some cases, certain capacities at the individual level are much more developed but become limited by the flaws at the organizational or institutional level.

### **5.5.5 Change readiness**

Some questions to assess whether the population is willing to cooperate and accept change are listed below:

- Do the right conditions and resources exist to support change? Such conditions include organizational management tools, staffing and trained personnel, and available financing.
- Do the people have the attitude and desire for change?
- What is the level of demand for change, and is that demand large enough to overcome the status quo? How willing are the people to cooperate with foreign parties?
- Do the people have a clear vision for the change they desire? What is this vision, and does it agree with the goals of the stakeholders?



## 5.5.6 Planning

### 5.5.6.1 Basic principles

- Capacity building is an endogenous and local process based on the demand of the local people and on methods compatible with local culture and ways.
- Development begins from existing capacities.
- There is no absolute goal for capacity building. Goals should be defined (such as pre-conflict levels), and measurable indicators should be determined in order to measure progress.
- Public cooperation, consensus, and perception of the intervening parties is very important. Projects with a quick and immediate effect on the population are likely to garner more support from the public. Therefore, a combination of short- and long-term projects should be implemented.
- The effectiveness of the response will increase if it combines actions across core issues with levels of capacity based on the local situation.

### 5.5.6.2 Type of capacities in need of development

- Define the specific capacities in need of development.

### 5.5.6.3 Target groups and stakeholders

- Identify the involved parties:
  - Working with stakeholders allows for the development of commitment and investment, instead of dependence on foreign entities for the service. This is where the value of Local Ownership becomes apparent. Stakeholders include those in positions of

power, decision makers, beneficiaries, and all participants, partners, and allies.

- Develop an understanding of the stakeholders' interests and abilities:
  - What is each party's interest in this matter? What influences its interest?
  - Who has the power to make changes? Who understands the power dynamics?
  - What kind of conflicts of interest between parties or resistance from people is expected?
  - What is the best way to communicate with each party?
  - What is the relationship between the stakeholders, and how much are they willing to cooperate?

#### *5.5.6.4 Garnering support and changing opinions*

- Develop a clear and easy-to-understand message for the goals of the project.
- Deliver the message through media, lobbying, advertising, public figures, or spokespersons.

#### *5.5.6.5 Final goals that are sustainable and functional*

- Define the desired outcomes and goals of the project and the desired change in capacity. Is the goal pre-war capacity levels or beyond?

## **5.6 Summary**

Capacity building is an extremely important asset for a society, so it is an important aspect of the reconstruction success. Capacity building has not been given the proper attention it needs in post-conflict environments, so a proper understanding of context in these environments is critical to derive a plan that can address issues with evidence-based development. This guide presents methods to encourage local population participation, and it addresses cultural challenges, conflict transformation, and other issues faced when planning for the short and long terms. A new way of viewing nations as complex systems and how that influences development in an untraditional manner was also discussed. Capacity development is critical for successful reconstruction and peacekeeping in a society, and there is no single way to achieve this goal. Planners should use this information in combination with a large collection of methods and personal experience in order to customize actions for each specific case.

## **6 Conclusion**

The pre-reconstruction phase is critically important to the success of any reconstruction effort. This report presented three foundational dimensions that contribute to creating a post-conflict or post-disaster environment that will foster success: political reality awareness, cultural property protection, and capacity building. This work also presented a methodology that quantitatively assesses the specific elements that contribute to the success or failure of a planned effort.

### **6.1 Political reality**

An in-depth understanding of political reality is necessary to ensure a stable environment so that reconstruction operations can proceed without unpredicted obstacles. Past reconstruction projects have suffered from the host nation's dysfunctional leadership, impotent and corrupt administration, widespread poverty, and significant ethnic, religious, and/or tribal divisions. The lessons learned from these experiences should be incorporated into U.S. military policies and procedures for future pre-reconstruction planning. In addition, sequencing of actions and agency coordination are extremely important to ensure a stable, safe, and supportive environment for the success of reconstruction operations.

### **6.2 Cultural property protection**

Providing cultural property protection (CPP) preserves the identity of the host population so that it survives beyond the conflict or disaster. CPP protection also preserves the faith of the population in the United States, and it protects economically valuable objects that can benefit the nation after the period of instability. In addition to the mission benefits of CPP, U.S. military personnel are obligated under international treaties during times of war to protect cultural property that is under their jurisdiction or authority, including occupied territory. Failure to do so may constitute a war crime.

In peace time, CPP is the responsibility of the host nation's government. A U.S. military regulation instructs commanders who are in country to yield all decision making and authority to that local government. However, the host nation's government may not be fully functioning after a conflict or natural disaster, so reconstruction missions involving the U.S. military

may fall into a gray area between wartime military occupation and peacetime standard operating procedures.

Reconstruction efforts at CPP sites pose a unique set of problems including the potential need for special material types, construction techniques, documentation requirements, and decision-making processes. Preplanning for reconstruction missions that involve CPP is critical to ensure that poor (and perhaps illegal) decisions are not made in the field due to ignorance or a lack of immediate options. This report also provides information to assist in the preplanning effort that precedes reconstruction.

### **6.3 Capacity building**

With the objective of reconstruction being eventual independence and reestablishment of stable normalcy for a population, capacity building requires investment in human capital to allow the population to recover and not to develop long-term dependency on outside parties. Capacity building should not be limited to narrow goals such as workforce training, but it should also build capacities at different levels of institutions and social systems as well as building hard and soft capacities. Capacity building should be demand driven, meaning it should be based on what a population knows it needs but lacks the support or resources to achieve those needs. Planners should prioritize humanitarian aid in the short term, but also develop plans for long-term capacity building. Existing capacities must be recognized and built upon instead of attempting to reconstruct them by imposing new or foreign practices. Thus, the local culture and context will define compatible forms of capacity.

### **6.4 Recommendations**

Planners should also be aware of the complex nature of societies and the potential unintended consequences of intervention actions. They should therefore not operate based on assumptions; instead, empirical observations and assessments should be a regular part of the process. Failure will inevitably be encountered at some stages, but the ability to learn and adapt will prove valuable in constantly changing post-conflict and post-disaster settings.

Information provided in this report can be adapted to apply to different contexts as well as to supplement existing protocols such as the Engineer

Site Identification for the Tactical Environment (ENSITE). Future endeavors to expand this information could include analyzing the roles of information technology, including internet accessibility and social media, in affecting reconstruction efforts and communication with host populations.

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# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

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<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> February 2019		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Final		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b>	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Pre-Reconstruction Planning				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b> T45	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Ghassan Al-Chaar, Carey L. Baxter, Ammar H. Elmajdoub, Kevin Cupka-Head, and George C. Calfas				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b> P2 455009	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL) PO Box 9005 Champaign, IL 61826-9005				<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b> ERDC/CERL TR-19-5	
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 103 Army Pentagon Washington, DC 20314-1000				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b> ASA(ALT)	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> <p>The period of reconstruction following an armed civilian conflict, military operation, or natural disaster is a critical window of opportunity to bring stability and normalcy to a region. Stability not only depends on resilient infrastructure, but also on reliable political systems, a national identity, and an able population to sustain the economy and system of governance. This report provides a guide to assist in planning the preliminary phases of reconstruction—pre-reconstruction. The pre-reconstruction phase is critically important to the success of any reconstruction effort. This report presents three foundational dimensions that contribute to creating and fostering a successful post-conflict or post-disaster environment: political reality awareness, cultural property protection, and capacity building. This work also presents a methodology that quantitatively assesses the specific elements that contribute to the success or failure of a planned reconstruction effort. Information provided in this report can be adapted to apply to different contexts (e.g., civilian, military) as well as to supplement existing military planning tools such as the Engineer Site Identification for the Tactical Environment (ENSITE).</p>					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Postwar reconstruction, Military planning, United States--Armed Forces--Stability operations, Engineer Site Identification for the Tactical Environment (ENSITE)					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>  UU	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>  130	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b>